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Abstract
This study explores the role of municipal governance in municipal-level
stabilization of inner suburbs in St. Louis County, Missouri. The data, from 1970 to 2015,
include a robust collection of official government archives collected from five
municipalities in St. Louis County, historical documents, city-state-national statistical data,
and related materials. Interviews of 25 stakeholders were conducted and data were
analyzed based on the community power structure framework.
I outline five mature St. Louis inner suburbs’ evolution in municipal-level
conditions from 1970 to 2015, and I detail the role each suburbs’ municipal governance
played in the evolution of municipal-level conditions. I conclude, the role of municipal
governance in municipal-level stabilization is to affect impacts of housing discrimination,
neighborhood blight, and fiscal stress through policy, administrative action, programs, and
practices. I find two distinct philosophies of municipal governance: open housing and
exclusion. I conclude the role of exclusion is more significant in municipal-level decline
than open housing is in municipal-level stabilization.
Much of what has been written about neighborhood stabilization espouses a
common theme of preemptive action to prevent decline. For many mature inner suburbs,
preemption is no longer an option as decline has long been realized. I offer
recommendations for future research and projects designed to produce economic,
structural, and civically vibrant neighborhoods by equipping officials and community
stakeholders with refined strategic planning tools to leverage existing resources, build
capacity, and employ revitalization methods in more effective and sustainable ways.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
On August 9, 2014, the fatal police shooting of unarmed Michael Brown, Jr.
focused the world’s attention on Ferguson, Missouri, a mature inner suburb of St. Louis.
Scholars argue Ferguson represented a microcosm of area cities that exhibit extreme levels
of segregation and concentrated poverty. Some attest the events of Ferguson could have
occurred in any number of other St. Louis municipalities as they lack the capacity to
address destabilizing activities, experience fiscal collapse, and revert to taxation by citation
measures to remedy financial strain.
My examination of five St. Louis inner suburbs reveals Ferguson possessed unique
municipal governance characteristics which created an exceptionally volatile environment.
I observed successful municipal-level stabilization through proactive planning, policy
adoption, and consistent tools refinement in University City and Hazelwood. In Jennings,
I found proactive action and open housing were ineffective absent adequate administrative
management. Maplewood exhibited nonracial associated municipal-level destabilization,
leveraged many of the same tools utilized in the north county cases, and experienced a
renaissance.
Municipal-level stabilization and decline denote conditions ranging from
economically and racially stable to fiscally stressed and racially homogenous. Conditions
are influenced by a combination of institutional, spatial, structural, and socioeconomic
factors working in relation. Municipal-level stabilization is rooted in a city’s capacity to
stabilize its neighborhoods.
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 made housing discrimination illegal, and blacks
began exiting the big city in pursuit of suburban living. Dramatic shifts in suburban
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demographics and fiscal health in the post-fair housing 1970s to 1990s posed new questions
and introduced new neighborhood destabilizing activities to inner suburbs. Black inmigration, white flight, and loss of tax base were big city problems up to that point.
University City, MO experienced these phenomena in the 1960s and had some success
stabilizing neighborhoods by employing several antidiscrimination policies and supporting
citizens’ efforts.
Open housing, minimum housing codes, and residential services were pioneering
approaches, and the municipality was lauded for adopting the tools. Other St. Louis inner
suburbs followed suit demonstrating timely use of measures and instituting policies prior
to any noteworthy change in neighborhoods’ racial composition. Some municipalities went
so far as to expand and redefine their city’s objectives and philosophies, modify planning
and zoning patterns, and form new community and human relations committees in
anticipation of change.
Inner suburbs who rejected or delayed the use of neighborhood stabilization tools
were no longer able to levy some of the more familiar neighborhood preservation methods.
Some officials opted to expand and reinforce exclusionary policies such as zoning for
large-lot single-family homes, and existing residents levied various deterrence methods to
prevent the entry of blacks into certain areas of the community. As deterrence measures
gave way to supply and demand, blockbusting, and racial steering, the influx of blacks into
these areas soon rivaled and in some suburbs exceeded numbers in open housing
municipalities.
A notable influx of blacks, whether in an open housing or exclusion suburb, resulted
in public and private housing practices which fashioned resegregated areas plagued by
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HUD foreclosures, vacant homes and lots, low-cost rentals, and subsidized housing. Some
municipalities were able to combat these trends and stabilize. Others resegregated,
experienced severe fiscal stress, and struggled to provide basic city services to residents.
Whether through an array of evolutions, varying levels of professionalism, or policy
precedence, changing neighborhoods revealed municipal governments’ unique foresight,
lack of capacity, or abundance of disdain.
Purpose of Study and Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to illuminate contributing factors impacting municipallevel conditions which are unique to municipal governance to better understand municipal
governance effects on racial composition and economic conditions in mature inner suburbs.
I plan to utilize my findings to develop and disseminate tools designed to strengthen
neighborhood revitalization and stabilization efforts by utilizing refined strategic planning
tools to leverage existing resources, build capacity, and pursue objectives in more effective
and sustainable ways.
This dissertation seeks to answer a central question: What is the role of municipal
governance in stabilizing inner suburbs? To answer this question, I must answer two
refining questions: What are the contributing factors influencing inner suburbs’ success
and failure in achieving and maintaining municipal-level stabilization? And what factors
outside of municipal governance authority impact municipal-level stabilization? These
questions are answered through a qualitative examination of policy decisions,
administrative actions, and related functions.
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Significance of the Study
By 1970, fair housing laws prohibited discrimination in the sale, rental, and
financing of housing based on race. Laws invalidated explicit discrimination, but less overt
discriminatory practices like racial residential steering, redline mortgage lending, and
blockbusting persisted. Policy changes were followed by racial integration in some inner
suburbs. While some municipalities boasted notable levels of black-white populations,
others transitioned to nearly all black. There is robust literature detailing black
suburbanization, housing, economics, and the racial implications associated with the era.1
During the black suburbanization period, many inner suburbs’ government faced
similar challenges that had plagued central cities for decades. Neighboring suburbs and
more secluded exurban locales poached residents and commercial businesses. Housing
crises and declining revenues increased costs for delivering services to citizens. Schools
resegregated and began to struggle. As poverty and isolation increased, so did crime.
Federal programs funded large initiatives, cities adopted creative taxing and financing
methods to fund developments, and municipalities revised policies and zoning ordinances
in attempts to remain competitive.
As blacks resettled, residential patterns exhibited in big cities emerged in inner
suburbs. Blacks were steered to the least desirable neighborhoods regardless of economic
means. This led to residential resegregation. Government action reinforced private
discrimination as subsidized housing and mortgage loan programs targeted these
neighborhoods. The disproportionate placement of the poor and discriminatory mortgage
lending, many ending in foreclosures, concentrated poverty in these neighborhoods.

1

See, Leven et al. 1976; Downs 1981; Galster 1990; 1991; Schneider and Phelan 1993; Sugrue 1996; Massey
2001; Johnson 2002; and Logan 2014.
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Neighborhoods began to experience significant decline as they were isolated from
economic opportunities and challenges compounded over time.2
Some municipalities experienced success in dealing with these issues while others
did not. Characteristics of successful stabilization efforts include proactive policy action,
community involvement, high level of membership and participation, progressive and
inclusive beliefs and attitudes, and financial support. Factors that played a significant role
in failed efforts include lack of capacity, delayed initiatives as demonstrated by slow
response to rapid racial changes, and advanced level of municipal decline exhibited in
deteriorated buildings. By the time attempts to stabilize were made, efforts were rendered
useless as the damage of housing discrimination, public housing concentration, and school
segregation had already occurred.
Political, institutional, and organizational structures were important contributing
factors to determining municipal governments’ timing, type, and level of action and
involvement. These structures, working in relation with size, resource richness, and fiscal
policies, guided decision making along well-defined philosophical views. These elements
determined policy patterns, administrative prowess, and financial management practices.
Consequentially, stabilization and decline were largely dependent upon these interrelated
dynamics as they determined suburbs’ capacity and willingness to respond to threats and
opportunities.
Adoption of open housing policies and supportive measures did not necessarily
result in effective stabilization. Fiscal incapacity could render an otherwise effective
municipal-level stabilization agenda ineffective. According to scholar Rebecca Hendrick

2

Massey and Denton 1989; 1993.
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(2011), fiscal capacity, both internal and external, is one of the most important factors
affecting municipal governance. Internal fiscal capacity consists of fiscal structure, prior
policy decisions, revenues, revenue wealth (level of revenue a government can generate),
and spending needs and obligations.3
External fiscal capacity includes state-level institutional rules that limit or enhance
access to different revenue sources, and the level of financial aid received from state
government. While Hendrick’s 2011 study focused on Chicago municipalities, the
researcher stresses the importance of examining cities’ municipal governments and the
state in which cities are located. Hendrick goes on to layout a model for measuring a city’s
fiscal capacity as conditions resulting from the governing body’s financial decision-making
patterns. As such, fiscal capacity is viewed as problem solving in the context of strategic
management.4
Fiscal capacity impacts municipalities’ professional standards, policies, practices,
and their ability to manage fiscal stress. Officials’ and administrators’ professionalism and
specializations are primary factors affecting how cities solve financial problems, avert risk,
and approach entrepreneurialism. It is important to understand that good fiscal capacity
(defined generally as high revenue wealth and low spending needs) does not always protect
local governments from crisis and poor financial conditions. Conversely, low fiscal
capacity does not necessarily result from a crisis.5

3

See Hendrick 2011. Note: I apply Hendrick’s theory that financial conditions are a culmination of financial
policies and practices. The researcher outlines specific areas in which to develop measurements for
establishing fiscal strength of municipalities which helps to explain municipal officials’ response to events.
Since level of professionalism affects these elements, I examine not only the financial decisions of municipal
governance in the context of institutional structure and socioeconomic philosophy, but I take care to
consider how the level of professionalism may interact with philosophy.
4
Ibid
5
Ibid
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The effects of capacity, governance, and other micro level factors on municipal
financial decisions are determined by how governments with different features respond to
threats and opportunities, especially ones with financial impact. Consider St. Louis
County’s decisions in shaping patterns of residential land use. Zoning authority rested in
the hands of individual municipal governments and the county. With no mechanism in
place to incentivize local officials to consider regional economic development and
infrastructure needs, land use decisions focused on maximizing local tax revenues. As a
result, large-lot single-family enclaves formed.6
Eventually, the lack of attention to larger metropolitan-level deficiencies garnered
increased stress for local governments. Municipalities were forced to compete for new
developments. Aggressive tactics were employed to attract new commercial developments
and increase economic activity. This often resulted in one suburb luring a business away
from a neighboring suburb. Similar processes occurred when suburbs developed further
west. These fresher, more exclusively zoned exurbs began poaching residents and
resources from the older municipalities. Eventually, the conditions that made local
revenues so scarce and local services so expensive in the metro city spilled over into the
suburbs.7
Specific reasons for past crises vary tremendously, but there was one obvious
similarity. Most mature inner suburbs struggled with economic deficits which made it
difficult to cover spending demands. Their local economies did not provide sufficient
wealth for them to draw enough revenues to maintain high-level quality services to citizens

6

For an exhaustive examination of how governments brought on their own problems through exclusionary
zoning policies, restrictive housing measures with little forethought for the health of the region, see Gordon
2008.
7
Ibid
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and property owners. Inner suburbs’ situations became progressively worse as
economically stable taxpayers continued exiting, residents were becoming increasingly
poorer, and destabilizing neighborhoods required even more city spending and resources
to service.
Conditions increased the tax burden on remaining taxpayers to fund basic city
services. Well-run, professionally staffed municipal governments were not immune to
these phenomena. Fiscal stress also severely compromised their ability to provide quality
services. Some governments were not fiscally sustainable in the long run, while others had
significant challenges managing their short-term financial situation. Cash shortages, which
were less likely to be publicized, contributed to numerous inner suburbs’ descent into
financial crisis.8
While this is a familiar story, often referred to as neighborhood decline in older
central cities and suburban decline in older inner-ring suburbs, municipal-level
stabilization has not been fully explored. Suburban decline theory posits the patterns of
racial resegregation, isolation, and inequities observed in inner suburbs are a reproduction
of those previously observed in metrocentric cities. Scholars point out metro centers
usually possess enough assets to fend off threats of municipal-level destabilization and
decline, while smaller, less asset rich inner suburbs are more vulnerable to decline as a
result of destabilizing activities.9

8

For good insight into fiscal stress causing decisions and impacts of fiscal stress on municipal governances’
ability to deliver services see, Duany, Plater-Zyberk and Speck 2000; Delisle 2010; and Hendrick 2011.
9
Resegregation in neighborhoods traditionally attributed to “tipping.” For more about tipping models, see
Schelling 1969; 1971; and Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2006; 2008. See also, Orfield and Luce 2013. See Lake
1981 for an early examination of suburban resegregation following the patterns exhibited in cities
previously.
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As more is learned about suburban decline, however, important discoveries emerge
which challenge the notion that suburban decline was an inevitable phenomenon for illprepared, ill-equipped, fiscally strapped inner suburbs experiencing significant black inmigration. I agree with the position that policy and program defenses against housing
discrimination, neighborhood blight, and fiscal stress improved suburbs’ stabilization
forces. However, stabilization depended a great deal on factors outside of local
governments’ authority.
Municipal governance which asserts concerted efforts to avoid, deter, and isolate
are much more effective at destabilizing neighborhoods independent of support.
Resegregation in and of itself does not cause suburban decline. There are middle-class
black suburbs with median family incomes greater than the national average. Furthermore,
areas of concentrated poor people are not inevitably doomed to resegregate, descend into
crime and mayhem, or require aggressive policing to manage.10
There are scores of poorer areas that are integrated, racially stable places that have
managed to remain stable for significant periods of time. Although policing tends to be
heavier handed in these areas when compared to whiter, higher-income areas, policecommunity relations are usually better, and tensions are not as high as observed in
Ferguson. It follows that racial tipping, concentrated areas of poor people, and fiscal stress
fail to sufficiently account for suburban decline. My examination exposes this critical
shortcoming by demonstrating, principally, that just as municipal-level stabilization takes
work to achieve, sometimes decline does as well.11

10

For more about the varying income levels seen in municipalities with high numbers of black residents,
see Johnson 2002; and Logan 2014.
11
Cortright 2018.
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Research Paradigm
The community power structure framework serves as the research paradigm for this
dissertation. Power is simply the capacity to bring about change, and a study of the role of
municipal governance requires an understanding that policy decisions and subsequent
outcomes do not necessarily have a causal relationship. There are multiple factors at play
when considering municipal conditions and the role municipal governance occupies in
prevention, management, and exacerbation of conditions. Nevertheless, research has
demonstrated that policy decisions impact communities in various ways. Community
power structure provides a framework in which to analyze key policy choices, identify who
influenced and made those choices, and what those choices mean for the community.12
Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. You have reached the end of chapter
one where I provide an overview of the research and outline my rationale for conducting
this study. Chapter two is background of the literature on neighborhood stabilization, racial
integration maintenance, and suburban decline. Chapter three is the methods and data used
in the research. Chapter four begins the findings sections of the dissertation with municipal
governance in St. Louis County. Chapters five, six, and seven present findings in housing
policy, land use policy, and fiscal policy, respectively. Chapter 8 is conclusions where I
provide a summation of my findings and offer recommendations for future research.

12

My examination and analysis leverage critiques of political power, community power structures, and
spatial inequalities. See Neumann 1950; Hunter 1969; Kraus 2000; Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom 2001;
and Hayward and Lukes 2008.
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Chapter 2. Background
This chapter is a summation of literature and principal theories regarding
neighborhood stabilization, racial integration maintenance, and suburban decline in mature
inner suburbs. Through this literature review, I layout contextual information relevant to
my examination of inner suburbs’ municipal governance to better understand what is
known, what gaps exist, identify why it is important to address these gaps, develop my
research questions, and construct a plan for answering my research questions.
Contextual Factors
According to the literature, there are mature inner-ring suburbs that achieved
stabilization and remain stable. Multiple studies have identified the contributing factors to
achieving and maintaining municipal-level stabilization. Research points to various
strategies including early implementation of antidiscrimination housing policies, racial
integration maintenance programs, civilian boards, and police-community relations
programs as effective stabilization tools. Reports detail efforts of inner-ring suburbs that
defy odds by demonstrating racial balance, mixed housing stock, and diverse commercial
businesses and industry.13
Scholars highlight a specific set of factors that need to be present for stabilization
to be sustained over a significant period of time: 1. Human capital (talented, inclusive,
committed); 2. Preemptive action (efforts begin prior to tipping occurring); 3.
Environmental capital (mixed housing stock, institutional involvement, regional efforts);
4. Political support and influence; and 5. Adequate funding. As much as these elements

13

Saltman 1990; Kirwin 1999; and Pitkin 2001 presents a helpful synthesis of neighborhood change theories
which outlines the three major schools of theoretical understandings of neighborhood change– ecological,
subcultural, and political economy.
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need to be present for successful stabilization, according to the literature, there are factors
that are outside of the authority of municipal governance that are just as important to
stabilization.14
Of the factors impacting stabilization, over which municipal governance enjoys no
authority, the most notable are: 1. Sprawl and regional development, 2. Architectural and
locational features, and 3. Residential choice. Findings also suggest various factors
determining inner suburbs’ preexisting conditions such as jurisdictional boundaries,
political polarization, and school district battles play a significant role in municipal-level
stabilization. These factors present challenges for municipal governance as they can have
significant impact on conditions, yet local governance often has little say in the matter.15
Suburban Sprawl and Neighborhood Designs
In weakening housing demand through inflated housing production, sprawl and
poor community design receive blame from some scholars for the decline of older innerring suburban municipalities. Researchers use examples of failed expansions into
undeveloped terrains to demonstrate their points. Anti-sprawl proponents contend that
newly developed exurbs attract middle-class residents away from the inner and middle
rings leaving poorer suburban residents behind. They contend, developing outlying areas
are usually unjustified as population stagnation does not call for additional housing, and
developments are usually for whites attempting to locate further away from communities
in transition.16

14

Ahlbrandt & Cunningham 1978; Orfield 1981; Lee 1985; Keating, Pammer and Smith 1988; Saltman 1990;
Nyden, Maly and Lukehart 1997; Ferman, Singleton and DeMarco 1998; Kirwin 1999; and Cashin 2004.
15
Berkovec et al. 1996; Gordon 2008; Rothstein 2014; Bruegmann 2005.
16
Duany, Plater-Zyberk and Speck 2000; Madden 2003; Gallagher 2013; Orfield and Luce 2013.
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Some researchers focus on periods of housing shortage crises that spur policy
decisions which result in adverse outcomes; actions which result in relocating poor blacks
from concentrated poverty in central cities to inner-ring poverty concentrations. Since
some zoning patterns in inner suburbs resembled metro city zoning which contained more
mixed use, more multifamily districts, and smaller single-family lot sizes, this process
repeated itself time and time again in some areas. Therefore, the patterns of residential
segregation and economic decline could not be attributed entirely to sprawl.17
Architectural and Locational
Architectural and locational features can make a home or neighborhood obsolete.
Age of a neighborhood’s housing stock and the neighborhood’s location in relation to the
metrocentric city’s commercial corridor may threaten the viability of any neighborhood
because it affects decisions to invest in property as well as decisions to move. Studies have
demonstrated that a neighborhood’s proximity to other neighborhoods also matter.18
Municipal decisions can influence the architectural identity of a neighborhood.
However, a municipality’s location cannot be changed. While it is true that some
neighborhoods, as they age and face competition from outlying areas do seem to sink in
socioeconomic status, this is by no means inevitable. As Bruegmann (2005) points out,
even a cursory glance at the location of many of the most affluent suburbs will confirm that
many of these communities today are the same ones that held this distinction in the 1920s
or even the 1880s.19
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When comparing the differences in municipalities’ success in stabilizing their
respective communities, scholars often point to the differences in their housing stocks.
Housing in some areas include many row homes, and the density of populations are
considerably greater than in areas’ zoned for large lot housing. Housing stock proves to be
a significant impactor of a community’s ability to stabilize. However, this does not
necessarily determine the success or failure of efforts. Many factors contribute to
conditions, and one must be wary of focusing inordinately on just one.20
Residential Choice
Some studies have attributed residential choice to influencing municipal-level
conditions and point to limitations of municipal governance’s control in such cases.
According to Keating and Smith (1996), residential choice is most influenced by
socioeconomic factors such as race, ethnicity, income, and age. As new inhabitants enter
the city seeking employment, the inner zone pushes into the next outer ring. This process
is referred to as invasion. Invasion continues until, eventually, the new inhabitants take
over the physical space of that zone. It is at this point that succession is achieved. This
process is presumed to be ongoing as long as migration and economic growth continue and
areas for different income groups are designated.21
In compliment to the income argument, status seeking based on socioeconomic
hierarchies has also been put forward. This theory suggests that people atop the income
and social order elect to reside in areas comprised of people with similar status. In other
words, high-income families prefer to live among other high-income families. Some
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scholars challenge these findings, arguing socioeconomic differences account for only a
small percentage of black-white segregation.22
Tests show income, occupation, or education level as weak predictors of racial
segregation. Some analysts argue that racial residential segregation is most attributable to
white families preferring to reside in neighborhoods where the presence of black residents
is low. From an institutional standpoint, residential choice theory presents additional
challenges for municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization efforts and must be
considered when strategic planning.23
Institutional Factors
Some stable areas were challenged by declining surrounding areas, and the
outmigration of middle-class blacks to the suburbs had negative effects on the economic
conditions of the inner-city poor left behind. Regardless of the neighborhood capital and
integration groups’ efforts, as the literature indicates, these areas may be in serious trouble.
Conditions in an area are affected by municipal governance activities such as zoning, code
enforcement, rent control, property assessment, lending practices, policing, and school
partnership strategies which shape housing-market operation and can precipitate negative
as well as positive neighborhood change. It is important to remember that these institutional
factors, like the factors outside the authority of municipal governance, are neither natural
nor inevitable.24
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Thus, there are decisions and non-decisions creating institutional elements that
influence municipal-level conditions. Identifying and examining how municipal
governance interacts with and influences socioeconomic and physical conditions in a
municipality is crucial to better understanding the role municipal governance plays in
stabilization and decline and what associated factors precipitate success and failure in
stabilizing municipalities.25
Constraints
Economic, political, and legal constraints limit what decision-makers may do in
efforts to achieve success. Examinations of urban politics conclude that because of the
many constraints on municipal governments, political influence on policies is minimal.
Despite influencing elements that are outside of municipal authority and constraints that
may hinder efforts, literature asserts that municipal governance can affect municipal-level
stability. While the federal and state policies and the timing of integration maintenance
efforts attribute to local success and failure in stabilizing a municipality, other internal and
environmental attributes may be more important determinants.26
Research has illuminated key factors for integration maintenance initiatives to be
effective and uncovers serious threats to prospects. Considering that two of the most
successful examples in the literature are government supported initiatives, budget cuts
threaten similar efforts in the future. Literature highlights that most successful and
sustaining stabilization efforts result from the interventionist approach. The interventionist
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view suggests that to achieve true racial integration, which means mixed and stable,
proactive coalition building, mobilization, and adequate resource dedication is required.27
Voter Preferences
Municipal-level data of citizens’ policy preferences are scarce. Consequently, it is
difficult for researchers to study how responsive municipal lawmakers are to constituents’
desires. Some researchers have overcome this problem. Utilizing advanced techniques of
measurement, Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014) determine mean policy conservatism in
cities with 20,000 or more residents by leveraging opinion estimation. Findings contradict
the theory that posits institutional change is required to improve municipal governance’s
responsiveness to citizens. They found that on a wide range of policy issues, local
policymakers enact laws that are consistent with the national policy preferences of their
voters.28
Further, the study shows that local government’s response to voter preferences are
minimally impacted by differences in institutional structures and episodic phenomena.
These findings serve as helpful insight in examining different municipal governments with
varying governmental structures. In demonstrating there is local official reverence for
voters’ policy demands, such studies provide additional context for examining the effects
of outside forces influencing decision making in municipal governance. They also
highlight the importance of considering resident interaction and response to the interaction
in determining municipal governance success and failure.29
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Many blacks looking to trade in deteriorating inner-city neighborhoods for
suburban oases found that what they gained was access primarily to suburbs adjacent to
central cities. In this process, whites fled the older deteriorating inner-ring and were
replaced by black inhabitants. Referencing this phenomenon, Galster (1991) argues:
"The average black household, though now residing farther from the central city
than before, remains as close to it as ever relative to the average white household.”
And "Suburban residence per se is not equivalent to desegregation or relief from
the burdens of ghetto residence."30
This observation is confirmed by studies that link the racial distribution of suburban
blacks to the characteristics of the suburbs where they reside. Black suburban residents are
typically segregated from their white counterparts in suburbs located just outside the edge
of the metro city. These inner suburbs lack economic viability, are poorly managed and
serviced by local government, and levy exorbitant taxes. The ecologist approach observes
this process of whites being likely to relocate to outer-ring and exurban areas as being
consistent with the "invasion-succession" theory.31
However, by applying the political economy framework it becomes apparent that
other forces such as discrimination in the housing market are involved in the process.
Studies have shown continued violations of Fair Housing laws and lack of enforcement.
Designing policies and programs that better empower, strengthen, and support suburban
municipalities and their citizens is extremely important work and requires valid research

30

Galster 1991; Schneider and Logan 1982; Bobo 2001; Orfield and Lee 2007; Wilson 2012; Orfield and Luce
2013.
31
See Keating and Smith 1996. Also, scholars track the process of black populations following whites to the
suburbs and refer to the phenomena as “Black Suburbanization.” For more about black suburbanization
see, Galster 1991; Schneider and Phelan 1993; Orfield and Luce 2013; and Logan 2014.

19

goals. Despite significant policy advancements, the damaging impact of segregation
remains.32
De jure Segregation
As Rothstein (2014) asserts, “We must not allow our distain for de facto segregation
to blind us into ignoring that it does not account for the segregation we currently observe.”
Rothstein highlights the importance of not making this mistake as it prevents us from
recognizing windows of opportunities that lead, not just to more integrated communities,
but to more stably integrated ones. We must seek newer, more innovative methods, begin
to think more regionally, and expand revitalization efforts beyond just the metrocentric city
as this model allows continued neglect of inner suburbs.33
Through landmark Supreme Court decisions from Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 to
Missouri v. Jenkins in 1995, the federal government of the United States sanctioned racial
segregation. Promulgating doctrine such as “separate but equal” and “local control,” the
Court has repeatedly issued rulings that serve to reinforce segregation, undermine
desegregation efforts, and dismantle or weaken earlier desegregation rulings. Despite
Supreme Court decisions that serve to make racial integration less of a federal priority and
local governments’ minimal support of integration efforts, integration does occur.34
It is important to understand racial integration policies as they relate to effects and
efforts at the local level. While federal-level decisions have significant implications
associated with the racial spatial dynamics of the country, literature asserts that racial
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integration maintenance efforts at the municipal level have demonstrated success. This
serves to better inform the examination of the role of municipal governance in municipallevel stabilization.35
Approaches to Stabilization
As black entry into traditionally white municipalities increased, communities
adopted integration maintenance plans. Integration programs seek to limit or channel black
entry while stemming the tide of white flight. Racial integration maintenance posits that
proactive antidiscrimination action, mitigation of black overrepresentation in residency,
and white flight prevention methods must be employed to prevent racial tipping, housing
stock deterioration, and economic decline in white neighborhoods experiencing inmigration of black families.36
Scholars have found that there are many neighborhoods that have stabilized and
have not tipped to all-black where intervention of institutional networks and resources are
present. Based on Lee’s (1985) findings, racially mixed areas in the largest U.S. cities are
not inevitably doomed to experience the irreversible process of resegregation like social
scientists have traditionally thought. We need to better identify and understand what policy
decisions and non-decisions are most influential in impacting positive and negative
municipal-level change.37
Some scholars argue that the variety of forms that integration maintenance policies
can take complicates the evaluation of their legality. They point to the allowance of
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communities to develop plans with varying levels of exclusion, racial preferences, and
government involvement. These opponents of integration maintenance, often law scholars,
question the constitutionality of such policies because the social, political, economic, and
legal judgments can be unique to each community. They argue that because integration
maintenance treats prospective entrants in a community differently based on race it is
essentially violating the constitutional rights that protect prospective entrants from similar
actions that brought about disparities to begin with.38
Some think of it as freedom of choice versus integration maintenance. This position
suggests that efforts to maintain integration deny freedom of choice to blacks thus
rendering them fundamentally in conflict with fair housing laws and equal housing
opportunity. Critics point out that blacks’ rights are violated for the sake of attempting to
achieve neighborhood integration and prevent tipping. However, as Saltman (1990)
highlights, the truth about integration maintenance is that it relies on affirmative marketing,
which is a moral, effective, and essential movement strategy, consistent with fair housing
laws.39
Given the question raised as to the legalities of integration maintenance policies
and practices, it is important to outline the approaches to serve as a guide to better
understanding the political implications of the different types of municipal efforts
undertaken. The most direct approach to integration maintenance is to limit the number of
blacks entering one neighborhood by restrictive selling and renting practices. This
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approach, when considered at face value, resembles the discriminatory housing practices
employed both by the private and public sectors during the era.40
Limiting a specific demographic from accessing housing based solely on race is an
egregious violation of civil rights and provides opponents to integration maintenance
strong support for their constitutionality argument. The literature explicitly refers to racial
residential integration maintenance when describing efforts that sought to address the
resegregation process that takes place because of black in-migration to a municipality and
white flight from that municipality by curbing white flight. A review of municipal and
historical archives uncovers examples of this type of integration maintenance practice. The
literature examines several attempts to enact such a practice by ordinance in Oak Park,
Illinois and an incentive of service in Shaker Heights, Ohio.41
Instead of deterring black entry, a less rigorous approach to integration maintenance
is to encourage entry into designated areas and promote to whites the benefits of remaining.
This approach can vary in rigidity and racial emphasis. A community can choose to
establish definitive targets for racial composition, such as a 30 % black population limit.
Real estate agents would be required to encourage white entry whenever the black
population exceeded 30 % and to encourage black entry whenever the black population fell
below that level.42
A community can choose a more fluid and less racially explicit alternative, such as
requiring encouragement of the entry of underrepresented racial groups in a community in
relation to the entire metropolitan community, the state, or the nation. The encouraged
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racial group will vary according to the racial demographics of the community and the
shifting of larger geographic population units. This practice, referred to as the mirror
approach, is the most frequently observed approach utilized in integration maintenance
efforts.43
However, it is important to point out that while implicit in the literature is the aim
to “preserve” a certain racial balance; only a small number of references of specific racial
composition targets were made by interventionists. A third form of integration maintenance
is the race-conscious dispersal of entrants throughout a community. This type of plan
encourages whites to move into areas that already contain some blacks and encourages
blacks to move into areas that are predominantly white. This form of integration
maintenance can be viewed as addressing the issue of racial residential segregation within
an area that may be inaccurately considered integrated when analyzing census tract data.44
Segregated Integration
Often communities are labeled “integrated” when they have racial compositions
comparable to that of the greater metropolitan area. However, upon closer examination
researchers discover that many of these communities are segregated with whites
concentrated in one specific area of the community and blacks concentrated in another.
Literature outlines in-depth examinations of examples of this form of racial residential
integration maintenance condition exposing a high-level frequency of this occurrence.45

43

Orfield 1984
Smolla 1981; Orfield 1984; Saltman 1990.
45
Applies to various forms of uneven distribution. For instance, one racial group might be overrepresented
in areas that are scattered throughout a city or packed closely together in the center of the city. This is
important to note as research has demonstrated that blacks were not particularly segregated in northern
cities during the 19th century. See Massey and Denton 1989; 1993. For more about tipping, distribution, and
dissimilarity index see Schelling 1969; Goering 1978; Lake 1981; Orfield 1984; Farley 1987; 1989; 2004; Ellen
1999; Massey 2001; Fischer et al. 2004; Orfield and Luce 2013.
44

24

Suburban Typology
There remain gaps in the literature regarding the role municipal governance plays
in influencing municipal-level stabilization and decline. In developing a suburban
typology, researchers must be careful not to commit the ecological fallacy of assuming that
suburban populations are automatically middle-class. Conversely, black suburbanites do
not always reside in poor, ghettoized suburbs. Research points to many examples to
strengthen this argument.46
For instance, a third of Washington, DC’s suburbs are categorized as black middleclass areas. Some of these suburbs are home to large populations. As such, the percentages
of middle-class black residents are not inflated by statistical anomalies from smaller
population sizes. Another assumption researchers should be careful not to make is that
suburbs are inherently better off than their central city. Some suburbs are comprised mainly
of blue-collar workers with modest incomes.47
These communities often do not have the resources and infrastructure to effectively
combat economic decline and other threats. Central cities are usually better equipped with
a tax base, business community, law enforcement, and social service providers needed to
navigate various pressures cities face. Without certain critical financial, institutional, and
social tools, inner suburbs are more vulnerable than major cities to succumbing to
challenges.48
It is important to note that suburban poverty differs from the urban poverty
traditionally associated with central cities. Further, not all suburbs with increasing poverty
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experience the trend the same. Some individuals experiencing poverty reside in middleclass suburbs while others live in areas where poverty is prevalent throughout the
neighborhood and municipality. Identifying the presence and the effects of poverty in the
suburbs is complicated by these variations in conditions. For policy to be impactful it must
incorporate diverse solutions for addressing poverty at the specific levels in which it
exists.49
Furthering these distinctions, researchers must consider that there are big suburbs
neighboring small suburbs; there are boroughs and hamlets; and there are suburbs that rest
in the hills while some others are flat suburbs located in low-lying valleys. A suburb’s
geographical proximity to the metropolitan area’s central city has important implications
as well. Whether the suburb is located in the inner-ring, the middle-ring, or the outer-ring
often referred to as exurb, is a critical factor that impacts social, economic, racial, and
environmental determinants.50
Schools
One of the first places to show signs of economic decline is the local schools, both
public and charter. Anti-segregation policies and enforcements such as public-school
desegregation have waned since the declines in segregation during the civil rights era of
1960 to 1990. Multiple studies have found that racial isolation of contemporary black
students is nearly as extreme as it was for black students during the civil rights era. In fact,
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since the signing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, not much has changed in terms of blackwhite school segregation rates.51
Research demonstrates underperforming outcomes for black children experiencing
racial isolation. They score less on tests, have higher high school dropout rates, have lower
wage-paying jobs, and are more likely to have interaction with the criminal justice system
than black children living in more integrated areas. As with housing segregation, school
segregation can serve as a precursor to economic decline in the area.52
In his Twin Cities study, Orfield (1997) found that by 1994, more than 20 % of
students received free or reduced lunch in nine of 11 inner suburbs’ school districts.
According to the findings, growth of low-income students outpaced Minneapolis schools
and eight of the schools were experiencing higher rates of minority enrollment. Orfield
uncovered that over the course of 10 years, 18 out of 29 mature inner suburbs experienced
significant white flight of preschool children. In inner-ring suburban Minneapolis, high
school non-graduation rates closely resemble the percentage of poor children in the central
cities. These schools typically become “school-to-prison pipelines” as the likelihood of
children being incarcerated often outweigh odds children will attend college.53
Municipal efforts in local schools are prevalent throughout the literature. For
example, a study of Milwaukee demonstrates how instrumental municipal governance can
be in local school stabilization efforts. Of 44 schools constructed between 1950 and 1965,

51

Wilson and Taeuber 1978; Orfield 1981; Farley 1984; 1987; Orfield and Eaton 1996; Fischer et al. 2004;
Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2006; Orfield and Lee 2007; and Nelsen 2015.
52
Massey and Denton 1993; and Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 1999. “Being black not only greatly accentuates
the level of segregation on any single dimension but also increases markedly the dimensionality of
segregation, generating an accumulation of segregation across multiple dimensions simultaneously
(Massey and Denton 1989).”
53
Orfield 1997.

27

only two were in areas where black enrollment was over 50 %. When white schools became
overcrowded or were closed down for remodeling, the school system for many years had
bused white children to receiving schools which absorbed them routinely. This practice
was known later as intact busing.54
Like housing segregation, school segregation is most pronounced in the Northeast
and Midwest. Municipalities that focus efforts in local schools demonstrate higher success
rates in stabilization efforts as conditions in local schools are improved. The purpose of the
school efforts is to promote quality integrated education, to inform the community of
educational programs in area schools, to support those programs, and to develop
supplementary educational activities for neighborhood children.55
Racial inequities span a broad range of economic strata. For example, a majority of
Ferguson residents are black. Although sections of the municipality have less poverty than
comparable neighborhoods, the city exhibits distinctly different characteristics than its
white neighbors. Elementary schools in the Ferguson-Florissant School District are among
the lowest performing schools in the state. Classified in the bottom 10 % to 15 %, Ferguson
schools only slightly outperform the typical central city school in the metro area.56
An effective municipal school strategy will exert a significant influence on school
board policies. By working with the school board, municipal government affects major
changes in local schools. In addition, it can be instrumental in reducing racial tensions
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when schools are desegregated and support people from the community who run for the
school board.57
This dissertation utilizes principles associated with local school stabilization efforts
in studying municipal governance success and failure. Several municipalities have fairly
contiguous school district boundaries. Others share school district boundaries with other
municipalities. Due to varying school district structures among the study cases, analyses
are performed in a way that considers these differences.
Regional Fragmentation
It is clear that many factors impact municipal government decision making. Some
scholars point to regional fragmentation as an influential factor. Inner suburbs’ physical
and fiscal health are connected with those of neighboring inner suburbs. Regional
fragmentation dissuades collaborative stabilization efforts in which cities throughout the
region leverage resources in a collective manner to address deficits. Thus, it is not
uncommon for governments in fragmented regions to be entrenched in fiscal deficits and
to exacerbate their problems with budgeting and financial practices that ignore the
economic deficits.58
In the absence of a solidified regional response to inner-ring suburban decline, some
municipalities have managed to avoid decline while others have declined dramatically.
Considering various municipal choices such as open housing policy, land planning and
growth management, property tax-base sharing, and investments in transportation systems,
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this study will identify municipal characteristics that may serve as predictors of municipal
success at stabilizing in a highly fragmented region. Of particular interest to this study is
the fact that some municipalities have stabilized in this fragmented environment.59
Summary
One of the largest social and racial transitions in the nation occurred in inner
suburbs of cities during the 1970s to 1990s. As scores of middle-class residents moved out
of inner-ring suburbs, low-income families were replacing them. While this transition
along with some physical decline may explain some of the racial tipping and economic
decline in mature inner suburbs, change in financial status of residents fails to sufficiently
account for the totality of the phenomena.
Examining the interrelated dynamics of municipalities’ institutional and fiscal
capacity will serve as a critical component to this study. As purported in the literature,
some municipalities that have suffered decline may have talented leadership capable of
governing effectively. However, financial troubles due to low revenue or external factors,
such as a national and local economic downturn can bring on severe fiscal stress for a
municipality despite municipal efforts. This point raises the importance of considering a
municipality’s size, resources, and policy tools available when examining its influence on
stabilization and decline.60
This study considers the impact of sprawl, architecture, location, and residential
choice factors. Of great importance, however, is the understanding that sprawl and an aged
housing stock do not necessitate decline. There is an interaction of elements, decisions, and
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non-decisions occurring. For example, understanding that the strength of residents’ social
networks, neighborhood sentiment, and symbolism may all play significant roles in
municipal-level change. Identifying these interrelated dynamics better informs the study.
This dissertation will contribute evidence to the field, providing a clearer
understanding of municipal governance’s role in municipal-level stabilization. In doing so,
the examination will better explain unique municipal governance characteristics that result
in municipal-level stabilization, economic growth, and increased diversity. I look forward
to providing the reader recommendations for increasing municipal level stability.
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Chapter 3. Methods and Data
In this chapter, I discuss the methods employed and data used in the study. I used
quantitative data to select the five case studies. I collected archives spanning from 1970 to
2015. I interviewed 25 community stakeholders, and I used the community structure
framework as the method of analysis to better understand the role of municipal-level
governance in stabilizing mature inner suburbs.
By performing a data analysis on multiple quantitative data of municipal conditions
from 1970 to 2015, I identify five St. Louis municipalities that meet several varying criteria
ranging from economically and racially stable to economically declined and racially tipped.
Comparative exercises are executed generating histograms, scatter plots, and charts of key
measurements. Results of the exercises are analyzed for key trends and conditions that
exhibit stable levels of racial composition and economic conditions as well as distinct
upward or downward trajectories in municipal-level conditions.
The quantitative data consists of Census data including the American Community
Survey (ACS), the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS), county
and city-level data, and state auditor data from 1970 to 2015 of the following 21 data points:
1. Municipality; 2. Population; 3. Percent white not Hispanic; 4. Percent black; 5. Percent
single parent headed household; 6. Poverty rate; 7. Percent residents under age 18; 8. Per
capita income; 9. Median household income; 10. Percent bachelor’s degree or higher; 11.
Median home value; 12. Percent pre-WWII housing; 13. Residential tax rate; 14.
Residential tax assessed; 15. Percent owner occupied; 16. Percent renter occupied; 17.
Percent vacant housing units; 18. Point of sale, pooled, or both; 19. Sales tax rate; 20.
Taxable sales; and 21. Sales tax assessed.
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To illuminate factors unique to specific elements of municipal governance that
affect economic health and racial composition, qualitative case studies are conducted on
the five municipalities. I examine municipal government decisions, administrative actions,
professional capacity, size, fiscal strength, location, interaction with residents, and factors
outside of municipal governance control.
Selecting the Cases
In some studies, researchers follow the standard used by the U.S. Census Bureau
which defines suburbs as municipalities located in metropolitan statistical areas, have
populations greater than 2,500, and are not central cities. In other cases, available data and
research questions determine the definition of the term suburb. The Census Bureau’s
definition does not delineate inner suburb, middle suburb, and exurb. The researcher must
make these distinctions to demonstrate that suburbs’ characteristics vary and these
variations impact conditions as well as municipal governance decisions.61
To circumvent this challenge, this study will use more finely grained place-level
data to categorize suburbs into inner, middle, and exurban and identify and examine mature
inner suburban areas of St. Louis County. This study asserts that the Census category
“Places” is the best available category for identifying suburbs and sets specific parameters
for identifying cases and for determining how to measure and analyze them.
Minimum thresholds are set to study like cases. First, only municipalities
maintaining at least a population of 10,000 residents throughout the study period 19702015 were considered. Fourteen municipalities met the population minimum over the
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period (See Figure 1., p.317). Additionally, municipalities demonstrating at least 30 %
black residency at some point during the study period 1970-12015 were considered. Six
municipalities met the racial minimum: 1. Bellefontaine Neighbors, 2. Ferguson, 3.
Florissant, 4. Hazelwood, 5. Jennings, and 6. University City (See Figure 2, p.318).
Based on trajectories of racial composition and economic conditions over the study
period, municipalities were partitioned into three categories: 1. Stable, 2. Declined, and 3.
Transitioning. Two municipalities were selected that exhibited stabilization. At least one
of the municipalities demonstrated stable racial and economic conditions for at least 20
years. The other exhibited stable racial and economic conditions at some point during the
study period but exhibited at least 10 years of demonstrable stabilization after exhibiting
signs of acute transition which threatened stability.
Two municipalities were selected that had declined or at least showed traits of
transitioning to decline in terms of racially resegregating and exhibiting stressed economic
indicators. One municipality had experienced decline for a minimum period of 20 years
exhibiting racial resegregation and economic decline during the study period. One
exhibited at least 10 years of demonstrable destabilization showing signs of transitioning
into declined status.
For racial composition, selected cases considered to be stabilized demonstrated
characteristics such as black population at least 30 % of the total population in the
municipality for a time period of at least 20 years between years 1970 and 2015. Through
plotting municipalities’ racial compositions at decennial points 1970 to 2010 as well as
five-year estimates from 2010-2015, trajectories in racial change and stabilization were
observed. Municipalities that met criteria outlined earlier and exhibited racial change
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including increase in black residents to at least 30 % and remained at least 30 % without
exceeding 70 % were considered stabilized or transitioning depending on the circumstances
and were eligible cases for the study.
Selected cases considered to be declined in terms of resegregating demonstrated
characteristics such as black population at 71 % or more for at least 20 years. Cases
considered to exhibit signs of decline demonstrated significant increases (at least 30
percent in a ten-year period) in black population and contained a minimum of 60 % black
residents at any point during the study time period. Identification of these cases was also
performed by plotting municipalities’ racial compositions at decennial points 1970 to 2010
as well as five-year estimates from 2010-2015.
Before an effective examination of municipal governance’s effects on stabilization
could be performed, a clear understanding of how the conditions in suburbs were changing
and why these changes were unique to suburbs needed to be reached. In addition to
considering racial shifts, this study operationalized the concepts of suburban poverty by
defining it and distinguishing it from other forms of economic conditions and poverty
observed in cities.
Poverty is generally accepted to mean a lack of resources to sufficiently provide for
one’s needs. Official measurements tabulate income and size of household to determine
poverty status. For this study, county-wide averages were used in measuring the prevalence
of poverty in a municipality and in determining overall economic conditions in the
municipality. For economic conditions, selected cases considered to be stabilized
demonstrated characteristics such as median household income at least 80 % of the
county’s median household income, per capita income at least 70 % of the county’s
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average, and poverty rate less than 200 % of the county’s average for a period of at least
20 years between years 1970 and 2015.62
Through plotting municipalities’ economic conditions at decennial points 1970 to
2010 as well as five-year estimates from 2010-2015, trajectories in economic conditions
were observed. Municipalities that exhibited the aforementioned economic conditions in
addition to meeting the racial composition threshold were considered stabilized and were
eligible cases for the study. Selected cases considered to be in decline in terms of economic
condition demonstrated characteristics such as median household income of 70 % or less
of the county’s median household income average, per capita income of 50 % or less of
the county’s average, and poverty rate of 200 % or more of the county’s average for at
least10 years.
Identification of these cases was also performed by plotting municipalities’
economic conditions at decennial points from 1970 to 2010 as well as five-year estimates
from 2010-2015. Municipalities that exhibited the aforementioned economic conditions in
addition to meeting the racial composition threshold for municipalities in decline were
considered to be declined or transitioning depending on the circumstances and were
eligible cases for the study.
Proximity to Metro City
Stabilized, declined, and transitioning cases exhibited similar attributes related to
population size, capacity, and municipal structure. Therefore, geographical proximity to
the central city was also considered in the selection process. However, given the
impossibility of selecting a group of municipalities that fit perfectly into these categories,
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For more about considering differences in suburban poverty, see Murphy 2010; 2016; Kneebone 2014;
and Murphy and Allard 2015.

36

variations in these factors were considered in the examination and played a significant role
in the final interpretation of results. Further, additional indicators such as housing stock,
education levels of residents, and number of single parent headed households were
considered during the selection process as well as throughout the study.
A suburb’s geographical proximity to the metropolitan area’s central city has
important implications. Whether the suburb is located in the inner-ring, the middle-ring, or
the outer-ring often referred to as exurb, is a critical factor that impacts social, economic,
racial, and environmental determinants. This study considered implications associated with
the location of municipalities and how these conditions may have affected municipal
governance. Proximity to the central city, which in this case is St. Louis, MO, correlates
with black population shifts. Municipalities to the northwest of St. Louis demonstrated a
significantly higher increase in black population during the study period than
municipalities located in other areas of the region. For instance, of the six municipalities
that have experienced at least 30 % black population at some point during the study period,
only one municipality (University City) is not located in an area northwest of St. Louis
City (See Figure 3, p.319).
While University City’s proximity to the central city differs from the other cases, it
was not eliminated from consideration as this study seeks to better explain the influences
geographical proximity may have on municipal governance. University City offered an
opportunity to study a mature inner-ring suburb’s municipal governance effects on racial
and economic conditions in the context of enjoying proximity to the central city. Other
interesting aspects making University City an acceptable case study are visited later in this
analysis.

37

As for the remaining five municipalities, a closer examination of their racial and
economic conditions over the study period was warranted to delineate them and identify
best cases for the study. There were several sets within the group with very similar
proximities to the central city (e.g. Bellefontaine Neighbors / Jennings, and Florissant /
Hazelwood). While Ferguson lies northwest of St. Louis City, as do the others, it is located
between the two aforementioned sets of municipalities.
Bellefontaine Neighbors and Jennings are located on the northwest border of the
city while Florissant and Hazelwood are located in the northwest corner of St. Louis
County. It was determined that Ferguson’s proximity to the city was unique from the other
sets of municipalities. This factor was considered a point of interest during the analysis of
racial and economic conditions.
Bellefontaine Neighbors and Jennings were considered first. Given their
similarities in location (northwest border of St. Louis City) and their populations as of 2015
(10,815 and 14,755), these cases were analyzed closer for dissimilarities that may make
one a more relevant case for study than the other. If no striking differences were identified
between the two, one would be selected based on traits important to the study such as
commonalities and differences in racial, economic, and other demographic indicators
related to the other selected cases.
Racial Composition
Like the other municipalities under consideration, with the exception of University
City whose black population was 20 % in 1970, both Bellefontaine Neighbors and Jennings
contained small black populations in 1970 (1.2 % and .5 %). Notably, Jennings’ black
population increased dramatically over the next ten years reaching 27.1 % by 1980. During
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the same period, Bellefontaine experienced a relatively small increase of 1.6 % in black
population which represented 2.8 % of total population in 1980.
The modest black population increase would continue for Bellefontaine Neighbors
over the next decade while Jennings experienced another significant increase in black
population over the same period. By 1990, Jennings was well on its way to racially tipping
with black residents representing nearly half (48 %) of its population−a nearly 47 %
increase in only two decades. While Bellefontaine Neighbors experienced a higher rate of
black population increase than in the previous decade, the municipality was yet to show
signs of tipping as black population was still fewer than 10 % (eight percent).
During the 10 years from 1990 to 2000, Bellefontaine would experience a
significant increase in black population reaching 44.4 % in black residents (an increase of
36.4 %). This was notable and worth investigating to better understand what policies,
actions, and phenomena occurred to bring about such a drastic increase in such a short
period. However, Jennings offered valuable insight into explaining what was happening
not only in Jennings but in the neighboring municipality. During the same period, Jennings’
black population increase by 30.6 %. Since Jennings’ racial shift began two decades earlier
and continued throughout the study period eventually topping 91.70 % black residents by
2015, Jennings represents a fully tipped municipality.
While Bellefontaine Neighbors tipped racially, according to this study’s metric, it
failed to meet the 20-year minimum threshold for declined. The municipality did not reach
the tipping threshold until 2010 (See Figure 4, p.320). Jennings met the 20-year minimum
threshold having tipped by 1995 (See Figure 5, p.320). Considering the geographical and
population similarities of these two cases, Jennings presented the unique attribute of tipping
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earlier and more dramatically. Additionally, the similarities decreased the need to examine
both municipalities. Jennings remained in consideration for the study as a declined case by
meeting the racial resegregation requirements. Bellefontaine Neighbors was excluded.
Florissant and Hazelwood were considered next. At initial glance, a glaring
difference in these two municipalities was apparent. Their population sizes were quite
different. As of 2015, Florissant had 52,356 residents while Hazelwood had just under half
of that with 25,686 residents (See Figure 1, p.317). While this raised the issue of whether
these were comparable cases, another notable statistic was also considered. These
municipalities experienced opposite overall population shifts during the study period.
From 1970 to 2015, Florissant experienced an over 20 % decrease (from 65,908 to
52,356) in overall population while Hazelwood enjoyed a 45 % increase (from 14,082 to
25,686) in overall population (See Figure 1, p.317). During the same period, both
municipalities experienced a gradual increase in black population (approximately seven
percent per decade) with the highest uptick coming during 2000 to 2010 (approximately
14 % for Hazelwood and 19 % for Florissant). Hazelwood reached the 30 % black
population threshold in 2010, while Florissant did not experience a 30 % black population
until 2015 (See Figures 6 and 7, p.321).
Florissant’s decline in overall population and Hazelwood’s increase in overall
population since 1970 were not unusual as other municipalities in St. Louis County
demonstrated similar trends. However, of the 14 municipalities meeting the population
eligibility for this study, only Ballwin and Hazelwood experienced population growth over
the study period; and both were significant increases−65 % and 45 %, respectively (See
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Figure 1, p.317). Notable was the fact that Hazelwood, unlike Ballwin, experienced more
than minimal black population increase.
Halfway into the decade of the 2010s, Hazelwood was on pace to maintain the trend
of modest increases in black population over 10-year spans. This was counter to trends
exhibited by other St. Louis County municipalities that reached the 30 % black population
mark during the study period (excluding University City and a number of small
municipalities).
According to this study’s metrics, the similarities in geographical proximity and
rate of black population growth were where the commonalities ended with Florissant and
Hazelwood. Their size difference, difference in population trajectory, and varying time in
which they reached the 30 % black population threshold made it difficult to select one or
the other based solely on their racial trends and was grounds to consider their economic
conditions before making a selection or perhaps selecting both cities for the study.
Upon initial review of Ferguson’s racial trajectory over the course of the study
period, it was clear the municipality had experienced significant population shifts. It was
third only to Jennings and University City in increase in black population during the period
between 1970 and 1980 and third behind Jennings and Bellefontaine Neighbors in increase
in black population over the entire study period from 1970-2015 (See Figures 8 and 9,
p.322-323).
This was very intriguing because, while Ferguson experienced one of the highest
levels of black population increases of the municipalities in the set, it had not yet tipped
according to this study’s metric (71 % or more). Notwithstanding, at 67.4 % black
population Ferguson appeared to be poised to inevitably tip to all black.
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However, upon closer examination of Ferguson’s racial trajectory, several
interesting attributes further distinguished Ferguson from its neighbors. Of each of the
municipalities in the set, as well as smaller neighbors such as Berkeley and Dellwood that
reached 30 % black population at some point in the study period (excluding University
City), Ferguson was the only municipality that did not experience a 30 % or more increase
in black population over any one 10-year period.
Further, Ferguson was second only to University City in decline in black population
since 2010 (See Figures 10 and 11, p.324). These characteristics coupled with Ferguson’s
unique location between border municipalities like Jennings and north county
municipalities like Florissant offer intriguing elements for case study. Based on Ferguson’s
racial shifts and accompanying elements, it was considered for the study as a transitioning
case.
University City offers perhaps the most interesting case of all the municipalities in
the set. Its unique geographical proximity to the central city was covered earlier. In addition
to that and possibly because of that, the city experienced racial shifts unlike any other case
in the group of eligible municipalities and otherwise. By 1970, black residents already
comprised 20 % of University City’s population— over 13 % more than second place
Kirkwood (See Figure 12, p.325). Consider Hazelwood was fourth in black population in
1970, and blacks represented only 1.9 % of that city’s population.
During the 1970 to 1980 period, University City and Jennings experienced similar
growth in black population (See Figures 13-16, p.326-327). By 1990, the municipalities’
racial trajectories inersected at 48 % and 48.2 %, respectively. Over the next 25 years,
University City and Jennings went in completly different directions related to racial
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composition (See Figure 17, p.328). It is important to note that University City’s path to
48 % black residents by 1990 was a much shorter one than was Jennings’ given Univerity
City began at 20 % in 1970 while Jennings had only .5 % black residents in 1970.
The rapid racial shift in Jennings from 1970 to 1990 was indicative of the racial
tipping that was occurring and continued until present day. Jennings was 91 % black at
study’s end. University City, on the other hand, managed to avoid the racial tipping that
claimed many of its smaller neighbors like Pagedale, Wellston, and Pinelawn. University
City offered a very interesting case as it represented a long-term stable case having enjoyed
black population above 30 % for over 35 years without ressegregating to all black. Notable,
however, was the fact that University City lost over 10 % of its black population since its
black population peaked at 48.2 % in 1990.
It is possible that University City’s loss of nearly a quarter of its overall population
since 1970 accounted for some of the black population decline (See Figures 1, p.317 and
11, p. 324). However, closer examination of the data reveals that the largest loss of overall
population in any one decade came during the period between 1970 and 1980. What is key
here is that this was also the period in which University City experienced its largest gain
in black residents (23 % increase).
This may indicate that there was some flight of white residets during this period.
More critical to this analysis, however, is what cirrcumstances, actions, decisions prevented
University City from continuing on a trajectory that ultimately leads to racial
ressegreagtion? Based on University City’s racial stabilization for over 35 years of the
study period, it was selected for analyis of its municipal governance influence on
conditions.
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Selected cases, based on racial conditions over time, include Ferguson, Jennings,
and University City. An examination of each of their economic conditions over the study
period would confirm or invalidate their eligibility for the study. Additionally, Florissant
and Hazelwood were deliniated more granularly for final selection based on their economic
conditions over time.
Economic Conditions
Ferguson’s economic conditions over time presented an interesting trajectory
which demonstrated steady increases in per capita income and median household income
accompanied by significant increase in the municipality’s poverty rate over the same
period. It is important to point out that though there were steady increases in the income
strata, the levels were consistantly below county-wide averages while the poverty rate
exceeded 200 % of the county average by 2015 (See Figures 18 and 19, p.329).
This raised important questions regarding the income levels of Ferguson residents
prior to the significant increase of black residents over the period from 1980 to 2010 as
well as the income levels of black residents moving in to the area over the period. Ferguson
appeared to get poorer as it increased in black residents. Consistent with appearing to get
poorer, Ferguson’s single parent headed households increased most significantly during
the period in which it experienced its highest increase in black population. This suggested
that a dispoprtionate number of low-income families were represented in the population of
black residents moving to the municipality.
This served as an important indicator to analyze as it was possibly associated with
Ferguson’s decisions related to low-income housing placement. Also notable was that
while residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher increased steadily during this same time
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period, the rate remained well-below the county average (See Figure 20, p.330). Changes
in housing conditions offered further evidence of Ferguson’s economic decline being
consistent with its growth in black population. Percent of owner occupied homes declined
while percent of renter occupied homes increased during the period of greatest black
population increase (See Figure 21, p.331). Even more intriguing was the trajectory of
percent of vacant housing.
A review of Figure 22 (p.331) demonstrates that during the period between 1980 to
1990, a nine percent increase in vacant housing occurred despite only an 11.5 % increase
in black population— roughly the same amount of black population increase the previous
decade which experienced only .7 % increase in vacant housing. Yet, during the decade in
which Ferguson experienced its highest increase in black residents (1990 to 2000) doubling
from 25.1 % to 52.4 %, its vacant housing rate decreased by 5.3 %. This suggest that a
clearing out and filling up process occurred. Such a phenomenon is consistent with the
increase in low-income housing developments taking place in the county during the period.
Ferguson presented evidence related to its economic conditions to qualify as an
exceptional case for this study. It was categorized, for purposes of the study, as a
transitioning municipality. While the municipality experienced 200 % of the county
average poverty rate, this level was just recently achieved between the 2010 to 2015 time
period and did not meet the minimum ten-year threashold for declined. Further, its median
household income was 72 % of the county average and its per capita income met the
minimum threashold of 50 % of the county average. Ferguson’s selection for investigation
of its municpal governance influence on racial and economic conditions was confirmed as
a transitioning municipality.
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Jennings was a much clearer case than Ferguson as it related to presenting definitive
evidence of a municipality that had declined in terms of economic conditions. The city
ranked within each economic indicator as a declined case. Jennings’ median household
income and per capita income were both demonstrated as being less than 50 % of the county
average for over 10 years while its poverty rate had been at least two times the county
average for 15 years and nearly three times the county average in the last five years of the
study period (See Figures 23 and 24, p.332).
A review of Jennings’ demographic shifts provided additional evidence of the
suburb’s economic struggles. While some decreases in single parent headed households
occurred, the rate remained nearly one in every five. In terms of residents with bachelor’s
degree or higher, Jennings had nearly 30 % less than the county average at 11.2 % (See
Figure 25, p.333). Jennings demonstrated similar traits as Ferguson in that it experienced
some economic improvements over time but the key difference was Jennings’ increases
were much more below county averages.
Several final elements related to Jennings’ economic conditions over time were
considered. As demonstrated in Figure 26 (p.334), Jennings’ housing condtions steadily
declined in ownership and increased in rentership to the point that there were nearly the
same percent of renters as homeowners (47.7 % and 52.3 %). Jennings’ vacancy rates over
time exhibited several significant spikes in vacancies during the 1980 to 1990 period and
again during the 2000 to 2010 period after enjoying a 10-year span of modest decrease in
the rate. As of 2015, estimates were that nearly one in every five homes in Jennings were
vacant (See Figure 27, p.334).
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As mentioned earlier, Jennings shares a number of similarities with Ferguson and
the two differ significantly in other areas. For instance, a review of median home values
shows notable similarities in trends of increase and decrease in value and noteworthy
differences in values at each decennial period (See Figures 28 and 29, p.335). These
observations offered additional economic evidence that further strengthened the case for
both Ferguson and Jennings to be included in the study as a transitioning and a declined
municipality.
University City presented an opportunity to investigate a case that demonstrated
economic conditions over the entire study period that remained within the stable range of
county-wide averages required for this study. Additionally, University City served as an
excellent contrast to Jennings. While University City’s population was over two times
larger than Jennings’ over the study period, the municipalities shared several
commonalities worth noting.
Both cities are positioned on the border of the central city. During the 1970 to 1980
period, the municipalities grew in black population at roughly the same rate. As noted
earlier, the municipalities’ percent of black residents were nearly identical in 1990. It was
at this point when the trajectories of University City and Jennings went in entirely different
directions.
As observed in Figure 30 (p.336), University City experienced some interesting
variances in economic conditions including poverty rates that appear to contradict the
notion of municipalities becoming poorer as its black residency increases. By 1990,
University City had experienced its largest gain in black population and peaked at 48.2 %
black residents. At this point, the city’s poverty rate was approximately 10 % less than the
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county average. Further, data indicates that over the next 25 years University City would
lose 11.3 % of its black population while experiencing a sharp increase in its poverty rate
up to just over 100 % of the county average.
Much of this increase could be attributed to declines in the overall economy during
these periods. However, the phenomena of black population decrease and increase in
poverty in the suburb raised important issues associated with University Cities’ economic
conditions over time which were well-worth investigating.
Despite University City’s increase in poor residents, its overall economic strata
remained strong throughout the period. This again raised a notable element associated with
the city’s racial shift and the impact on its economic conditions. Over the period between
1980 to 1990, University City enjoyed its largest jump in per capita income and median
household income. Notable was the fact that this period followed the period in which
University City experienced its largest growth in black residents. The following decades
saw a decrease of over 11 % in black population (See Figure 31, p.336).
In analyzing University City’s economic conditions, it became clear that the city
faced threats to its economic stability over the years such as acute shifts in rate of poor
residents. However, these threats appeared to have been effectively mitigated. Perhaps this
successful mitigation was due in part to positive trends that counter the threats. For
instance, when University City’s single parent headed households peaked in 1980 (17.2
%), though still below the county average, the spike was followed by a decade which saw
a peak of 58.3 % of residents with a bachelor’s degree or more (See Figure 32, p.337).
A 58 % increase in residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher could help
explained some of how University City managed to avoid full decline during periods of
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significant economic shifts. The city enjoyed a significant proportion of residents who were
more likely to be civically involved. However, following this surge in educated
constituents, University City experienced a significant decline in residents with degrees
over the next 10 years. Athough the city rebounded with modest increases over the next 15
years, the rate has not returned to the 1990 level (See Figure 32, p.337).
Unversity City’s residential demographics may offer an even more intriguing
quandry than its racial-economic dichotomy. During the periods of largest per capita and
median household income increases, University City experienced its largest declines in
owner occupied residency rates and its highest rates of renter occupied homes (See Figure
33, p.338). Further, during this period, the city’s median home values rose steadily (See
Figure 34, p.339). Most notably, the biggest jump in home values occurred during the
period of black population decline accompanied by a sharp increase in vacant housing (See
Figure 35, p.339).
It is possible that municipal governance had minimal impact on these trends and
that these phenomena were mostly caused by market forces, resident choices, or a
combination of the two. However, because University City was such a unique case among
this set and among most mature inner suburbs, an examination of the suburb’s municipal
government was warranted to better understand decisions and impacts of those choices on
economic conditions over time. Therefore, University City was confirmed as a stabilized
case for study.
Despite significant difference in total population, Florissant and Hazelwood
exhibited very similar traits elsewhere. Selecting the municipality that reflected attributes
most relevant to this study required a comparative analysis of the cities’ economic
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conditions over time. Florissant and Hazelwood’s economic attributes were viewed in the
context of the size differential between the two as certain comparisons were skewed due to
the population gap. Therefore, the analysis was not Florissant versus Hazelwood but rather
Florissant in relation to the study and Hazelwood in relation to the study.
A review of both municipalities’ economic trends revealed that conditions over
time remained within stable ranges of county-wide averages. Neither city experienced any
noteworthy spikes unique to trends exhibited at county levels. However, each city recently
experienced notable increases in their black population and reflected noticable changes in
median household incomes. Florissant experienced an insignificant increase in its median
household income (See Figure 36, p.340). Hazelwood, on the other hand, experienced a
6.3 % decrease in median household income in 2015 after its black population more than
doubled since 2000 (See Figure 37, p.340).
While Hazelwood’s black population grew at a slightly higher rate than
Florissant’s, the growth may not have been significant enough to account for the drop in
Hazelwood’s median household income. Florissant’s size and capacity could help explain
why the suburb’s median household income remained stable during the period. This
highlighted the possibility of size impacting municipalities’ ability to stave off economic
threats.
This also shed light on municipalities’ experiences related to their poverty rates
during the period in which both cities experienced their highest black migration into the
areas. As observed in Figures 38 and 39 (p.341), Florissant remained below the countywide average poverty rate while Hazelwood exceeded the county-wide average by 2015.
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Hazelwood exhibited signs of being acutely impacted economically by moderate to
significant shifts in racial composition while Florissant appeared to experience
insignificant changes in its economic conditions as a result of racial change in its residency.
However, further investigation illuminated that the phenomenon of black population
growth influenced some demographic attributes in the municipalities in virtually identical
ways and other demographic attributes in the inverse.
In analyzing Florissant and Hazelwood’s rates of single parent headed households
and percent of residents with bachelor’s degree or higher, the numbers were nearly
indiscernible, particularly during the period of the highest increase in black residents from
2000 to 2015 (See Figures 40 and 41, p.341-342). Despite their parallel trajectories in
demographic shifts over the 2000-2015 period, Florissant and Hazelwood exhibited
distinctly different residential traits. Contradictory to the results in poverty rate and income
levels for the cities, residential figures reflect Hazelwood experiencing a lower level of
adverse impact on its residential conditions over the period.
Despite Florissant’s occupied homeownership figures remaining higher and its
rentership lower than Hazelwood’s, Hazelwood’s homeownership decreased and
rentership increased at slower rates than Florissant’s during the period (See Figures 42 and
43, p.342-343). Further, Hazelwood’s home values (despite some decrease due to the
housing crisis of 2008) and vacancy rate were representative of a stable municipality with
the capacity to effectively navigate crisis and prevent decline (See Figures 44 and 45,
p.343).
This is not to imply that Florissant did not have the capacity to navigate crisis and
avoid decline. In fact, Florissant may have had more effective resources needed to thwart
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significant threats to its stability. This concept was important for better understanding the
varying levels of stability represented in these municipalities. Even though Florissant’s
homeownership decreased (See Figure 42, p.342), vacancy rate increased (See Figure 46,
p.344), and median home values decreased during the period of black population growth
(See Figure 47, p.344), it remains stable with values in stable range of county averages.
Additionally, one must consider how Florissant’s geographical space, number of
buildings, and number of residents impact figures. Based on the results of the analyses of
Florissant and Hazelwood’s economic conditions over the study period, Hazelwood was
selected as the fourth case for study for several key reasons: 1. Hazelwood’s sharp
population growth over the study period provided an interesting counterbalance to the other
cases that have all declined in population over the same period. And 2. Hazelwood’s size
presented additional bonuses for the investigation.
Hazelwood was a municipality large enough to leverage certain resources to
effectively address concerns of decline but was small enough to experience similar
challenges that have proven too great for several comparably sized cities in the region.
Hazelwood experienced positive demographic trends in response to racial and economic
shifts thus far. However, will the suburb maintain a balanced turnover rate and remain
stable or will a continued increase in black population and lower income residents lead to
resegregation and economic decline?
While this study does not seek to answer this question per se, the looming
possibility of the newly integrated area eventually tipping provided relevant information to
the study. I proceeded with caution and skepticism regarding Hazelwood’s status as a stable
municipality thus categorizing the suburb as a transitioning case for analysis purposes.
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Selected Cases
Ferguson, Hazelwood, Jennings, and University City (Note: Maplewood was added
to the study as a comparison case and was not held to the minimum thresholds).
Data Collection
Data was collected through primary sources such as official government archival
records of council, board, and committee meeting notes; legislation; ordinances; codes;
budgets; purchase orders; legal briefs; case files; transcripts; memos; letters; historical
documents; US Census including the American Community Survey; National Historical
Geographic Information System; St. Louis County; Missouri State auditor; and related
materials. Additionally, interviews of 25 stakeholders were conducted.
Secondary sources included books, prior studies, reports, electronic sources, print
articles, and multimedia news sources.
Recruitment
Interviewees were identified by accessing public records such as historical data,
occupancy permits, data bases, neighborhood associations’ membership logs, etc. Some
participants referred candidates for interview. Candidates were contacted via letter, phone,
and email notification requesting their participation in the study. Participants were
provided all the required forms and information prior to interviews commencing.
Participants
Individuals considered for participation in this study were limited to those who had
experience as a resident, public official, business owner, and other relevant connection to
the municipality being studied (e.g. employed in or by municipality, parents home located
in municipality, attended school in municipality). The criteria for participant eligibility

53

included at least five years’ experience in one or more of the aforementioned areas and
must be over the age of 35 at the time of interview.
Interviews
Interviews were preceded by a short conversation to confirm eligibility and level of
knowledge about areas. This process served to better categorize the participant in terms of
relevance to the study as well as topic of priority. Conducting this pre-interview
conversation allowed for effective and efficient organization of submissions for easier and
accurate identification and interpretation during the qualitative data analyses.
Interviews were conducted in person, over the phone, or via video chat. Interviews
were audio taped and handwritten notes were taken as well. The method in which the
interview was conducted depended primarily on how a participant was categorized and
how pertinent the participant’s perspective was to the study. While the selection process
may appear rather subjective, a clear rubric outlining various levels of priority was
developed based on timing of policies, institutional structure, fiscal conditions, racial
composition, and function of suburb (e.g. bedroom, commercial, etc.). This process
produced rigorous parameters for minimizing subjectivity.
Data Preparation
Data were considered with other relevant elements before performing the
examination for final interpretation. Along with integrating various quantitative data,
qualitative characteristics collected independent of interviews were categorized and
prioritized to be considered during the analyses phase. Certain integrated data were ranked
to account for variances in conditions and considered in a weighted context to better glean
unique nuances of municipal governance without significant skewing of findings due to
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outliers, unusual circumstances, one-time occurrences, and distinct municipal
characteristics outside of municipal governance authority.
Trustworthiness of the Research Process
There were potential biases, errors, and other subjective possibilities that could
skew results of the examination. The research methods accounted for these by
acknowledging them as well as leveraging techniques throughout the study to minimize
their effects. Scholars suggest that theory, policy, and decisions based on studies that only
offer a snapshot in time are problematic because the full picture may not be exposed, and
HUD determined that an area is racially impacted when more than a 10 % change in black
population occurs in a 10-year period, or when an area becomes more than 40 % black.63
With these principles serving as one of the guides to ensuring this study produces
reliable findings, an examination of time series data integrating a variation of the elements
above was performed. No one point in time was weighted more than another. To better
understand the changes occurring in racial composition and economic conditions,
phenomena were observed over time and contextualized with other factors before
interpreting the changes and identifying factors which influenced those changes.
In isolating factors which were outside the authority of municipal governance, a
better understanding of the role municipal governance played was achieved. Once the role
of municipal governance was identified, illuminating specificity and uniqueness within
each municipality was possible. Identifying and examining differences in municipal policy
and other related decisions provided information critical to an effective study of municipal
governance success and failure in stabilization efforts.

63

According to HUD 1979.
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Data analysis
Selected cases were categorized into three groups: 1. Stabilized, 2. Declined, and
3. Transitioning. Since some suburbs had small segregated pockets of poverty,
transitioning refers to municipalities exhibiting significant municipal-level segregation and
poverty increases over a shorter period but have yet to meet the declined thresholds. In
some areas, poverty remains well-concealed. Exclusive zoning and minimal pedestrianfriendly conveniences which tend to increase resident interaction make it difficult for
residents and visitors to observe poverty in certain areas.
Race is more easily identifiable than economic characteristics. Participant
submissions related to economic conditions may have been more tainted by the invisibility
of poverty in some areas than submissions related to race. Therefore, analyses of economic
conditions were performed utilizing more of the quantitative data and archival records than
data collected in interviews.
As for measuring race, the literature reveals that scholars depend a great deal on
U.S. Census data which helps mitigate the race quandary. Still, some researchers struggle
with what level of data to utilize due to potentially misleading findings. Researchers
express concerns that areas, often mistaken as integrated at the tract level, are not all that
integrated when data are examined at the block level.64
While this study utilizes Census place data in selecting the cases, more granular
nuances associated with the racial composition of municipalities were leveraged. These
included specific interview questions about racial dynamics, school enrollment records,
and racial composition in neighborhood associations.
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Ferman, Singleton and DeMarco 1998.
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Of important interest to researchers is the transition to predominantly black
municipalities from exclusively white ones and the transition from one race to integrated
over time. This study, however, dealt primarily with cases in which the municipality shifted
from all white to an integrated area and cases in which the municipality appeared to be
tipping to all black after experiencing a period of stabilization. However, the study does
not assume that municipalities were automatically tipping from all white to all black. A
selected case could have included a formerly stabilized area that was experiencing
resegregation back to all white.65
This study developed measures and interpretations that offered more insight on
what was truly happening as it relates to racial and economic change. For instance,
measuring the length of time an area maintains a certain racial composition and economic
health was a critical component to the study. The analysis challenged notions of success
and failure and offers an expanded understanding of effectiveness and political influence
by establishing metrics for better assessing varying degrees of integration and economic
implications.
Degrees of integration vary as its measures rang from slightly integrated to
moderately and then substantially integrated. This dissertation considered integration as
referring to the amount of black-white mix of residents in a given municipality. To measure
this mix, numbers were assigned to each level of integration relative to the proportion of
blacks in a municipality and how the proportion of blacks in a municipality compared to
the proportion of blacks in the county.
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See Ellen 1999; and Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2008.
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Economic strength was analyzed over the 45-year period by considering the
changes in the data points relevant to economic conditions. These figures were measured
against county-wide averages and compared within the set of selected cases in order to
ensure that cases were appropriately categorized according to fiscal strength and analysis
of financial decisions were performed equitably by adjusting measures to ensure relativity.
The case studies involved a robust set of qualitative data such as interviews,
archival records, and media stories. Interpreting the qualitative data involved integrating
the quantitative data elements and developing context in which to explain phenomena and
tell the story of municipal governance success and failure in stabilization. This process
required a great deal of subjectivity. Therefore, the analyses of quantitative data in selecting
the five cases as well as the integration of quantitative data into metrics with the qualitative
data were extremely important in minimizing subjectivity prior to the examination.
The examination of cases was performed with the utmost reverence to both the
quantitative and qualitative data. While eliminating all subjectivity in the study was
impossible, producing findings that consider only the data in measurable and replicable
contexts was attainable. This dissertation outlined a definitive rubric by which evidence
collected was measured and cataloged. This process assisted in strengthening the validity
of interpretations of the findings.
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Chapter 4. Municipal Governance in St. Louis Inner Suburbs
(Post-Fair Housing Era)
Introduction
By 1970, St. Louis County had become highly urbanized and was approaching a
million in population. Approximately 75 % of county residents lived in one of 96
incorporated areas. Of the 96 municipalities, 44 had less than 2,000 inhabitants. Efforts to
consolidate smaller municipalities had been ongoing since the mid-1960s. Proponents of
consolidation believed if these municipalities merged it would help solve many of the
problems county residents were experiencing. Meanwhile, some cities sought growth
through annexing pockets of unincorporated areas adjacent to their boundaries.66
The City of Ferguson had recently finalized its 15th annexation since incorporating
in 1894 and boasted a population in excess of 28,900 residents. Although University City
had lost around 10 % of its population since 1960, the municipality was still home to 46,309
residents. Study group cities Jennings, Hazelwood, and Maplewood recorded populations
of 19,379, 14,082, and 12,785 citizens, respectively. While these five cities were not among
the smaller communities under pressure to consolidate, they were experiencing pressure
nonetheless.67
Housing stocks, infrastructure, and service delivery systems were antiquated, and
demographics were rapidly changing. Populations in the inner ring were now older and
becoming increasingly poorer. Revenue sources were inadequate, inflexible, and in some
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According to US Census figures included in City of Ferguson, MO archives October 13, 1970, page 3 and
City of Hazelwood archives Special Meeting on County Consolidation: December 20, 1976.
67
National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS). When Ferguson incorporated in 1894, the
city had a population 1,200 residents. City of Ferguson archival document dated October 13, 1970, page 3.
Records of annexations taken from City of Ferguson archives Regular Council Session: February 14, 1984,
page 2.
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cases, obsolete. Inflation in the nation’s economy further intensified economic woes as
expenses often outpaced revenues. Concurrently, the failure of large urban renewal projects
in the City of St. Louis displaced many black families and in part, sparked a significant
housing shortage in the central city. Along with recent fair housing enactments, the lack of
available dwellings in the city resulted in more black families moving to the suburbs.68
As blacks moved westward, a complex financial crisis not unlike the one that had
existed in central cities for decades was emerging in the county’s older inner-ring suburbs.
A dramatic decline in revenues threatened significant reduction in public services and
spurred the need to continually increase taxes and commercial activity to maintain quality
public services. This created a cyclical effect that served to compound economic struggles.
Balancing budgets was increasingly difficult, and fiscal tools were limited. Suburban
governments were ill-equipped to effectively manage such dynamic changes without some
form of alteration in governance structure, financial aid, and resources from state and
federal agencies.69
Municipal officials scrambled to address public safety concerns, stem the tide of
residents exiting for newer suburbs established further from the central core, and to
maintain financial solvency. Left unaddressed, housing discrimination, mass exodus of tax
base, and outmoded suburban idealism would result in resegregated neighborhoods of
concentrated poverty garnering nominal property tax revenues from deteriorated housing
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Claim references multiple archival mentions of the results of urban renewal in St. Louis. For example,
Mayor Cervantes, St. Louis City sends communication regarding the housing shortage in the St. Louis
Metropolitan area which is included in City of Ferguson archival document from August 25, 1970, page 5.
69
Note: Larger municipalities like University City were not immune to the rapidly changing business
markets, demographics, and public demands. The city was feeling the strain from a shrinking and poorer
tax base. By 1970, 19 % of residents qualified for some form of public assistance or tax relief. University City
had already reached the legal limit of taxation on real property at $1 per $100 assessed valuation and could
not increase the rate without a vote of the people.
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stocks. Most pre-fair housing policies were no longer legal preventative options. Suburban
cities needed to develop creative strategies, enact policies, and support grassroots efforts
for meeting physical, fiscal, and social challenges.
Forms of Government
At the beginning of the study period (1970), University City and Ferguson were
two of only fifteen Missouri municipalities operating under a home rule charter having
adopted the provision in 1947 and 1954, respectively. Electing to govern under the councilmanager form of government, both municipalities had professionally trained and highly
skilled city managers. They were well-versed in county, state, and federal laws and
understood how policies at those levels impacted conditions and local governments’ tools
for dealing with conditions. Each city had a council comprised of six councilmembers (two
for each of the three wards) and one councilmember at-large (mayor) possessing one equal
vote in the council.70
Acting on recommendations from the charter review committee and with voter
approval, University City made several revisions to its charter in the last third of the 1970s.
Revisions included adjusting term limits from two years to four, establishing a conflict of
interest section, and stipulating council members deal with administrative staff only via the
city manager. In the late 1980s following a turnover of councilmembers, a rumor emerged
that Ferguson’s council was against the city manager form of government. Officials
vehemently denied these claims imploring citizens to allow the new council to gain
experience. Aside from a few charter moderations and an unfounded rumor, I found
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For more on charter cities and other forms of government and years of adoption, see Westbrook 1968,
page 45.
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nothing to suggest these cities were anything other than satisfied with the council-manager
form of government.71
Hazelwood and Maplewood adopted home rule charters and established the
council-manager form of government in the 1970s. Residents voted to transform their
governmental structure citing the need for a professionally trained manager. They believed
it was in their respective city’s best interest to have a city manager responsible for the dayto-day administration of city business. While the municipalities took different paths to
enacting the council-manager form of government, both cities struggled to adjust to the
change and experienced extreme difficulties early on.72
In 1969, the board of trustees of the Village of Hazelwood adopted its first charter
electing to institute the council-manager form of government. The village became a city on
April 7, 1970, established six wards with one councilmember per ward and a councilmanat-large (mayor), and initiated a search for a city manager. On September 15, 1970, the
City of Hazelwood officials began governing as a council-manager city. The first decade
was plagued with uncertainty, internal strife, and a high rate of administrative turnover.
According to one official, “With the newness of the charter, confusion arose. The council
was used to acting in the capacity of administrators.”73
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Ferguson officials believed the rumor began because of difficulties new councilmembers were
experiencing adjusting to being in office. They thought residents needed to give the new council a fair
chance to gain the experience needed to navigate public office. One councilmember stressed that he
supported the city manager form of government and as for inexperience, “By the time any new persons
would be elected they would be the inexperienced ones and the current members will have at least one
year of experience on the council.” City of Ferguson, MO archival document dated January 10, 1989, page
2.
72
According to claims in transcript of City of Hazelwood Mo archives Regular Session: July 26, 1978, page 9
of 13.
73
Excerpt of quote taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Special Session: March 11, 1971, page 1-2.
City of Hazelwood, MO Charter set forth on page 40, Section 4. "The Village Trustees shall remain in office
until the date the charter is adopted after the election of April 7, 1970. See also: City of Hazelwood, Mo
archival documents dated March 4, 1970; April 14, 1970; and September 9, 1970.
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Maplewood began its transition, in October 1974, by first establishing the office of
city administrator to be appointed by the mayor and approved by a majority of the city
council. Although the position required professional training and duties resembled those of
a city manager, the city administrator served at the pleasure of the mayor as the chief
administrative assistant. As was the case in Bridgeton, Missouri where 17 different
managers had served since 1968, the arrangement was not successful in Maplewood.
Shortly after the institution of the city administrator citizens began petitioning for the city
manager type of government. One petitioner exclaimed, “We’ll have a city manager who
is not the council's yes man. He's not anybody's yes man.”74
While Maplewood City Council initially rejected requests to transition, appeals
gained steam when candidates campaigned on a platform promising the installation of a
city manager. In 1976, the city began investigating the charter form of government and on
April 4, 1978, voters elected to adopt a home rule charter by a narrow margin of 1,462 to
1,325. The city selected the council-manager government, appointed its first city manager
on May 8, 1978, and later divided the city into three wards with two legislators serving
each ward. As in the other council-manager cities, the mayor was elected city-wide, had an
equal vote in the council, and did not have veto power.75
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Bill No. 3867: An ordinance creating the office of city administrator. City of Maplewood, Missouri archive
Regular Session: October 28, 1974, document 108-111. See Section 7: Duties in document 109. According
to reference made to Bridgton, MO in City of Hazelwood archive Special Session: August 23, 1978. Excerpt
of quote taken from transcript of public hearing in City of Maplewood, MO archives Year 1975, Document
No. 237.
75
City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1976 document #59, City of Maplewood Missouri archives year
1977 document number 380 resolution number 158, 1977; City of Maplewood Missouri archives Resolution
No. 31, 1978 declaring the results of the special municipal election voting on the proposition of the adoption
of a home rule city charter on the 4th day of April 1978 : by Ordinance No. 3924 approved on the February
13, 1978; City of Maplewood Missouri archives Resolution No. 40, 1978 approved May 8, 1978, Document
No. 49 and 84. See also, City of Maplewood, Missouri archive dated September 10, 1991 Document No.
310.
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Maplewood’s early experience with the council-manager government mirrored
Hazelwood’s experience. Attempts to remove mayors for alleged violations including
administrative interference were accompanied by suspension, resignation, and termination
of city managers. Hazelwood had three different city managers in its first five years as a
council-manager government and four in the first eight years. Maplewood changed city
managers three times in its first three years as a council-manager city. Some observers
believed the cities lost several very capable city managers during these times. Nonetheless,
each city would eventually settle into their new structure and enjoy competent, longserving city managers.76
The City of Jennings has never favored the council-manager form of government.
Through the years, officials and residents alike have expressed their preference to have
more elected officials rather than appointed administrators running the city. As a third class
city, Jennings possessed the authority to establish any form of government it wished
without voter approval. The municipality chose the mayor-council structure. The only
notable call for a city manager in the city’s history registered amid escalating turmoil
during the 1990s. Opponents of the idea mobilized, Jennings elected not to transition to the
council-manager governing arrangement, and the municipality remains a mayor-council
city to this day.77
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Allegations were that the mayor of Hazelwood violated a charter provision under Article II, Section 10
(Prohibition of Interference). See: City of Hazelwood, MO archive Special Session: March 11, 1971, page 1.
See also: archive dated September 15, 1971 for allegations Hazelwood mayor failed to report city mail
received. For city manager transitions, see archives Special Session: April 15, 1971; Regular Session:
November 5, 1975; Special Session: January 24, 1979; and Regular Session: June 6, 1979. See also,
Resolution No. 60, 1981 City of Maplewood, Missouri archives dated April 10, 1981 approved April 28, 1981
in Document No. 448; and 2/8/83 Document 133.
77
For more information about preferences see City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Council Session:
December 28, 1992, page 3. For more information on elected offices in Jennings in the 1970s, see City of
Jennings, MO archives Regular Session: February 8, 1971, page 5; and Jennings election results in Regular
Session April 12, 1971, page 6. Researchers from the University of Missouri conducted a study examining a
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Governing under the mayor-council form, the mayor of Jennings was an executive
official possessing veto power and the power to appoint boards and commissions. The
mayor performed many of the duties executed by city managers and other administrative
staff in council-manager cities. For example, Jennings’ mayors have been responsible for
planning for the city, directing community development, administering Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) programs, liability and property insurance programs,
and the signing of checks.78
A 1992 University of Missouri examination concluded, “The value of functions
performed by Jennings’ mayor far outweighs the compensation the mayor receives.”
Although the prevailing rationale for retaining the mayor-council form in Jennings rests in
the notion of more voter influence on administrative forces, it was clear affordability
played a role as well. The city saved money by not paying a mayor and a city manager. Did
this decision cost the city more long-term? Did the other municipalities better position
themselves to deal with stabilization threats by adopting the council-manager form of
government?79

change in the form of government in Jennings. Jennings could consider the commission, city manager, or
city administrator form or a city charter. The city could contract with the county for certain services, as well.
For more info see: Jennings archive Regular Session 1240: February 10, 1992, page 1; and Prepared
statement in reply to allegations, Document Aug. 10, 1992.
78
Section 7.250 of the Missouri revised statutes 1969: Mayor to be president of council, the mayor shall be
president of the council and shall preside over same but shall not vote except in case of a tie in said council
when he shall cast the deciding vote but provided however that he shall have no such power to vote in
cases when he is an interested party. He shall have the superintending control of all the officers and affairs
of the city and shall take care that the ordinance of the city and the state laws relating to such city are
compiled with. See: Jennings Regular Council Session: October 14, 1974, page 4 Document 2887; and
Resolution dated December 13, 1993.
79
Jennings record Regular Session 1240: February 10, 1992, page 1; and Document dated August 10, 1992,
page 41. Note: In one instance, a Jennings mayor offered to pledge his personal assets to the bank to secure
a loan so that the city employees’ payroll could be met. See Jennings documents above.
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I examined the municipalities’ forms of government to determine if and how form
of government impacted their role in stabilization.
Impact of Forms of Government on Municipal Governance
By the end of the study period (2015), Jennings had recently elected the first black
mayor in the city’s history. The city was also embroiled in a lawsuit filed against the city
by the new mayor. As the city’s contract with the St. Louis County Police Department
neared the renewal date, officials were seeking cheaper pricing for police services. City
lawmakers were also initiating impeachment procedures against the mayor on grounds of
incompetence and creating a hostile work environment. There were allegations of sunshine
law violations, misappropriation of funds, and abuse of power.80
The state of Jennings’ municipal government in 2015 bore striking resemblances to
the City of Maplewood in the 1970s— highly polarized and politically charged. Politicians
doubled as administrators, the city struggled financially, and local government was largely
ineffective and entangled in corruption allegations. In fact, one lawmaker in Maplewood
was indicted on 18 charges in 1973. Policymaking and administering city business is
difficult work. Trying to stabilize a municipality in this type of political environment is
much more daunting. However, not only did I find this type of environment in each
municipality at some point during the study period, I also observed increased
responsiveness to voter preferences and efficiency as negative environments proliferated.81
Campaign violations, corruption, “stealthy” backdoor dealings, and ineffective
municipal governance were not reserved for the mayor-council form of government in the
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City of Jennings, MO archives Regular Session: June 22, 2015, page 4; Regular Session: August 24, 2015,
page 3; Regular Session: November 23, 2015, page 2-3.
81
While there were four lawmakers removed from office, only one was indicted on charges. See City of
Maplewood, Missouri archives Year 1973, Documents 253-254; 320-321;
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City of Jennings. Intense infighting among lawmakers, polarized politics, divisive rhetoric,
and hardline stances were observed at one time or another in each study city during the
study period. These activities were exacerbated by recall attempts and multiple political
power struggles within local government. Just as Jennings had a strong mayor, each charter
city had strong city managers who not only managed the day-to-day but also enjoyed
immense power in the policymaking sphere.82
Interviewee U4 recalled about one city manager, “He gradually came to feel that it
was his city. He kind of just made decisions and the city council would rubber stamp it.”
The goal for the new council-manager cities was to separate politics from the
administration. However, citizens often complained their city manager behaved “like a
dictator.” Atmospheres were especially toxic when incoming legislators, voted in as pseudo
referendums, challenged veteran officials and established norms. Disagreements regarding
delineation of legislative and administrative duties often resulted in what one former local
lawmaker framed, “an inertia model for cooperation in an era of individualism.”83
Interviewee U2 thought it pertinent to point out, “In a council-manager city, the
council decides the budget and a professional administrator runs the city.” In doing so,
some city managers’ decisions led to votes of no confidence for poor performance,
disturbing results from financial audits initiated by citizen petitions, employment
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“Stealthy,” part of a larger quote referencing the speaker’s description of management style in City of
University City, MO archive Regular Meeting: October 10, 2005, page 13.
83
Excerpt from Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents.
Also, from Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public Official. “There was a
council that was not, in my opinion, protecting its initiative in the policy-making of the city. We had a city
manager at that time who, in my opinion was too active. Now with the current administration, he's trying
to take it back to his time.” Excerpt of Quote taken from City of University City transcript of archive Council
Retreat: October 31, 2006, page 1-4. Excerpt of quote from transcript of City of Hazelwood, Mo Public
Hearing dated July 26, 1978, page 9 of 13. For more information regarding the changing political landscape
and divide see archives: Regular Session: March 6, 2006, page1; and Council Study Session: August 28, 2006,
page 1.
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discrimination lawsuits, and alleged violations of citizens’ constitutional rights. Despite
the presence of professional administrations, council-manager cities faced “potentially
crippling financial obligations”84
There is broad agreement among political science scholars that there are significant
benefits to municipalities having a professional administrator. According to Interviewee
J4:
“Having a council-manager form of government with a professional city manager
plugs the policymaking apparatus into a tradition of looking for best practices. You
have a much broader sweep of alternatives that can be presented to elected officials
for making a determination about policy.”
Like pre-charter Hazelwood and Maplewood, Jennings lacked the expertise of a
professional city manager, and by the end of the study period, Jennings had long been
resegregated and economically stressed.85
Considering these observations, one may deduce that cities like pre-charter
Maplewood and Jennings struggled in large part because they were not council-manager
municipalities, and one rebounded in large part because it became one. However, the

84

Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official. It is important
to note that despite intense division and diminished federal and state supports, the council-manager cities
sustained high service levels. See: City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session Public Hearing dated May
5, 1971; September 1, 1976, page 7-8 of 11; City of University City Council meeting transcript of Regular
Session 1408: May 5, 1986, page 1; City of University City public hearing transcript of archive Session 1915:
March 29, 2004, page 13; City of University transcript of archive Session 1934: September 20, 2004. Excerpt
of quote from Interview U1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 33-year Resident / Public Official. Also, a poll of
several thousand city residents showed 55.4 % were in favor of a state audit of city finances, 17.6 % opposed
the audit, and 27 % were undecided. Poll numbers listed in City of University City archive Regular Session:
December 7, 2009. See also, Humphreys v. City of University City, et al. Case information outlined in City of
University City archive Regular Council Meeting October 26, 2009, page13. For example, University City’s
insurance deductible was as high as $150,000 as a result of so many lawsuits levied against the city.
According to a University City official, the city was no longer in the insurance pool because “we had been
sued so often.” Note: Deductibles for cities like University City normally range between $10,000 to $15,000.
85
Excerpt of quote from Interview J4: 07/26/2019. White / Male / Educator / Consultant / Ex-Outreach
Director.
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evidence does not support such claims. It is clear their institutional structures, operational
mechanisms, and subsequent conditions differed from the council-manager municipalities.
Nevertheless, I found that the forms of government did little to influence the quality
of municipal governances’ policy decisions. In fact, I found Jennings’ policy decisions—
particularly pre-2000s were slightly superior to Ferguson’s in terms of quality (number of
times best practice was applied to in-common destabilizers). Best practice refers to policies
and practices which mitigated negative effects of destabilizing activities. Examples of best
practice include open housing/antidiscrimination policies, zoning which dispersed low
income rentals, and establishment of a land clearance authority or housing corporation.
Jennings’ mayor-council government did not preclude the city from proactively
intervening, supporting grassroots stabilization efforts, and making good policy and
administrative decisions. Equally, the presence of a city manager did not exclude Ferguson
from failing to do so. As a former mayor of Hazelwood said:
"No government is better than the people who run it. It makes no difference what
the form may be so long as the administrators are honest and capable."86
Faced with the Jennings/Ferguson form of government dilemma, I examine other
distinguishing characteristics which may better account for discrepancies in quality of
policies. I posed the question, did officials’ characteristics and the varying composition of
individuals in municipal government determine the quality of policy decisions? I examined
municipal officials’ characteristics and the composition of governments to better determine
if and how these attributes impact municipal governances’ role in stabilization.

86

Excerpt of quote taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Special Session: April 22, 1981.
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Characteristics and Composition of Municipal Governance
Many transitions occurred in the 1970s, but few were more significant than the
changes in characteristics and composition of municipal governments. Some cities tried to
improve conditions by professionalizing. They were new to the council-manager form and
struggled adjusting to the transition. Others witnessed longtime serving officials and
established professionals cycle out. Some were replaced with individuals who upheld
previous policies and practices. Others were replaced with reformers. Cities created new
positions and redefined roles for existing ones. Regardless of the shifts and alterations in
municipal governance, municipalities experienced perpetual crisis in the 1970s.87
Policymakers and administrators diligently attempted to serve as stabilizing
influences in their respective cities. They generally tried to engage and educate citizens and
work with various groups for their city’s betterment. Municipal leaderships consisted of
talented, knowledgeable decisionmakers possessing unique specializations. They held firm
commitment to upholding the constitution as public officials, took pride in their public
service, and believed by governing according to the letter of the law, “Every citizen was
amply protected.”88
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See City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1973 document 202; City of Maplewood Missouri archives
year 1973 document 202; City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1973 document 209; and City of
Maplewood archives September 28, 1979 Document number 273 -274. City of Ferguson, MO archive dated
March 26, 1974 page 7. In University City, by mid-year 1975, City Manager announced on May 12, 1975 he
accepted the city manager position in Eugene, Oregon. His departure signaled a substantial changing of the
guard. Henry had served as city manager since 1958. City of University City archive Regular Session 1105:
June 16, 1975, page 28; For more about resignations and decisions not to run for reelection see the
following: City of University City archives: Session 1172: October 17th, 1977, page 2; Session 1176:
December 12, 1977, page 15; and Session 1187: May 22, 1978, page 2.Also, see Charter revisions of 1975.
The term councilmember replaced councilman. Councilman at-large was now referred to as mayor. For
more on the city’s charter revisions of 1975 refer to City of University City archive Session 1120: December
15, 1975, page 5. See also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated April 18, 1979.
88
Excerpt of quote taken from City of University City archive Regular Session 1069: March 18, 1974, page
10.
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However, civility and collaboration were difficult to achieve during this period,
especially between parties with diverging perspectives on how to approach changes in
racial composition and economic conditions. Interviewee U5 described the environment
this way:
“Before, there were always people striving to get to the middle to make decisions,
understanding that compromise was important for peace and stability. But you
didn't see that anymore in city government.”
Lines were clearly drawn. Officials stood firm on either side and did not mince words
regarding alliances.89
While each municipality’s municipal governance consisted of a majority of
officials in favor of progressive racial integration policies and practices, opponents of such
measures were present and vocal in each case. Opposing integration, albeit a view held by
a minority of officials in the study group, was widely accepted, and in some situations
expected. To get a better sense of the atmosphere during this period, observe the language
used by a Ferguson lawmaker to refer to Kinloch residents and councilmates in the
following excerpts of a 1970 public hearing transcript:
“We have people here in the city saying that we have to play it [really] careful, it’s
touchy. I think we should call a spade a spade, a black a black, and not be afraid to
face up to these people and tell them we don’t want their little pickaninnies coming
over and throwing rocks at our kids…. Call a coon a coon and nigger a nigger. If
you are [diplomatic] about it they walk right over you.”
“I sometimes get disgusted by some of the outrageous antics of the council
majority…. In these times when it sometimes seems as though the limp wristed,
weak wheel types are [predominant] in so many areas, it has been a pleasure for me
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Excerpt from Interview U5: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / Resident / Ex-State Government Official.
Interviewee says, “I would go to a meeting and I wouldn't care if it was about whether or not we should put
a tag on a dog at the dog park; half the people were yes, and half the people were no. Nobody was in the
middle.”
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to serve on the council with a real man’s man…who is not afraid to espouse the
proper…position no matter how politically unpopular.”90
Despite the fact that some fellow city officials held racist convictions, municipal
leaders employed collegial approaches in attempts to reach consensus. They quickly
became adept at navigating rough political, economic, and social terrains consistently
seeking to learn new strategies and techniques. They participated in professional
development groups and held memberships in local, state, and national consortia designed
to help build municipal capacity for combating threats to stability. Council majorities often
responded to issues in concert— particularly in matters related to justice. However,
decisions did not always align with their expressed views. In these instances, minority rule
prevailed.91
For cities like Hazelwood, where civic engagement was relatively low, and
Maplewood, where no threat of resegregation ever emerged, municipal leadership enjoyed
more liberty to enact policy and practices consistent with the preferences of the council
majority and administrative recommendations. These municipalities realized tremendous
progress and accomplishments. Hazelwood grew from a small village occupying the 15th
position in 1970 to registering as the fifth largest municipality in St. Louis County by 2002.
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Excerpts of quotes taking from City of Ferguson, MO archive dated June 23, 1970, page 5 and City of
Ferguson, MO Outgoing Council Session: April 11, 1978, page 3. See also, Ferguson archive dated August
25, 1970, page 5.
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When the Missouri Municipal League decided to endorse a Missouri, Peace Officers Associationsupported mandatory sentencing bill, University City Council unanimously opposed the league’s position.
They sympathized with the association’s objectives but thought it inappropriate for the league to take a
position on the matter. Officials argued the function of imposing criminal sentences should be left to the
judiciary and not enacted into law by the Missouri General Assembly. For more information regarding the
council’s position on the bill refer to archive Regular Session 1061: November 26, 1973, page 6-7. See also,
See University City, MO archive Session 1120: December 15, 1975, page 2.
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As far as revitalizations are concerned, Maplewood’s renaissance serves as a model that
cities continue attempting to replicate.92
While increased flexibility in municipal governance does not explain their success,
it did increase the probability of decisionmakers voting according to their preferences—
which usually aligned with best practice. In the civically engaged cities experiencing
change in racial composition, policymakers did not enjoy the same freedoms. Voting
according to best practice sometimes meant going against an overwhelming majority of
constituents. Against their better judgement lawmakers could choose to honor the requests
of those who put them in office and preserve their seat, or they could choose to vote for
best practice and risk losing it.
In chapter 5, I examine policy decisions and contextualize them in their respective
citizen environment to better understand if and how citizen environment impacted policy
decisions, how policy decisions impacted municipal stabilization, and how this relationship
influenced municipal governance’s role in stabilization.
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Note: As late as 1980, Maplewood was still working on improving its fair housing policies. See, City of
Maplewood, MO archives Year 1980, Document No. 346. Bill No. 4141: an ordinance authorizing and
directing the mayor of Maplewood to enter into a contract with St. Louis County for assistance and services
to further the policies of the fair housing code of the City of Maplewood passed unanimously; City of
Maplewood, archives March 25, 1980, Document 350. Bill number 4141 was approved on March 25, 1980
as Ordinance Number 4035 filed in Document No. 350. According to City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated
November 4, 1970; City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated April 21, 1971, page 10. City of Hazelwood, Mo
archives dated September 1, 1976; and November 20, 2002. City of Maplewood Missouri archives August
3, 1983, Document 221; City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 23,1983 Document number 224; City
of Maplewood Missouri archives May 8, 1984, Document number 289; City of Maplewood, Missouri
archives June 22, 1993.
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Chapter 5. Housing Policy
Introduction
For decades, suburban governing bodies enjoyed immunity from having to deal
with the types of racial and spatial challenges emerging in the suburbs in the 1960s, 1970s,
and in to the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, most were ill-equipped to effectively do so. Their
policies were designed and enacted in the pre-fair housing era. In many suburban
communities, archaic restrictive deed covenants were still in use and various other
discriminatory laws still stained the pages of city code books. With the advent of fair
housing laws, suburbs began to face threats traditionally reserved for central cities.
With diverse housing options and a county-wide apartment boom occurring, cities
like this study’s five municipalities could accommodate homebuyers and renters of all
races and economic stations. This status rendered these cities vulnerable to panic selling,
white flight, and loss of tax base. When black suburbanization began in the early 1960s, it
was primarily working-class, middle-class, and upper middle-class individuals and
families in search of a safe, pleasant, and affordable community in which to settle. Black
home seekers desired good schools, pedestrian friendly public spaces, quality public
services, and a mix of amenities.
As black migrants from St. Louis City settled in the various municipalities, a
disturbing trend emerged. Black families were relocating from isolated concentrations in
the central city to rapidly transforming areas in the suburbs. They settled in resegregating
neighborhoods comprised of primarily smaller, more affordable post-WWII homes and
multifamily dwellings. Eventually, many of these communities mirrored the segregated
neighborhoods of St. Louis city. Differences in white/black median household incomes and
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neighborhood preferences could explain only a modest percentage of racial disparities in
the housing market.93
Municipalities’ housing stock and income of home seekers could not account for
the level of resegregation occurring in these neighborhoods. Inner suburbs were
resegregating in large part because of housing discrimination. Real estate agents would not
show black families homes in white neighborhoods and discouraged white families from
moving into areas where blacks were present. Regardless of economic status blacks were
steered towards neighborhoods where blacks lived (traditionally offering low-value
housing at inflated prices) and white families were steered away from those areas. The
practice of racial steering was emblematic of the federal government’s real estate policies.
The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also
engaged in housing discrimination. HUD’s mortgage insurance program administered by
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) refused to insure loans for white families
attempting to buy homes in and around black residential areas. HUD properties repossessed
through foreclosure and tax sales were often left vacant and in need of substantial repairs.
Some were vandalized and left in such disrepair they had to be condemned and
demolished.94
The real estate industry and federal housing administrators engaged in housing
discrimination and other activities which were detrimental to communities. Their actions
93

According to reviews of 1970-2010 US Census data and 1970-2015 demographical indicators from each
study city.
94
Example of discriminatory housing practices being employed during a time following the passage of the
1968 Fair Housing Act. For more details about this example see: City of University archives Regular Council
Meeting Session 1104: June 9, 1975, page 15. In one instance, a white family moved from Kansas City and
purchased a University City business. They placed $2,500 down on a three-bedroom home in the Third Ward
but were denied an FHA loan. The denial letter cited “instability” as the reason the agency did not approve
the loan. The family involved was a family of means. It was widely known that the FHA would have
authorized the same house for a minority family who needed counseling to cope with the payments.
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helped accelerate and intensify resegregation and neighborhood blight and made stabilizing
these areas much harder for local governments and citizens. When HUD amended its public
housing program, proponents pointed to the new format as an effective way to avoid the
decline experienced during the failed public housing projects model.
The new system involved HUD transitioning from developing and managing public
housing to paying a share of low-income renters’ rent on the open market through Section
8 subsidized housing. Local officials wrestled with the question of proportionality of
Section 8 housing within their municipal borders. Most municipalities discouraged
developments and aimed to restrict the total amount of rental property by setting maximum
limits. However, as suburban populations aged and transitioned income levels, notable
numbers of residents could no longer maintain their larger homes. Thus, certain areas
allowed for higher percentages of subsidized housing.
As black suburbanization progressed, migration became more a result of
displacement rather than choice. North St. Louis County became inundated with lowincome black residents uprooted from failed housing projects in the central city. Some
communities possessed the resources, capacity, preparedness, and willingness to mitigate
negative reactions to integration thus minimizing their destabilizing effects. Although
some others were not as resource rich or equipped to effectively combat resegregation and
economic decline, each possessed the capability to implement policies designed to help
stabilize their city.
Regardless of policy starting point, each of the study’s municipal council
demonstrated attention to detail, performed careful analysis of issues, and enlisted the
assistance of independent experts. Officials navigated rapidly evolving environments
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which included significant demographic shifts, market fluctuations, and funding
modifications.

Circumstances

required

amending

allowances

for

multifamily

developments, affordable housing, and subsidies. Through various policy actions related
to antidiscrimination, appropriations, building codes, zoning, and land reutilization local
governments enacted ordinances based on their respective goals.95
Policy decisions were distinguished by each respective municipality’s
policymaking processes; level of citizen civic engagement, citizens’ preferences, and
legislators’ responses to citizen engagement and preferences; types of policies enacted;
timing of policy actions; and other ancillary factors such as varying instructions for how
administrative forces were to implement and execute policies and monitor policy impacts.
Municipal governance’s role in municipal-level stabilization started with open housing /
antidiscrimination, housing, and land use decisions, indecisions, and nondecisions.96
Open Housing / Antidiscrimination
While no singular variable exists to explain why black residents in Maplewood
represented only .2 % of the city’s population at the start of the study period, research
allows us to conclude racism played a part. Like 18 other counties in Missouri, blacks were
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Residents accused city servicers of treating apartment complexes as rows of single-family homes and
allowing multiple families to occupy single-family units. Municipal governments set out to address the issue
of overcrowding by instituting new policies and regulations which dictated who could live together in a
single housing unit. Policies aimed to alleviate overcrowding in neighborhoods and schools ignited a fierce
debate over the definition of family. Many residents felt defining family in occupancy policy was an
outrageous infringement on privacy. Other opponents of the policies felt ulterior motives may be behind
the restrictions. Detractors argued the laws were discriminatory because they targeted low-income
families, served to only protect wealthier residents and property values, and were based on fear of opening
the gates to poor blacks. Groups like the League of Women Voters spoke out against the policies. They along
with others worked to increase the supply of low and moderate-income housing by getting zoning laws
changed to allow for shared housing. Shared housing was critical as older adults and other groups living on
limited incomes represented a significant proportion of residents.
96
I use the term “Positive” to denote municipal influence that helped municipality stabilize. Conversely,
negative influence would denote inaction or actions which influenced the expansion of resegregation in the
community.
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not yet welcome to reside in most areas of St. Louis County in 1970. One-half of one
percent of Jennings’ residents were black, less than one percent in Ferguson, and just under
two percent in Hazelwood. University City’s black residents accounted for 20 % of that
municipality’s total population. The city had experienced remarkable growth in black
residency over a short period of time.97
Just 10 years earlier, only 88 of University City’s 51,000 residents were black. Of
the city’s 260 employees, only 35 were black and they held only unskilled jobs in the
sanitation department. Much of post-1970 neighborhood change and racial integration
literature praise University City as a pioneer of open housing in the 1960s and rightfully
so. However, one should be careful not to romanticize the University City experience as a
racially harmonious utopia borne of exceptionalism, altruism, and passivity. As late as
1959, University City seemed just as unlikely to be a leader in the protection and promotion
of blacks’ civil rights as the other municipalities in the study.98
Racial discrimination was not only prevalent in the city, it was still officially
sanctioned by law in many arenas. A University City ordinance adopted in 1938 requiring
black males working as city porters and janitors to wear badges bearing their photographs
and fingerprints was still in use. And a survey conducted by the League of Women Voters
found that of 45 establishments serving food and drink more than half did not serve blacks.
When black families began migrating to the area in 1962, racist fears of irresponsible
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According to US Census data; and demographical indicators taken from each city’s archives as of 2015.
Population figures according to the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS). Also
referenced in Harris 1981, p.156; and Lubeck 1978, p.73 along with Missouri counties’ persistence of
discriminatory views of blacks and city employment figures.
98
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tenants, absentee landlords, declining property values, and proliferation of crime
abounded.99
The in-migration of black families prompted an exodus of white residents and a
dramatic reduction in the growth of new white residents. Interviewee U5 recalls:
“I was the second African American in the neighborhood in 1967. As time went by
though, I started seeing other African Americans move in around me. Before long
it was a little over 50 % African American. It stayed like that for a while, and it was
stable.”100
University City’s success in stabilizing was in large part the result of intelligent,
proactive, and strategic action by a cooperative collection of municipal officials and citizen
advocates. Notwithstanding, policy decisions were the critical component supporting and
empowering the actors to effectively navigate amenable as well as adversarial
environments.
Throughout the 1960s, instead of denying the inevitable (a substantial increase of
blacks residing within their municipal borders) or engaging in futile prevention attempts,
University City lawmakers went about the work of instituting progressive policies aimed
at preventing resegregation. They enacted fair housing ordinances, established antiblockbusting policies prohibiting real estate agents from steering and soliciting sales,
banned the use of “for sale” signs, and implemented an occupancy permit system.
University City’s municipal governance was not necessarily prepared for the situation, but
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For a more detailed history on the racial shift and the city’s response, see Harris, N. 1981. Legacy of Lions:
A History of University City. University City, MO: The Historical Society of University City; and Lubeck, Dennis
R. (1978). University City: A Suburban Community's Response to Civil Rights, 1959-1970. St. Louis University.
The 1938 identification ordinance and survey information taken from Harris 1981, p.156; and Lubeck 1978,
p.73.
100
Excerpt from Interview U5: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / 52-year Resident / Ex-State Government Official.
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it acted swiftly. Officials maximized available policy tools, innovated, educated, and
advocated new policy tools.101
By 1970, University City looked strikingly different than the other four
municipalities. It was a multi-ethnic, multi-racial city compromised of residents of various
nationalities and religious affiliations with a wide range of educational backgrounds. As
the community’s ethnic character broadened, it retained its upper-middle-class standing.
Blacks moving into the municipality matched whites in education and income levels. Data
indicates 73 % of the work force were employed in white collar jobs and 61.5 % of houses
were owner-occupied. Perceptions of a crisis that had gripped the city several years earlier
soon dissipated.102
Although University City’s forward thinking put them ahead of the integration
curve during the turbulent 1960s, the phenomenon still brought with it many social
challenges amid growing economic strife and inter-suburban and exurban competition.
Except for episodic examples, the study’s remaining cities were not experiencing such
destabilizing activities. Migration of St. Louis blacks had not yet reached their municipal
boundaries. Via direct communication, consortia updates, and other avenues, local
government leaders in other cities remained abreast of the events happening in University
City. They were well-aware the municipality was combating resegregation of its
neighborhoods and was no longer an enclave of white exclusivity.
University City’s experience granted other municipalities not only the benefit of
additional time to prepare, but also demonstrable evidence of effects of certain policy
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See City of University City, MO Fair Housing Information at ucitymo.org/203/Fair-Housing-Information;
Harris 1981, p.160.
102
Figures taken from Harris 1981, p.163.
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actions. Among the study group city councils, none leveraged these benefits more
effectively than Hazelwood City Council. Additionally, no other city’s local lawmakers
held as many meetings and reviewed the same items more repetitiously before deciding an
action than Hazelwood’s.
The City of Hazelwood held a minimum of four meetings per month— one each
Wednesday and held additional meetings as needed. Councilmembers were aggressively
involved often performing duties executed by city managers in other cities. Only months
into operating as a charter city, Hazelwood City Council established itself as a highly
productive, progressive policymaking body.103
In July 1972, Hazelwood requested a copy of the City of Berkeley’s antisteering/anti-blockbusting ordinance to study. Despite the most recent census indicating
the municipality was home to only 270 black people out of a total population of over 14,000
residents, Hazelwood City Council initiated a stabilizing policy implementation program.
On August 7, 1974, the city council unanimously passed Bill No. 1101 strengthening the
prohibition of housing discrimination. Filed as Ordinance No. 1071-74, the legislation
outlawed the practices of steering and solicitation. Less than a year later, on June 18, 1975,
the city adopted Ordinance No. 1118 -75 banning real estate signs.104
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City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated February 7, 1979.
City of Hazelwood, MO archives dated July 19, 1972; Special Session dated July 13, 1972; Regular Session
August 7, 1974: An ordinance amending the municipal code of the City of Hazelwood, Missouri, by
amending Chapter 7, Buildings, buy the adoption of Article IV, Sections 7.13 and 7.14 relating to the
regulations of solicitation of the sale, rental, leasing, or otherwise disposing of or moving away from such
dwellings, and discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. To prohibit
interference with the peace of owners and occupants of such dwellings by the use of certain tactics to
encourage such owners or occupants to sell or move from such desires to make available to any person,
regardless of race. For real estate ban see City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated June 18, 1975: Bill
1144 was adopted as ordinance number 1118-75 by vote of 4 to 2 on June 18, 1975; and Special Session
dated August 25, 1975.
104
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Hazelwood’s enactment of these legislations was in no way unprecedented. As
referenced earlier, University City and Berkeley had similar ordinances on the books and
larger central cities had leveraged the policy tools in various forms years earlier.
Nevertheless, Hazelwood’s actions were noteworthy as they occurred long before any
notable signs of resegregation or threats materialized. In fact, Hazelwood had ten fewer
real estate listings over the year leading up to enacting the real estate sign ban than it had
two years prior.105
Hazelwood officials’ position on proactive antidiscrimination, blockbusting, and
steering policies was best demonstrated in the following two statements made by two
different councilmembers: “The appearance of two or three for sale signs in an area has a
psychological effect and could create a problem.” And, “Since we do not have this problem
as yet, this would help prevent its developing.” Racial integration literature lists early
intervention as a critical requirement in stabilizing municipalities. Like University City
before them, Hazelwood acted early.106
By the year 2000, Hazelwood’s black population had grown to 16 % from just under
two percent 30 years earlier. Consider also, Hazelwood’s total population nearly doubled
during the 30-year period growing from 14,082 to 26,206. Contrast that with Ferguson
where total population had declined 23 % but black residency went from less than one
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According to statistics referenced in City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated June 18, 1975.
The City of St. Louis system only allowed real estate signs in residential areas if the petitioner paid a fee of
$5. 00 and appeared before the Human Relations Commission to seek a variance to permit such a sign. The
city did not grant many permits. Opponents of the ban including representatives of the Real Estate Board
of Metropolitan St. Louis suggested alternatives which were in use in various locales along the east coast
(e.g. Baltimore County). They argued they had been effective without being as restrictive as the Hazelwood
ban. Signs may be used, but if ten voters petition to have certain signs removed, the authorities must hold
a public hearing to decide if they should be removed. They then pass a resolution to ban signs in that area.
This process took a minimum of 90 days. The procedure was unresponsive to immediate problems.
106
Excerpts of quotes taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated May 21, 1975.
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percent in 1970 to accounting for over 52 % of the municipality’s population by 2000.
Racial composition and population were not the only discernable differences between the
two cities. Ferguson not only gained a disproportionate number of new black residents,
they gained a disproportionate share of poor black residents.107
Consider that by the time Ferguson instituted its landlord initiative in 2005, the
problem the city hoped to solve already had an over 35-year head start. Of the 385 tenant
eviction recommendations made through Ferguson’s landlord initiative between January
2008 and June 2010, 46 % emanated from six apartment complexes on the city’s eastside.
Nearly half of all emergency and police calls made in Ferguson in 2010 were attributed to
these six apartment complexes and of those, more than 2/3 originated in two apartment
complexes: Canfield (42) and Northwinds (56). Contrast this with the five calls made from
the six-building Arbor Village Courts apartment complex on the city’s westside and an
obvious distinction in conditions begins to emerge.108
Erected in the late 1960s, a cluster of apartment complexes on the eastside of
Ferguson adorned an area flanked by small homes, neighboring Jennings, and a busy
thoroughfare. For the city of nearly 30,000 residents, 28 % renters, and 84 % post-WWII
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Note: By 1997, an average of 80 dwellings per month were transitioning occupants due to people moving
in and out of Ferguson. Stat taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: May 27, 1997, page
2. According to US Census data; Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information
System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016.
108
City of Ferguson, MO archives entitled Extended 2010 Council Work Session Transcript, pages 86, 89, 91.
Ferguson officials held a council work session to discuss the problems emanating from the city’s eastside
apartment complexes. Officials believed the complexes were becoming a public safety issue. Despite 40
years of citizen complaints and concerns, officials were asking “What's going on there?” And did not know
“what else we're going to do from the council standpoint.” They were unsure if the problem was their
concern. The mayor expressed this, “I almost feel like if that's a concern of ours, we should probably just
go ahead and instruct our staff now to start brainstorming or coming up with a solution to bring something
to us.” Officials identified two major conflicts: 1. Need for a better screening process of acceptable tenants.
2. Properties’ ownership needs to provide a safe environment by enhancing their security with private
security on location, gated communities, etc. City of Ferguson, MO archives entitled Extended 2010 Public
Hearing Transcript, pages 86, 89, 91.
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dwellings, developments like the Canfield and Village apartments went largely
unnoticed— except by area homeowners. Longstanding problems had existed in the area
prior to the advent of the apartments.109
With no traffic light system at the intersection of West Florissant and Canfield, no
speed limit signs, and no speedbumps on the access road, heavy traffic and speeders made
negotiating the area extremely dangerous for pedestrians. Insufficient city services and
government apathy left this section of Ferguson’s Third Ward feeling ignored. The
apartment complexes added overflowing trash dumpsters and constant drainage backups
intensifying local frustrations. Supplicating for action from the city, one civically engaged
citizen asked, “What can be done for the people living on Canfield?”110
The city attributed its inaction to having no authority in these matters. West
Florissant was a state road, apartment complexes were private properties responsible for
providing refuse services, and MSD held authority over the sewer system. Before long
homeowners who had resided on streets like Canfield, Glen Owen, Ellison, and Clarion for
decades began putting their homes up for sale. When this process began, Ferguson was still
overwhelmingly white. There were only 265 black citizens in the entire city, and the
majority of racial hostility focused on the black municipality to the west— Kinloch.111
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Ibid
Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson public hearing Regular Session: February 10, 1970, page 3.
See also, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: July 10, 1973, page 1. Citizens address council
concerning speeding conditions existing in the area of Canfield and Village apartments. A man was killed
while walking on the sidewalk by a speeding car. Citizens in the area remain concerned after years of
petition the city to act. City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Session: June 9, 1970, page 5; April 14, 1970,
page 1; June 9, 1970, page 1; April 27, 1971, page 1; May 11, 1971; Traffic Commission Meeting: May 12,
1971; July 27, 1971, page 1; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session: October 14, 1975, page 2; Ferguson
Regular Session: March 8, 1977, page 4.
111
Note: University City took a decidedly different approach. Even though similar traffic light installations
were needed in their city and were beyond their scope of authority, University City worked with the
Missouri State Highway Department to get them installed. University City officials implemented
requirements for private complexes to secure refuse services and even negotiated contracts to provide the
110
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It had only been months since the municipality removed barricades erected to
prevent Kinloch resident’s entry into Ferguson. While the city’s racist animus focused on
preserving and protecting the westside of Ferguson from a Kinloch invasion, demographics
on the city’s eastside were transforming. The city’s policies, however, were not. Within a
decade, Ferguson’s total population declined 14.4 %, black population increased to 13.6
%, and Jennings had erected a barricade quarantining Ferguson’s eastside residents from
its western borders. By 2010, the transformation was complete, Ferguson was 67.4 %
black, and its eastside was home to a resegregated area comprised of multifamily
complexes, low-cost single-family rentals, and concentrated poverty.112
During the fall of 1996, the Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing Opportunity
Council (EHOC) conducted an audit of real estate firms serving Ferguson. Utilizing tests
designed to detect disparate treatment and noncompliance with fair housing laws, the
agency found firms treated minorities different. According to a Ferguson resolution,
“Violators may be required to attend housing training provided by EHOC.” By the time
the City of Ferguson contracted EHOC to investigate real estate practices, 35 years had

service. With habitual flooding in the municipality, University City worked closely with MSD in efforts to
address its challenges with the River Des Peres.
112
According to Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version
11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016. http://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V11.0.
Ferguson officials finally sought to address the West Florissant/Canfield intersection problem by calling for
a bond issue election for a traffic signal in 1977. See bond issue resolution and Jennings barricade issue in
City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Session: March 8, 1977, page 4; Ferguson Regular Session: March 22,
1977, pages 1 and 4. See also, Jennings Regular Session: April 11, 1977, page 1, Document No. 3082: Public
hearing to decide if a barricade should be erected on Clarion Dr. and Ellison Dr. at the boundary line
separating the City of Jennings and the City of Ferguson. A unanimous decision that the streets could be
blocked with no detrimental effects. Jennings argued there were adequate fire plugs and alternate
automobile routes available to the residents of Ferguson. Ferguson citizens did not want the barricade and
stated they believed the only reason people wanted the barricade was racial. Jennings Regular Session:
February 28, 1977 document 3069; Jennings Regular Session: April 11, 1977, page 4, Document 3087;
Jennings council approved the barricade. See, Bill No. 1201: An ordinance authorizing the Jennings street
department to barricade Ellison drive at the boundary line separating the City of Jennings and the City of
Ferguson passed unanimously and approved as ordinance No. 1183. Jennings Regular Session: April 25,
1977, page 1, Document No. 3089.
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elapsed since the first black families began migrating west to settle in University City,
black residents had represented roughly 15 % of Ferguson residents for nearly 20 years,
and had represented a quarter of the total population for a decade.113
For blacks moving into Ferguson during the black suburbanization period, they
were entering a city with a decidedly different policy agenda than University City and
Hazelwood. Consider that by 1995, Ferguson still had not accepted Oak Park, IL racial
integration group’s offer to help initiate programs, and the city had not implemented any
of the group’s recommendations. During a council work session, officials made their
positions on the Oak Park matter clear through the following statements:
“I see it as governmental steering. I don’t think that is an appropriate governmental
activity. I have been opposed to a report listing occupancy turnover and how many
of the different races have moved into Ferguson. There are too many other
important things for the council to do like economics and streets.”
“I’m not totally against the Oak Park programs. There are some good things behind
it, but I don’t think most of it would work for us.”
A former Ferguson councilmember attending the council work session said,
“Ninety-nine percent of comments involved racial issues. I believe this is one more
attempt to enforce racial integration.”114
Long before the word Ferguson became synonymous with suburban transgressions,
the seeds of the city’s principal challenge were sown. Divided policy preferences, lack of
political will among a slim council majority, and disproportionate policy power enjoyed
by a slim citizen majority led to a deficit in best practice policies which plagued the city
throughout the study. For decades, community members supporting integration efforts in
Ferguson had been overshadowed by those opposing such measures.
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Excerpt of Resolution passed and approved by the city council of the City of Ferguson, MO archive filed
January 14, 1997.
114
Excerpts of quotes taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive Council Work Session included in Regular
Session dated January 10, 1995, page 3-4.
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Opponents felt support of racial integration maintenance programs should, “Forget
about Oak Park.” According to one resident, “If people want to live that way, they can
move to Oak Park.” In expressing their disapproval of policies they believed would
transform their municipality in an “undesirable fashion,” Ferguson’s slim citizen majority
often referred to places like Hazelwood and University City as examples.115
Ferguson has a longstanding reputation as a city that did not desire to integrate.
Such an assessment is demonstrably accurate. However, it is important not to rely solely
on subsequent policy action or inaction without unpacking contextual nuances to better
identify motivating factors behind policy action and inaction.
When the mayor of Ferguson received a letter from the chairman of the Real Estate
Board of Metropolitan St. Louis, in September 1970, Ferguson’s population of 28,915
included only 265 blacks, and a Ferguson homeowner “could refuse to sell to someone
because of race, color, or creed and he would not be in violation of city code.” The purpose
of the letter was to inform the mayor that the board was “becoming increasingly alarmed
at reports of block-busting.” In response to the letter, Ferguson’s mayor introduced Bill
No. 445: an ordinance enacting Chapter 52 “Fair Housing Code.” A Ferguson official not
aligned with the council majority’s philosophies objected. According to the lawmaker, “A
fair housing code in this city will only bring on problems.”116
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Excerpts of quotes in transcript of City of Ferguson, MO public hearing portion of Regular Session dated
October 10, 1995, page 1.
116
Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive of public hearing dated October 13, 1970,
page 1. A statement made by Ferguson’s city attorney in response to a citizen’s inquiry regarding fair
housing laws. Excerpt of quote in transcript of letter read during City of Ferguson, MO public hearing dated
September 8, 1970, page 3. Figures according to Minnesota Population Center. National Historical
Geographic Information System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016.
http://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V11.0.
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Essentially, the bill was redundant as federal law already prohibited discrimination
in the sale and rental of properties based on race. Nevertheless, Ferguson’s discussion on
the matter offers an illuminating glimpse into the complexities involved in their
policymaking process. Despite having the 4 to 3 majority required to pass the bill,
proponents continued attempting to convince those in the minority to support the
legislation. They pointed out that there had been no trouble with the city’s public
accommodation bill, claimed the bill did not apply to individual property owners, and
argued the bill could improve the city’s position in dealing with federal agencies. One
official tried to elicit support by framing the issue as a matter of morality exclaiming, “A
vote against this bill would be a vote in favor of discrimination.”117
The majority’s efforts did little to sway the three opposed to the bill. Despite being
in the minority among councilpersons, they enjoyed the support of a slim but politically
powerful citizen majority who were very civically engaged residents. For them, claims that
no problems were realized with the public accommodation bill and equating an opposition
vote to discrimination were categorically false and weakened proponents’ arguments. They
cited robust citizen disapproval of the public accommodations law and argued such laws
“placed further limitations on the people of Ferguson to use their property.” Ferguson’s
city council was decidedly split along two philosophical lines.118
Each official agreed Ferguson citizens had the right to protect their property and
families. However, one contingent believed this meant the character of the city should be
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Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Ferguson, MO archive dated September 22, 1970, page

5.
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For examples of citizen’s disapproval of the bill, see City of Ferguson, MO archives October 13, 1970,
page 1. Also used here is an additional excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Ferguson, MO
archive dated September 22, 1970, page 5.
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determined by the people, and they felt the mandate from the people was clear: The council
enacts policies which preserve that character and prevent change. The other contingent
believed it meant that, in electing them as representatives, the people had conferred
protection responsibilities to the council, and “there are times when leadership should be
exerted.”119
Through these types of exchanges, I observed a critical component in Ferguson’s
policymaking process which had significant impact on policymaking processes, shaped
policies, and resulted in enduring and detrimental effects. Nearing the end of the 1970s, a
decade in which Ferguson experienced exponential growth in black population (approx. 13
%), the city was yet to enact anti-blockbusting/anti-steering legislation. Complaints of
housing discrimination were common but went largely unaddressed.120
It was not until homeowners began complaining of being disturbed and pressured
by real estate firms using scare tactics and other unethical behavior in residential areas that
the council began considering legislation. In June 1978, Ferguson’s city manager secured
copies of University City’s ordinance to use as a template for drafting a Ferguson antiblockbusting bill. Local real estate industry representatives opposed the legislation as
unnecessary citing the existence of federal law as sufficient and arguing all reputable firms
respected the law.121
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Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive dated September 22, 1970, page 5. Also note:
Bill No. 4450 was declared passed by a vote of 5 ayes to 2 noes and became Ordinance No. 70-119 “Fair
Housing Code” filed in the City of Ferguson, MO Ordinance Book No. 4, page 3.
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According to US Census data; and Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic
Information System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016.
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See City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Session: May 23, 1978, page 4; and City of Ferguson, MO
archive Regular Session: June 13, 1978, page 3.
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Ferguson officials responded to the real estate industry’s objection by suggesting
they send the council a copy of a bill “with any deletions and rewording [they] felt would
be more acceptable to the real estate people.” Ferguson had not reached the end of the
decade without such legislation because of a lack of local efforts. Concerned citizens and
civic groups had been lobbying for similar measures since before black residency eclipse
one percent of the total population.122
As early as 1975, initial signs of resegregation were beginning to show. There
were already pockets of concentrated low-income black residents and a proliferation of
for sale signs throughout residential areas of Ferguson— especially in the central city
area. Citizens that had been petitioning the council to take actions such as removing and
banning real estate signs from Ferguson were initially met with fierce opposition. Scores
of homeowners complained an ordinance prohibiting real estate signs would be too
restrictive as it would greatly limit their ability to sell their homes.123
Officials told those in favor of a ban they could contact real estate companies and
request the excess signs be removed. By mid-1975, however, the inevitable was finally
beginning to be realized and panic was widespread. Officials were “surprised at the number
of real estate signs that [were] up in neighborhoods and how very few [were] Ferguson
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Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: June 13, 1978, page 3. See
also, Regular Session: March 28, 1978, page 1. Some Ferguson citizens had been expressing specific
opposition to things like the misuse of for sale signs on properties and felt the practice should be eliminated
through city ordinance. See, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: July 10, 1973, page 1.
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Citizens were present in the council chambers requesting the council place the matter on the floor for
future advisement. They presented a petition to remove all real estate signs in Ferguson. The petition
contained approximately 160 signatures. A citizen claimed to have contacted a Dellwood real estate
company said the agency said they would not take their signs down. Citizens were working diligently to get
legislation to ban real estate signs. See, City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Session: June 10, 1975, page
1; and Regular Session: June 24, 1975. Citizens presented another petition bearing 90 additional signatures.
See also, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: July 22, 1975, page 1. Some citizens felt that after
a real estate sign ban is established it caused more panic selling. They suggested integrating a neighborhood
by establishing a percentage system regulating the number of homeowners to a fixed percentage.
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firms.” Support for the real estate sign ban had grown substantially and the city’s planning
commission recommended enacting the measure. On August 26, 1975, Bill No. 4828 was
declared passed and became Ferguson Ordinance No. 75-1509 prohibition of real estate
signs.124
A decade later, Ferguson remained philosophically split. One contingent was still
accusing the other of “attempting to control who moves into the city… [introducing bills
designed] to keep minority groups out of the city.” Members of the majority lauded, “The
council is proud of the diversity of races, home sizes, residents in this community, and feel
that it is an asset to the city to have this diversity.” A member in the minority responded
by suggesting the matter be “placed on the ballot to allow the citizens of Ferguson to vote.”
Meanwhile, the city’s black population continued to rise and did so until 2010.125
Interviewee F2 shared some insight into the Ferguson experience with the
following:
“At first, I didn’t see the edges of the neighborhoods and how it would…. I hate to
say infect, because that sounds so negative. But some of the other communities and
neighborhoods were just bringing themselves into Ferguson. Like you had Kinloch
who was going through its ups and downs and people were trying to find a place to
live. You had north city St. Louis where people were getting kicked out of homes
and they had to find a place to live. Normandy, with the school district going up
and down. [You] had people saying I still want to live in an affordable home, but I
want my educational system. With that influx of all these different communities
trying to come in to one, trying to make it, I don’t think that we were ready for that
diversity and newness.126
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Excerpt of quote from City of Ferguson, MO archives public hearing Regular Session: June 24, 1975;
Planning Commission meeting July 2, 1975; Regular Session: July 22, 1975, page 3; Regular Session: August
26, 1975, page 2 and 9. Ferguson Ordinance No. 75-1509 is permanently filed in codebook No. 8, page 107.
125
Excerpt of larger quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Outgoing Council Session: April 17, 1984, page
2.
126
Excerpt of Interview F2: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / 32-year Resident / Ex-Public Official.
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Ferguson, University City, and Hazelwood offer three examples of varying
policymaking motivators, processes, action, inaction, and subsequent conditions.
Notwithstanding, these factors are not necessarily linked, do not require specific
sequencing, and tend to be nonconsequential when isolated. Only when certain other
factors are considered in combination with these elements do these factors become
significantly important in better understanding the many complex dynamics influencing
the role of municipal governance. No municipality in the study group demonstrates this
more revealingly than the City of Jennings.
Like Ferguson, Jennings’ black population at the start of the 1970s was minuscule
(.5 %) and increased at a very high rate in a short period of time. Just a decade later, black
residency was 53 times higher and grew to represent 4/5 of total population by 2000. By
period’s end, over nine out of every 10 Jennings residents were black. Jennings is a
quintessential example of a resegregated suburban municipality, and the city exhibits many
of the conditions scholarly literature classifies as symptoms of suburban decline. However,
Jennings’ policy path is not emblematic of the typical tipped, fiscally stressed suburb.127
Unlike Ferguson, Jennings entered the decade of the 1970s with several
antidiscrimination policies already on the books, and the city continued to enact additional
policies throughout the decade. In summer 1971, with fair housing and antisolicitation/anti-blockbusting ordinances in place, Jennings sought to strengthen its antidestabilization defenses. City lawmakers unanimously passed a minimum housing code
initiating an occupancy permit system and banned real estate signs. The city attorney began
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According to US Census data; City of Jennings, MO archives; and Minnesota Population Center. National
Historical Geographic Information System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
2016.
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issuing legal notices in local publications advising real estate companies for rent and for
sale signs were no longer permitted in single or multifamily dwellings in the City of
Jennings.128
Two weeks after notification, the city’s building commissioner embarked on a
compliance check throughout the city, and violators were prosecuted under the city code’s
penalty clause for noncompliance. Less than a year later, Jennings City Council passed Bill
No. 1012 as Ordinance No. 990 which expanded the city’s prohibition of solicitation to
include other tactics such as steering. When Jennings enacted these policies, its black
population had not yet reached one percent of total population. More notable, Jennings’
City Council instituted these policies amid a citizen environment bearing striking
resemblances to the citizen environment of Ferguson.129
Jennings’ municipal government operated under intense scrutiny from a civically
engaged citizenry comprised of a majority of residents who disapproved of integration or
at least preferred not to integrate the municipality. However, Jennings’ citizens were
engaging a council that enjoyed unanimous consensus in their definition of the role of
municipal governance in municipal stabilization. The Jennings City Council was unified
on issues, objectives, and strategies for achieving outcomes. This infused the council with

128

Jennings considered a real estate sign ban as early as February 1970. See, City of Jennings, MO archive
Regular Session: February 9, 1970, page 6: Bill 909. See, Regular Session: August 9, 1971, page 4. See also,
Bill No. 976: An ordinance that provided minimum health standards for sanitation facilities in housing
requiring adequate ventilation, light, and heating, required safe and sanitary maintenance prohibiting
substandard conditions, and provided for occupancy permits. The ordinance set forth enforcement
regulations, penalties, and corrective measures for the violations of its provisions. Bill was unanimously
passed and approved as Ordinance No. 958. Fee for the occupancy permit was originally set at $15. See,
City of Jennings Regular Session: August 24, 1971, page 4.
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Mayor instructs building commissioner not to confiscate real estate signs erected in violation of the city
code. Instead, he is instructed to file property owner’s, real estate agency, or other relevant party’s name
and information with the city for prosecution. City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Session: August 9, 1971,
page 4.; and City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Session: June 12, 1972, page 3-4.
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policymaking efficiency, empowered it to lead in matters of consequential importance, and
essentially insulated the body from citizen backlash.
Relishing complete collegial support of policies such as the real estate sign ban,
Jennings’ mayor responded to citizen and real estate industry opposition by asserting, “I
would not think of repealing the ordinance; it is a good ordinance.” As reviewed earlier,
governing in a council structure where a separation of powers endows one member with
veto authority and supplementary controls not possessed by the other members does not
prevent municipal lawmakers from producing policies designed to help stabilize
municipalities. Nevertheless, leveraging antidiscrimination policies was only a first step to
achieving stabilization.130
Enacting anti-discrimination laws did not eliminate discrimination and inequities
in housing. In fact, “open housing” policies did little to combat the resegregation and
isolation blacks experienced in these communities. For instance, some residents of
University City’s eastern end felt “trapped in the area either because they could not afford
better housing or because they were black.” However, some officials and residents were
reluctant to concede that race played a role and argued that despite some challenges, the
area remained more desirable than most areas in other municipalities.131
In response to residents’ claims of racial bias contributing to conditions, University
City’s mayor asserted:
“There are many residents of the area, who like me, are not black and could afford
to live anywhere in St. Louis County. We live in the eastern end of [U City] by
130

Excerpt of quote made by the mayor of Jennings in response to requests to repeal the city’s prohibition
of real estate signs in the city. See, Regular Session No. 791. A meeting of the City Council of Jennings, MO
dated July 10, 1972, page 1.
131
Excerpt of quotes taken from a St. Louis Post-Dispatch staff who wrote a series on the county apartment
boom. In the first two articles, residents of the eastern end of University City are pictured and quoted as
recorded in City of University City archives Session 986: March 1, 1971, page 9.
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choice. No other area of St. Louis County can boast of the cultural advantages we
have, the proximity to a major university, art museum, and zoo. No other area has
a library that is without equal in the county. As for recreational, we do not have our
own private club houses, but we are five minutes away from a heated indoor pool
in the winter and a wonderful outdoor pool in the summer. Trapped? Not on your
life.”132
The mayor was expressing the sentiments shared by many University Citians like
Interviewees U4 who, due to their pride in the city’s ethnic diversity, were quick to defend
against accusations of racism. As they put it, “We were very progressive. Remember we
came from Hyde Park [IL].” Interviewee U2 asserted, “I think that the people in University
City don't care who lives in the house next door as long as they take care of the house. I
don't care what color my neighbors are as long as they're taking care of the house.
Municipal governance plays a role in bringing about policies, but they won’t affect that.”133
Prevailing attitudes and integration policies did not insulate the municipality from
transitory effects, however. Racial resegregation can sometimes occur in subtle increments
with housing policy serving as an insidious perpetrator. In cities like University City with
its integrated communities, mixed incomes, and amenities, this can be especially difficult
to acknowledge and accept. According to Interviewee U3, “That was indicative of the
challenges [U City] faced. I think one of the main problems is many people don't even
think there are challenges.”134
By late 1976, property values had risen in the first and second wards and many
people could no longer afford properties in those areas. While there were some modest
property value increases in the Third Ward, they only occurred in a small area of the ward.
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Ibid
Excerpt from Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents;
and Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official.
134
Excerpt from Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public Official.
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With University City’s Third Ward being home to the majority of the city’s black
population, once again, negative perceptions of increased crime, bad tenants, and poverty
emerged.
However, perceptions were often inconsistent with reality. Interviewee U3 said, “I
had people who had lived here for 15 or 17 years and had never been north of Olive and
were surprised at what a nice neighborhood it was.” Some areas of University City’s Third
Ward did exhibit destabilizing symptoms— particularly those areas closest to struggling
neighboring municipalities like Pagedale and Wellston. However, the Third Ward
consisted mainly of owner-occupied homes while 85 % of University City’s Section 8
renters resided in the Second Ward.135
My examination revealed that adoption of open housing antidiscrimination policy
whether early or delayed offered indications of municipal governances’ preferences and
for some the preferences of their citizenry. Preferences impacted timing of implementation
and degree to which local policymakers promoted and enhanced policy. Policy influenced
subsequent policies, use of tools and allocation patterns, and affected demographic,
housing, and fiscal conditions. Affordable housing policy decisions demonstrate this best.
Affordable Housing
St. Louis County’s suburban municipalities consist of a range of residential zoning
standards, neighborhood designs, and housing styles. City officials established codes
regulating building size, buffering requirements, use of greenspace, and certain aesthetic
features. Many municipalities zoned exclusive allowing only homes built on large single-
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Excerpt of quote taken from Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public
Official. Figures according to US Census data; and Minnesota Population Center. National Historical
Geographic Information System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016.
http://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V11.0.
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family plats. Following WWII, there was a substantial surge in more affordable suburban
housing. Increased affordability combined with the apartment boom of the 1960s, 70s, and
into the 80s blended accessibility with exclusivity. Accessibility did not mean equitable
treatment or service delivery, however.
Exclusionary planning and disparate allocation of suburban resources predates the
arrival of black suburbanites. Regardless of race, areas containing clusters of low-income
nonowner inhabitants received the least consideration in decision making. A Hazelwood
resident’s 1978 statement, “I do not feel renters should have a voice in the park issue,”
reflects this attitude. Local governments often neglected these areas and their inhabitants,
failed to protect them from hazards, and allowed conditions to further deteriorate while
protecting and prioritizing the preferences of wealthier sections of the community— often
at the expense of the entire municipality.136
Residents and officials alike were largely opposed to new apartment developments.
“The backbone of the community are the people who buy their homes and raise their
families,” decried one Ferguson resident in June 1971. During a 1975 building permit
hearing, a Ferguson councilperson stated, “I believe multifamily dwellings would be
repulsive to the people who live in the surrounding areas.” Some opponents cited spot
zoning or complained apartment complexes overcrowded the schools and worsened traffic
conditions. Others questioned if adequate police protection would be provided in these
areas.137
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Excerpt of quote taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archives Regular Session: September 6, 1978, page

3.
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Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO transcript of public hearing dated June 22, 1971, page
1; and Excerpt from quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting: February 25, 1975,
page 4. Also see, City of Ferguson, MO archives dated March 24, 1970, page 1-2 and April 28, 1970, page 2
which demonstrate more about how residents submitted petitions against rezoning to multifamily and had
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While the presence of multifamily housing does not necessarily indicate a
preponderance of low-income residents or a deteriorating housing stock, they are usually
nonowner occupied and were perceived as likely placements for public housing. Amid a
hostile environment, the era ushered in an immense wave of new residents and the need for
additional housing was great. For certain areas in some municipalities, rezoning from
single-family districts to multifamily was unavoidable. Apartment projects represented
large investments, and officials believed certain developments would be an asset to some
neighborhoods.
In addition to city ordinances specifying multiple requirements such as the
installation of new sidewalks and parking lots, new apartment developments could attract
more young couples and professionals to the area. Scores of developers submitted requests
for rezoning and presented detailed plans before city plan commissions. Presentations
incorporated skillfully crafted marketing strategies emphasizing the blending of amenities,
proximity, modernity, and practicality in designs. Cities approved plans for the erection of
multistory apartment buildings, apartment complexes, duplexes, and townhomes.138

no objections to more single-family dwellings being built. Show of hands vote called by the mayor indicated
10 to 1 in opposition of rezoning for multifamily developments. When rezoning requests involved only
single-family structures, residents argued they should be the owner’s right to rezone for their development.
See, archive dated July 27, 1971, page 5.
138
In a June 1971 report on the conditions of the Kensington Subdivision Apartments in Ferguson, MO an
advertisement in a local newspaper is referenced in which a realtor is advertising rentals for single people.
This is notable because the realtor originally marketed the property to the city as geared towards young
executives and their families. Ferguson residents in the area were very upset with the new project. From
March 24, 1970, page 1. Ferguson May 12, 1970 page 1 “Maison de Ville” Apartments; Ferguson July 27,
1971 page 2 Florissant Valley Garden Apartments presented that the property was close to W. Florissant
and I-270 for easy access, close to the Jr. College, and close to other services like YMCA, Churches, and
shopping Center at W. Florissant. 132 units- 66 one bedrooms, 66 two-bedroom apartments, swimming
pool children’s play area, and club house. The building line are staggered in order to get away from the row
type development.
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By 1970, the five study cities were comprised of a mixture of districts zoned for
small to large-lot single-family homes as well as multifamily dwellings. Variations in size
and price provided housing for a broad range of tenant incomes. As urban renewal projects
began winding down, federal funds to cities for redevelopment transitioned in format.
Revenue sharing, which city officials had lobbied so diligently for, was authorized by the
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. But these were unrestricted funds that did
not necessarily encourage development of affordable housing.139
The Housing and Development Act of 1974 authorized the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) process. In the CDBG program, cities applied for
grants to be utilized in developing affordable housing, anti-poverty programs, and
infrastructure improvements. Like central cities, inner-suburban municipalities were
familiar with HUD initiatives as many of them received funding from the agency for parks
and urban renewal projects. In order to qualify for CDBGs, a community had to have a
planning consultant either on staff or under contract and have a comprehensive plan for
community improvements. This meant some cities were not prepared.140
As a newly formed city in August 1970, Hazelwood lacked the administrative
prowess to qualify for HUD’s 701 grant which would pay 2/3 of the cost for preparation
of a comprehensive plan. Contrast that with Jennings, who in 1972 entered into an urban
planning contract with the Missouri Department of Community Affairs, St. Louis County
Department of Planning, and East-West Gateway Coordinating Council to obtain 701 grant
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For more about the act, see General Explanation of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, Public Law
92-512. February 12, 1973.
140
See, Section 109 of the Housing and Community Development (HCD) Act 1974 at HUD.gov.
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funds for planning assistance, preparation of a comprehensive plan, and implementation of
administrative control measures.141
Qualifying for a CDBG was only part of the battle, however. Many residents
opposed receiving CDBG monies. Members of a Ferguson citizens’ group spoke out
against accepting CDBG funds warning its council, “This is an attempt to inveigle
Ferguson into regional government.” Officials in each of the study cities pondered the
implications of accepting federal dollars. They wanted, and in many cases needed the
money. However, municipal leaders did not want the federal involvement in city affairs
that came with the funds. Grants required strict adherence to programmatic standards
focusing on anti-poverty goals and increasing subsidized housing. Despite reservations and
objections, however, cities applied for CDBGs.142
Ferguson was one of the few cities to put the issue to a city-wide vote following
citizen calls for a referendum. Ironically, in Ferguson’s general election held Tuesday April
1, 1975, Ferguson voters approved the city’s use of CDBG funding by a vote of 2,346 to
1,663. In defeat, opponents believed that most residents did not fully understand the
proposition. They felt they had failed to effectively communicate the downsides of the
city’s agreement with HUD. Along with CDBGs, the federal government instituted the
Section 8 subsidized housing program, and the low-income housing market was born.143
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See City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Council Session: August 13, 1970; Taken from archived
transcript of presentation by a community planner from the St. Louis County Department of Planning to the
Jennings, MO City Council: Regular Session 796 meeting of the City Council August 14, 1972, page 1. See
also, passing of Ordinance Number 1002 in Jennings Regular Council Session: October 9, 1972, page 4.
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Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO public hearing Regular Session: December 10, 1974,
page 2.
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According to the Board of Election Commissioners of the County of St. Louis, State of Missouri abstract
of certified votes related to the referendum proposition Ordinance No. 75-14 Housing and Community
Development Act. By Ordinance No. 74-1449, the council of the City of Ferguson, MO authorized the mayor
to enter into a municipal housing and community development corporation and supplemental agreements
with St. Louis County. Note: Citizens had spoken in opposition to Bill No. 4751 Housing and Community
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The vast majority of residents opposed increasing public housing and officials and
administrators wrestled with the question of proportionality within their municipal borders.
Nevertheless, meeting CDBG eligibility requirements meant cities committed to increasing
federally assisted housing in their municipality. Dedicating dwellings to federal assistance,
opponents argued, would further hamper cities’ ability to effectively ensure a high-quality
housing stock as officials had no control over which landlords, buildings, or tenants
received subsidies.
There remained the issue of an aging population, however. By the 1970s, many
suburban municipalities were comprised of significant numbers of low to moderate fixedincome households headed by residents over the age of 65. Many of these residents could
no longer maintain larger homes and required subsidized housing assistance.
Consequentially, municipal officials were left with no other option but to try and balance
the issue by allowing for a limited amount of subsidized housing. Attempting to restrict the
increase of public housing, officials either excluded or minimized the amount of resources
for subsidized housing in their community development plan.144
Interviewees U4 criticized University City officials’ omission of Section 8 housing
in its initial community development application adding, “Municipal governments can
mandate a certain amount of public housing, affordable housing, or they can pass policies.”
With no CDBG funds dedicated to Section 8 housing development in its original plan,
HUD denied University City’s 1975 application. After polling other local jurisdictions who

Development Act of 1974. However, when asked for a show of hands relative to the city’s participation, a
majority of hands raised where in favor of the city signing the agreement for participation. See public
hearing Regular Session: December 10, 1974, page 3.
144
According to Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version
11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016. http://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V11.0.
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had submitted community development applications, city staff arrived at a three-year goal
of 90 housing units for the Section 8 housing category. HUD approved the revised plan.145
Some prospective residents, otherwise impressed with the city, highlighted
University City’s HUD plan as “serious cause for concern.” Consider that municipalities
rely on property taxes for general revenue and financing of capital improvements. People
not only viewed subsidized housing as potentially harmful to the physical characteristics
and desirability of an area but concluded it would also further erode the local tax base and
interfere with local assessment and rate setting processes. A proliferation of subsidized
housing further intensified fears of the deterioration of suburban oases. However, early
agreements with HUD for CDBGs were fairly nonconsequential.146
Hazelwood received an initial grant of only $34,000 and expected to receive
between $190,000 and $210,000 over three years. Hazelwood used the funds to upgrade
housing and make improvements in an unincorporated area adjacent to their city limits.
Maplewood received $48,000 and was approved to spend $34,600 of the funds on
constructing sewers under contract with the St. Louis Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD).
Jennings’ initial block grant allocation totaled $55,950 with which the suburb remodeled
an old police station, demolished some vacant houses, and made repairs to senior citizens’
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Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents. For more
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houses. The announcement of the fourth round of CDBG funding in 1977 signaled to cities
that the stakes were exponentially higher.147
The implementation of a new formula resulted in the St. Louis area gaining $20
million in CDBG funding. Although most of the funds would go to the City of St. Louis,
St. Louis County officials were pleased. The new formula made more revenue available
for the entire area. For 27 St. Louis County municipalities, however, the new formula
significantly reduced their allocation. The principal change in the formula concerned age
of housing stock. According to the new formula, old houses were blighted and age of
housing now accounted for 50 % of the allocation.148
This was problematic as many of St. Louis’ oldest communities were also some of
the wealthiest. According to the new formula, Webster Groves was the most blighted
community in St. Louis County. However, the formula failed to assess true community
need by employing a flawed metric which disproportionately weighted age of housing
while disparaging growth lag and measures of poverty. Nothing illustrates this better than
contrasting Hazelwood’s $30,200 grant with the $460,700 Webster Groves received
following the implementation of the 1977 formula change.149
Behind the leadership of its mayor, Hazelwood joined other area leaders and
successfully advocated for revisions in the formula. For each of the next two years,
Hazelwood’s allocation was $136,875 and by 1979, municipal officials considered CDBG
147

According to City of Hazelwood, MO archive Council Work Session dated November 20, 1974. Note: On
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also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Special Meeting dated October 12, 1977.
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an imperative revenue stream. At this point, Maplewood was receiving over $275,000 with
a total balance of $335,426 under contract, and Jennings had allocated $555,750 over the
previous three years. Despite limits on eligible uses, CDBG spending garnered contentious
debate. This was especially true in the civically engaged cities of Ferguson and University
City.150
Citizens, organized groups, and associations often presented detailed plans for how
to spend CDBG funds, and vigorously contested councils, city managers, and finance
directors’ positions. More revenue via CDBG funding not only attracted more parties
lobbying for a bigger portion, it also required more subsidized housing commitments.
Subsidized housing became more intertwined with infrastructure improvements and new
developments as cities relied more on CDBGs to fund projects. By the end of the study
period, CDBG agreements were essentially renewed automatically every three years.
Increased reliance on CDBG funding to help finance municipal improvements
resulted in rapid growth in subsidized housing for some municipalities. As early as 1979,
fearing similar fates would befall them, suburban cities like Ferguson and Maplewood were
enacting moratoriums on all subsidized housing within their municipal borders. However,
officials quickly realized how integral the support had become to their city’s ecosystem
and within two years, moratoriums were removed. The tide in suburban locales had
changed dramatically in a short period of time.151
150

Figure taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session: August 2, 1978. Note: In August 1977,
St. Louis County Department of Human Resources announced that the City of Hazelwood had been
authorized to receive $93,850 from the Community Development Act funding for the acquisition of
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Officials that once opposed federally funded housing were now forced to become
advocates. A collection of 1981 Maplewood resolutions best demonstrate this point. The
resolutions, which passed five to one, outline the municipality’s agreement with HUD to
participate in a Section 8 demonstration project. Additionally, documents indicate officials
directed and authorized the city attorney to obtain a restraining order stopping the St. Louis
County Housing Authority from terminating the Section 8 subsidy for tenants of an
apartment complex and called for an investigation into revocation of subsidies.152
Municipal officials set out to restrict the amount of rental properties, subsidized
units, and low-income housing in the 1970s. But by the end of the 1980s, the opposite was
evident. A robust market consisting of rental properties, subsidies, and low-income housing
had emerged in the suburbs. Apartment complexes and rental homes had become a part of
most inner suburbs’ fabric. University City was home to roughly 2,800 multifamily units.
Rental properties accounted for nearly 40 % of dwellings with a disproportionate number
of single-family rentals located in the city’s majority black Third Ward. With a population
density of approximately 6,000 people per square mile, ½ to 2/3 of University City
residents resided north of Delmar.153

condominium conversions and the issuance of permits until the Planning Commission and the council of
the city of Ferguson shall have the time necessary to review and revise the existing subdivision and zoning
regulations passed unanimously. See, City of Maplewood Missouri archives Document number 288,
Resolution number 95, 1979. Resolution of the City of Maplewood, Missouri adopted unanimously. Note:
As recorded in the City of Maplewood, Missouri archive 1980 Document number 343, Resolution number
18, 1980 repealed Resolution number 95, 1979 pertaining to the moratorium on all subsidized housing in
the City of Maplewood, MO a year later. The City of Bridgeton passed a resolution calling for the elimination
of the Community Development Act requesting that the funds be used to reduce the individual income tax.
See, City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated March 21, 1979.
152
See, Resolutions No. 39- 1981 in City of Maplewood, Missouri archives 1981, Document No. 441;
Resolutions numbers 69- 1981 and 70- 1981 from City of Maplewood, Missouri archives 1981 Document
No. 455.
153
US Census data report of University City included archive Session 1667: May 20,1996, page 6. According
to City of University City records Session 1273: April 27, 1981, page 13; and According to figures in City of
University City archive Regular Council Meeting: June 23rd, 2014, page 4.
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In Hazelwood, over 40 % of the housing stock was in the form of multifamily
housing structures. While Ferguson residents believed, “Neighboring communities [didn’t]
have the number of renters Ferguson [had],” the city’s rate of rentals was less than 25 %
of housing— notably lower than Hazelwood and University City’s. Interviewee F2 says,
“Ferguson was still one of the desirable districts for homebuyers. People were more
worried about Jennings during that time.” Rental property comprised 47 % of Jennings
housing selection. In contrast, Ferguson seemed to be avoiding any significant proliferation
of low-cost housing or decline in homeownership. However, housing numbers masked
what was actually transpiring in Ferguson.154
Inaction and delayed policies of the 1970s had rendered the city more vulnerable to
resegregation and decline. Over the next decade, Ferguson’s acute growth in nonowner
residency indicated noticeable differences. Its new nonowner residents tended to be poorer
than the renters arriving in neighboring municipalities a decade earlier. This 1995 Ferguson
resident statement was more appropriate for 1980:
“We are concerned about subsidized housing like in Hazelwood. We need to
prevent further subsidies in Ferguson because there are too many greedy people
who want to rent through Section 8 to get more money and become slumlords.”155
154

Figure taken from public hearing on public housing in City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated July 29, 1981.
For more about Hazelwood’s IDA activities also see, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Council Session:
July 11, 1984; and City of Hazelwood, MO archive IDA Village Square Apartments dated March 6, 1985. This
project consisted of 47 buildings containing a total of 148 one and two-bedroom units. Note: One
apartment building permit netted Hazelwood $22, 000 in 1984 -85. See, City of Hazelwood, MO Special
Budget Meeting May 20, 1985. According to figures in archive City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session: March
11, 1980, page 5; Excerpt of quote taken Interview F2: 07/26/2019 Black / Male / 32-year Resident / ExPublic Official; and According to City of Jennings, MO Redevelopment Plan in public hearing dated January
29, 1990, page 2.
155
Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO public hearing notes dated October 10, 1995, page 1.
Note: A communication reporting St. Louis County will discourage the concentration of low- income housing
projects in areas where a disproportionate amount already exists was sent to Hazelwood by the St. Louis
County Executive. North County Inc. and the Florissant Valley Chamber of Commerce sent a memo to
Hazelwood opposing a rental housing financing for a development of opposition to the funding of a 200unit proposed subsidized housing development. For more see City of Hazelwood, MO archives dated
October 18, 1995; and March 20, 1996.
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By this time, however, Ferguson’s housing subsides already rivaled Hazelwood’s.
And just five short years later, Ferguson had nearly reached Hazelwood in percentage of
renters with 33 %, while Hazelwood’s percentage of renters had declined from 1990s 36.5
% to 2000s 35 % nonowner occupancy. Other indicators shed more light on the neighbors’
divergent trajectories. Per capita income in Ferguson and Hazelwood was $17,661 and
$22,311, respectively. Of Hazelwood households, 7.5 % were headed by single parents
while over 16 % of Ferguson households were single parent headed.156
While these numbers only illustrate a snapshot, they lend context to a larger picture.
Municipal-level figures serve as a glimpse into what was occurring in neighborhoods. High
rates of renter occupancy, particularly in single-family residential areas, indicate low
desirability. Stable neighborhoods of single-family residential dwellings would boast
around 85 % owner occupancy. Municipal-level destabilization was well-underway in
some municipalities as assessed value of residential property declined dramatically.
Several key components drove the decline in property values. Typically, white
homeowners who fled the area were now unable to sell their properties. Consequentially,
housing stock preservation measures became inadequate as a growing number of houses
were becoming renter occupied. Besides performing daily tasks of general upkeep and
addressing minimum maintenance matters, renters generally lack the authority and
finances to initiate improvements or rehabilitation that correct structural deterioration. This
dilemma was exacerbated in inner suburbs due to age and obsolescence.
While advanced-aged housing does not automatically suggest deterioration,
preserving older homes required more maintenance and updates to compete with newer
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According to US Census data 2016; and Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic
Information System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016.
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homes offering the latest in amenities and convenience. Many residential areas in inner
suburbs still bore obsolete spatial and structural designs which rendered them impractical
for modern residential use. Housing demands, specifications, and expectations had
evolved.
Characteristics once considered essential were now deemed objectionable and
undesirable. These elements helped create a perpetual cycle of housing stock erosion
culminating in blight and socioeconomic liabilities for inner suburbs. The challenges of an
aged housing stock, decline in homeownership, and neighborhood blight were especially
prevalent in the study cities.
Established in 1908, Maplewood was the first centrally located municipality
outside the St. Louis city limits. Amid difficult economic times, Maplewood began to lose
its dedicated residential core. The inner suburb of just under 13,000 had seen its share of
ups and downs over the years. In previous decades, however, homeowners braved the
storms which allowed for the natural transfer of homeownership. A growing number of
them were now choosing to relocate instead. Maplewood struggled to retain longtime
residents and preserve the quality of its historic homes and neighborhoods.157
Degeneration of housing conditions in the north county suburbs was more rapid
and severe than in Maplewood and occurred for different reasons. During the 1970s and
1980s, HUD’s housing policies were in direct conflict with cities’ revitalization and
stabilization efforts. Negatively impacting cities’ housing stock, property values, and
overall attractiveness, HUD’s activities resulted in concentrated poverty, dilapidated
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Figure according to US Census data 2016; and Minnesota Population Center. National Historical
Geographic Information System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016. For
more, see Mitchell 2006; and Houser 2019.
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houses, and vacant lots. North St. Louis County municipalities were disproportionately
impacted by HUD’s practices as the agency targeted these areas and concentrated its
activities in these places.
A 1980 North Area Community Forum report noted while representing only 18 %
of eastern Missouri’s population (from Jefferson City east to the Mississippi River), north
St. Louis County accounted for 73 % of FHA insured mortgages, 40 % of all FHA activity,
and 35 % of HUD repossessions. Negative effects of this type of discriminatory targeting
compounded as image problems arose further hampering these municipalities’ stabilization
efforts. Property values plunged as renter occupancy, low-income housing, and Section 8
subsidies grew.158
A 1989 St. Louis County planning department report cited, “The high percentage
of Section 8 housing being located in north St. Louis County is the biggest concern of
officials in north St. Louis County municipalities.” Responding to inquiries about denied
subsidized housing requests in 1991, Jennings’ mayor replied, “The city has too high of a
percentage of such housing now and the maintenance record of this type of housing has
been poor.” Often these properties became neglected rental housing. The negative loop was
devasting for these municipalities.159
A 1991 examination of single-family homes in Jennings found that between 1987
and 1989, 31 % of the 75 homes surveyed experienced a decline in recorded appraisals.
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Figures taken from the North Area Community Forum report in City of Hazelwood, MO dated March 19,
1980. The North Area Community Forum, founded in 1975, was funded through the St. Louis County
Department of Human Resources, Office of Community Development. The organization provided a forum
for elected officials and other representatives of North County and University of Missouri-St. Louis Public
Policy Administration Program.
159
Report included in City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Session dated November 13, 1989 page 2; and
Excerpt of quote taken from City of Jennings, MO 1236 Meeting of the City Council November 25, 1991,
page 1.
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Declining property values meant loss of revenue and higher taxes. This further increased
dependency on federal aid which mandated more subsidized housing. The loss of property
tax revenues also made it extremely difficult to maintain quality-level public services such
as policing. Perceptions emerged that there was more crime in these areas than in other
parts of St. Louis County. North St. Louis County suburbs were caught in a vicious cycle.160
Although University City was not technically located in north St. Louis County, it
lied just south of Page which served as north county’s southern border. Proximity to
struggling north county municipalities as well as decaying areas of the City of St. Louis
made University City a target for similar transitory activities. Furthermore, the mature
inner suburb was only partially protected by its proactive housing policies of the 1960s.
Participation in low-income subsidized housing funding programs did not necessarily serve
as a registerable contributing factor to achieving stabilization.
Instead, policies which dictated the way in which cities participated in these
programs and whether cities leveraged these resources in combination with other resources
and activities served to determine if participation was significant or negligible. The seeds
of stabilization were planted with the timing and degree of open and affordable housing
policies. However, specific types of policy designed to combat housing stock deterioration
were required as well. As Interviewee U3 framed it, “Housing stock preservation was a
place for municipal governance.”161
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St. Louis County records of City of Jennings, MO in Redevelopment Plan dated January 29, 1990, page 3-

9.
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Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public Official.
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Housing Stock Preservation
City leaders, lawmakers, and administrators worked tirelessly throughout the 1970s
to combat housing discrimination practices like racial steering, redlining, and blockbusting.
Some officials enacted policies, initiated programs, and pursued legal recourse. But as
smaller, poorer populations replaced larger more economically stable citizenries, property
values changed dramatically. Officials had to decide rather to uphold, amend, or exchange
prevention, preservation, and improvement policies from previous decades.
Race predominated municipal-level decision making prior to 1970 and continued
to influence choices in the post-civil rights era. However, socioeconomics dominated
policy in the post-fair housing period. According to one longtime resident of University
City’s Third Ward, “It became less about race and more about economics.” Residents of
St. Louis’ inner suburbs identified with their town’s social character and economic class,
and homeowners took pride in how the houses in their neighborhood differentiated them
from neighboring municipalities.162
In the study cities, however, shrinking tax base and social change confronted deeply
rooted identities and neighborhood nostalgia. Meanwhile, a serious threat to
municipalities’ stability existed in the form of a public agency. HUD’s discriminatory
housing practices and its neglecting of homes repossessed for defaulted Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) insured mortgages presented additional challenges.
HUD properties repossessed through foreclosure and tax sales were often left
vandalized and condemned. Many of the properties repossessed by HUD needed
substantial repairs or were in such disrepair they had to be demolished. This left behind
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Excerpt from Interview U5: 07/26/2019. Black / Male / 52-year Resident / Ex-State Government Official.
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scores of vacant parcels, some of which were being used as makeshift parking lots in some
municipalities. As geography dictated, Jennings and University City were among the first
municipalities to experience the neighborhood blighting impacts of HUD’s practices. City
officials and administrators initially attempted to work with local HUD officials to address
the issue of deteriorating housing.
Municipal leaders made minimal progress through these means. City officials often
felt the agency ignored cities’ concerns. Records indicated as early as June 1974, Jennings
City Council instructed its city’s building commissioner to forward complaint letters and
pictures of HUD houses to senators, congressional representatives, and the county
supervisor. Further worsening housing conditions in 1975, HUD changed its policy for
handling repossessed houses to include low-priced “as is” investor purchases. That same
year, University City’s local government decided to submit a grievance directly to the
source of the activities.163
University City’s city manager sent a letter of complaint directly to the HUD
secretary’s Washington, D.C. office. The correspondence included spot maps showing the
locations of foreclosures and derelict HUD properties along with a report detailing the
impact of “as is” housing in residential areas in the city. Nevertheless, HUD repossessions
continued to mount, properties deteriorated, and the devastating impact on property values
persisted. University City homes that listed for $15,000, when HUD acquired 26 buildings
between 1972 and 1973, garnered less than $3,000 three years later.164
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See Document No. 2852 in City of Jennings, MO Regular Session: June 24, 1974, page 6; and Document
No. 42 in City of Jennings, MO Regular Session: July 22, 1974, page 2.
164
For more about the contents of the letter see: City of University City archives Regular Session 1101: May
19, 1975, page 13. Letter of complaint addressed to HUD Secretary, Washington, D.C. The correspondence
included spot maps showing locations of foreclosures and recent reports regarding derelict HUD properties.
Of the 26 properties, 15 were considered buildable lots. The lots involved structures which required
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With collegial measures proving futile, municipal decision-makers collaborated to
openly promote filing a lawsuit against HUD. Officials accused HUD of violating Chapter
89 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. The law authorized cities to regulate and restrict the
use of land within their jurisdiction for the purposes of promoting health, safety, morals,
and the general welfare of the community. According to a local newspaper announcement,
“City officials claimed to have received a greater degree of cooperation from HUD
following the threat of a lawsuit.” Whether the news of a potential lawsuit was truly a
catalyst to increased cooperation is unclear. What is clear, however, is that municipal
leaders recognized that HUD’s activities threatened municipal-level stability.165
Prior to any recorded FHA foreclosures within their borders, Hazelwood officials
began lobbying for regulatory changes, strategically planning to combat the agency’s
practices, and coalition building. The municipality’s leadership served as a prominent voice
in the county’s push for more rigorous mortgage bank requirements, penalties for bad
actors, and prospective homebuyers’ education. Working with the North County
Community Forum, Hazelwood leveraged tracking reports to monitor FHA lending
activity and advocated for the equitable dispersing of low to moderate-income housing
throughout north, south, and west county.166

demolition and were being offered to the city at a cost of $1 per lot. For more information regarding the
early phase of HUD foreclosures see: City of University City archives Session 1073: May 6, 1974, page 10;
Regular Session 1101 May 19, 1975, page 13; and Special Session 1115: October 13, 1975, page 1.
165
Excerpt of quote referenced in transcript of City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 1117;
and City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 1160 dated May 23rd, 1977, page 5.; Statute
referenced in discussions regarding filing a lawsuit against HUD. See: University City, MO Regular Session
1089 dated November 18, 1974, Page 4.
166
For more information see City of Hazelwood, MO archives Regular Session October 4, 1978; Hazelwood
Regular Session August 1, 1979; Hazelwood FHA Activity Special Meeting January 23, 1980; Hazelwood
Special Meeting June 25, 1980; Hazelwood Regular Session February 27, 1980; Hazelwood Regular Session
March 19, 1980. See also, North Area Community Forum proposal under Section VIII, Support Program,
funded out of the St. Louis County, MO Office of Community Development. There were 312 units proposed,
with the vast majority being in South St. Louis County and a few in Berkeley, MO and Ferguson, MO in
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Hazelwood policymakers saw what was happening in Jennings. A city of just over
19,000 persons at the time, Jennings’ unemployment rate was above the national average.
Residents, both existing and forthcoming, were largely working-class folks of modest
means. Stability was already fragile. Jennings officials understood they needed to act with
urgency. In October 1976, Jennings leveraged dollars from the Department of Commerce
and Economic Development’s capital investment program to establish a special community
stabilization fund.167
Utilizing capital investment funds, Jennings started home loan and home
improvement programs. They leveraged CDBG funds and partnered with a local bank who
reserved $250,000 in loans for program participants to purchase homes in Jennings. On
January 23, 1978, Bill 1250 unanimously passed as Ordinance1221 authorizing the City of
Jennings to enter into a contract with FHA to purchase foreclosed properties. Bypassing
the county’s HUD agreement, Jennings began working directly with HUD in the Federal
Urban Homesteading Program. The homesteading program established grant accounts for
cities to draw upon to address the HUD foreclosure problem.168
Homesteading involved HUD selling foreclosed homes to cities for $1. Loan
balance of the houses was then deducted from the account. The previous year, University
City had taken advantage of a similar program involving vacant lots. As mentioned earlier,
HUD foreclosures often ended up in demolition leaving behind vacant parcels. Within the

Hazelwood archives Special Meeting dated January 3, 1981; Hazelwood Regular Meeting May 20, 1981; and
Hazelwood Regular Meeting February 23, 1983.
167
According to US Census data; Document No. 3037 archive October 25, 1976, page 4. Employment rate;
City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Council Session Document No. 3037 dated October 25, 1976, page 4;
and Jennings Regular Council Session October 23, 1978, page 4. Document No. 255. See also, Jennings
Regular Council Session dated May 10, 1976, page 4: Document 2991.
168
Jennings Regular council session January 23 1978 page 2 document 03162.
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first several years alone, HUD transferred deeds to over 50 plots to University City.
Jennings aimed to avoid the proliferation of vacant lots by helping the homebuyer avoid
foreclosure to begin with. In the event of foreclosure, Jennings acquired the home for resale
through the homesteading program in the period between foreclosure and dilapidation.169
Utilizing the services of the North Area Community Forum, who screened for
qualified applicants, the city would then sell the property as a three-year lease-option to
first-time homebuyers. Program participants would have one year to bring the house up to
code. Once the city’s building department verified compliance with all health and safety
conditions, the deed was conveyed to the new owner. According to Jennings’ mayor,
“There will be no need for advertising because at this time we have approximately 50
applicants in our files waiting for property to purchase.” Jennings sold 11 of the HUD
foreclosures in the first year of the program.170
Jennings prioritized preventing neighborhood blight by keeping the FHA homes
occupied. However, they also recognized their efforts would be ineffective without
physical improvements to other segments of the housing stock. They instituted a home
improvement rebate program and earmarked funds to rebate 20 % of any improvement cost
homeowners incurred in making improvements to their home. Jennings modeled the
program after University City’s homeowner rehabilitation program which required
homeowners to pay a portion of the costs of labor and materials on a sliding scale according
to certain criteria.171
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HUD transfer of deeds referenced in transcript of City of University City, MO archive Regular Session
1117; and City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 1160 dated May 23rd, 1977, page 5.
170
Excerpt of quote taken from City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated June 11, 1979, page 1.
See also, City of Jennings Regular Council Session dated October 8, 1984, page 2.
171
According to City of Jennings, MO transcript of the Community Development Public Hearing dated
October 24, 1977, pages 4-9.
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Partnering with a local bank, University City established a revolving loan and
interest subsidy program for eligible homeowners as housing rehabilitation assistance.
Initially, the city’s policy was to extend home rehabilitation loans to single-family
residential areas only. However, to encourage rehabilitation throughout the city, officials
leveraged CDBG dollars to initiate a two-tiered system which included two-family
dwellings and met the objective of giving special consideration to low-income residents.
By the end of 1976, the city had extended loans to 247 homeowners.172
University City policymakers further improved its housing stock by authorizing the
city to rehab homes designated for low-income seniors. Certain areas of the city were
comprised of blocks of single story, one and two-bedroom homes with small lots grouped
close together. The houses required modest rehabbing, were easy to maintain, and were
taxed at a minimal rate. The city acquired groups of these homes and partnered with the
University City School District to rehab the homes. The rehabilitated homes were either
sold or dedicated to leasing through the Section 8 assisted housing program.
By the end of the study period, in 2015, Hazelwood’s home improvement loan
program was entering its 33rd year in existence. The program contained enough funds to
provide 13 loans averaging $5,000 each to 13 low to moderate-income homeowners and
provided grants to homeowners meeting certain income qualifications. Emerging in the
second half of the 1970s, Hazelwood modeled its program after neighboring Bridgeton
whereby the county and city acted as intermediaries between homeowner and contractor.
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Figures taken from City of University City archives Session 1149: December 20, 1976, page 7.
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Upon securing community development funds from the St. Louis County Office of
Community Development, Hazelwood compensated the contractor for the work.173
The county selected sections of unincorporated north county to initiate the program.
Berkeley, Riverview, and Flordell Hills, along with the aforementioned study group cities,
were among the north county incorporated areas receiving support from the program.
Initially absent from the group was Ferguson. Ferguson originally resisted enacting
homesteading and home improvement policies to protect its housing stock. In September
1975, by a narrow margin of four to three, the city approved a ways and means committee
recommendation to procure and renovate a foreclosed HUD home. However, the city had
no formal plan in place for how to move forward.174
As with antidiscrimination, Ferguson lawmakers were bitterly divided on housing
programs. One camp’s position was predicated on the stance that, “Government should
keep out of private enterprise and not be getting into the real estate business.” The other
camp believed, “If the city bought the house, renovated it, and found an owner, it might be
the start of other people fixing up their own homes.” By August 1978, with pro-housing
program legislatures still enjoying a plus one majority, Ferguson instituted a home
improvement assistance program.175
Ferguson boasted 20 program participants as opposing legislatures pushed for
addendums like requiring repayment of home improvement monies if homeowners sold
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City of Hazelwood, MO Special Session dated September 11, 1978; and Regular Session dated October
11, 1978; Figures taken from City of Hazelwood, MO City Manager’s Report on the Municipal Housing and
Community Development Cooperation Agreement 2015- 2017 with St. Louis County Office of Community
Development.
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City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated September 9, 1975, page 3.
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Excerpts of quotes taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated September 9, 1975,
page 3.
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their home. By June 1983, the city had issued $270,000 in home improvement assistance
to 213 residents. The following August, Ferguson instituted a homesteading program
purchasing two homes in the early phase of the program. Homesteading and home
improvement programs were valuable tools to defend against housing stock deterioration,
neighborhood blight, and destabilization. However, they required early application and
commitment to be effective.176
St. Louis city was already utilizing these measures, and places in Ohio
demonstrated they could be successful. St. Louis County municipalities were not required
to devise innovative funding mechanisms to implement these programs as federal dollars
were made available through the county. County officials had identified north county areas
for improvement projects, and home improvement was among the county’s program goals.
In other words, these tools were readily accessible and proven. Nevertheless, Ferguson was
embroiled in an ideological struggle which cost the municipality precious time and ensured
programs would receive minimal resources and support.
This was best exhibited in Ferguson’s response to St. Louis County housing
turnover maps in 1983. In reviewing the data, Ferguson officials discovered areas with high
rates of turnover, distressed rental properties, and crime. Officials responded to this
information by electing to, “Inspect the boundaries of these areas each year.” Contrast this
with Hazelwood’s response to being told by St. Louis County, “Because of the extremely
low foreclosure rate, we are not encouraged to establish a homesteading program in
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According to City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Council Session Regular Council Session dated August
23, 1983, page 2-3; City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Council Session dated August 22, 1978, page 5.

118

Hazelwood.” Hazelwood instituted a policy for monitoring conditions of the properties
despite the low number of HUD foreclosures.177
Hazelwood recognized the trajectory of FHA’s destabilizing practices and
responded proactively. The housing inspector monitored and recorded the conditions of
foreclosed HUD homes by performing an exterior inspection of the properties every three
months. Hazelwood applied this procedure for monitoring non-HUD foreclosures as well.
Although it was difficult to obtain private foreclosure information, Hazelwood utilized
techniques such as reviewing trash collection records to determine if homes were vacant.
While their actions did not prevent FHA activity in the city, they were better prepared to
mitigate damage if FHA foreclosures increased.178
No city’s process or programs were void of deficiencies. Maplewood struggled
writing up their programs let alone implementing them. While officials proposed focusing
on houses in most need of improvement, fights over limited eligibility, first come first
serve, and per-home outlays delayed the passage of the bill authorizing the city’s
participation. Critics bashed the plan because, as one resident complained, “Two-hundred
Seventy-five thousand dollars isn’t going to fix all the homes in Maplewood.” Of course,
officials could not satisfy everyone, and no amount of good city leadership or policies can
guarantee a high-quality housing stock.179
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Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of St. Louis County Assisted Housing Coordinator presentation to
the council in City of Hazelwood, MO February 27, 1980; According to City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular
Council Session dated August 23, 1983, page 2, Ferguson made $80,000 in home improvement funds
available for people to fix up their homes in 1983. See also, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Council
Session dated October 12, 1982, page 4.
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For more information see, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated November 14, 1984.
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Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Maplewood, Missouri archives Year 1977, Document
No. 257.
Bill number 3974: An ordinance accepting the provision of chapter 353 revised statutes of Missouri Urban
Redevelopment Corporation. See also, City of Maplewood, Missouri archives Regular Session dated October
14, 1980, Bill number 4173: An ordinance authorizing the mayor of the city of Maplewood to execute a
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Ultimately, municipal leaders could only assess situations, utilize available
information, access and leveraged resources and tools, and make decisions. While HUD
played a prevalent role in impacting residential patterns and housing conditions, municipal
governments possessed authority to address the phenomena. Type, timing, and level of
action impacted the degree to which HUD activity affected municipalities’ housing.
However, it was not a singular driver of housing stock conditions. Housing codes and
enforcement determined preexisting conditions, informed officials of trends, and guided
policy responses.
Code Enforcement
Suburbs have a long history of stringent housing codes. But no suburban city
exemplified this more than University City. The municipality was known for having some
of the strictest codes in the region. For some residents, housing codes were a source of
extreme frustration. Families sometimes moved from the municipality because of the high
costs of bringing their houses up to code. Others filed complaints accusing housing
inspectors of harassment and hurling insults. Albeit, housing inspectors are seldom popular
in any town as they are charged with the duty of enforcing the codes. But University City
inspectors were often loathed.180
Reports outlined claims that inspectors would sometimes go through dresser
drawers and open refrigerator doors as part of inspections. Following windshield surveys
for the rehabilitation loan program, residents claimed citations were sent to people whose

cooperative agreement on behalf of the city with the Maplewood Housing Authority and declaring
ordinance to be an emergency bill passed and became ordinance number 4161.
180
For more information about University City’s codes see City of University City, archives Regular Session
1009: February 7, 1972, page 7. For example, of references see also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated
May 13, 1971; Hazelwood, MO archive dated February 18, 1975; and City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated
September 6, 1989.
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properties were among the best kept properties in the neighborhood. According to one such
homeowner, “I received the letter out of the clear blue sky.” A 1972 Washington University
School of Social Work survey of 41 University City homes found most interviewees
disagreed with the city’s inspection process.181
The survey revealed that some residents felt the housing inspections hurt their
neighborhoods rather than help rehabilitate them. They believed the council did not want
certain types of modest low-income housing in University City and the inspections were a
way to minimize and eliminate them. Criticism seldom affected the decisions of University
City officials concerning matters related to the municipality’s aesthetic qualities.
Policymakers were not open to debate on issues that might weaken the city’s housing codes
and enforcement. With over 17,500 dwellings in less than six square miles, the slightest
housing deterioration could mean a dramatically different looking University City.182
Rigorous codes and tough enforcement resulted in nearly 45,000 repairs each year
between 1970 and 1975 alone. The city consistently sought ways to fortify and expand its
housing codes. For University City, Building Officials Code Administrators (BOCA)
building codes simply served as a foundation upon which to build. BOCA provided
regulations for the design and construction of buildings and encouraged cities to adopt
uniform building codes and enforcement measures. Adoption of BOCA codes was standard
practice. Archives reflect each study city adopting the latest BOCA building codes
throughout the study period.183
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Excerpt of quote taken from City of University City archives Regular Session 1099: April 21, 1975, page
18; Taken from City of University City archives Regular Session 1009: February 7, 1972, page 7.
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Density and properties count taken from University City, MO archives Session 1145: October 25, 1976,
page 4.
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According to records outlining the city’s code enforcement figures included in Session 1378: February
11, 1985; For example, see Jennings adopt the fifth edition of BOCA basic building codes in January 1970
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In addition to following BOCA recommendations, cities used nuisance abatement
laws to regulate conditions of properties. Nuisance abatement authorized cities to levy
special tax bills against property owners for costs of city workers performing property
owner responsibilities such as cutting and removing overgrown grass and weeds. Adopting
BOCA codes and nuisance abatement policies offered municipalities some professional
credence and regulatory authority over the structural design, maintenance, and exterior
appearance of the housing stock. However, they were essentially guidelines in a book and
rules governing things like landscaping.
Without rigorous inspections and enforcement policies, BOCA and nuisance
ordinances did little to protect the character, preserve the taxable value of land and
buildings, or ensure stability of residential areas. Minimum housing standards provided
cities with more powerful tools for attaining and maintaining these elements. According to
Interviewee J3, “Minimum housing standards were the codes that had some teeth.”
Presence or absence of minimum housing codes significantly affected housing stock
conditions entering the 1970s.184
As residential patterns changed and HUD activities ramped up, the degree of impact
and municipal toolboxes varied. Although HUD had established certain standards for
buildings constructed under its housing programs, they did little to curb deterioration.
University City was the first city in Missouri to adopt minimum housing policies in the
1960s. A minimum housing code instituted new standards, enforcement measures, and

and the BOCA national building code 14th edition in November 1999, page 2. Bills authorizing BOCA always
passed unanimously.
184
Excerpt of quote taken from Interview J3: 07/24/2019, White / Female / 70-year Resident.
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penalties for violators, and better equipped cities to prevent and address housing stock
deterioration.185
By 1970, as in most other mature inner suburbs, a notable percentage of Jennings’
housing stock was in disrepair or exhibited some form of substandard conditions. Jennings
began taking steps towards minimum housing policy. On August 24, 1971, Jennings
enacted a law requiring occupancy permits. The new policy stipulated that an inspection of
property be performed and approved before transfers of ownership or occupancy could be
completed. The new law was an effective way for Jennings to begin addressing
deterioration by interjecting required improvements at the point where seller/lessor impetus
and buyer/leaser interest intersect.186
Then, in May 1973, the passage of Bill 1050 authorized Ordinance 1029 enacting
space restrictions in Jennings. The law regulated the number of occupants allowed to live
in a home based on specified dimensions. Finally, on June 24, 1974, Jennings’ building
commissioner issued notice to property owners regarding the City of Jennings’ enactment
of a minimum housing law governing every dwelling within the city limits. True minimum
housing meant Jennings now conducted periodic inspections of every dwelling.187
In addition to change of occupancy inspections, periodic inspections were
performed at all properties and code violations had to be corrected within an allotted time.
Jennings’ path to minimum housing was unique in that the process progressed rapidly after
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the introduction of bills. This was caused primarily by the council’s unity and insulation
outlined earlier in the chapter.
Other cities’ attempts to enact the policy involved entrenched battles. Opposing
views pitted those who believed cities already had sufficient ordinances to control blight
against those who argued existing ordinances were inadequate to deal with current trends.
While opponents of minimum housing urged officials to do a better job enforcing existing
ordinances, it was clear their principal fear was that the policy would create hardship.
Consider that in the early 1970s, minimum housing laws were still regarded as a
controversial issue.
Rumors abounded in neighboring municipalities that, “University City’s minimum
housing hurt older residents.” Many suburbanites viewed laws like minimum housing as
peculiar, unwarranted, and authoritarian mandates that placed an undue burden on
homeowners. According to one citizen, Ferguson’s 1973 minimum housing bill was,
“Ridiculous and unnecessary and should be thrown out.” Ferguson was a prosperous
community and to many, it appeared some officials were busy looking for ways to weaken
the city instead of strengthening it.188
Prevailing attitudes in Ferguson favored more traditional means such as exclusion
as the best method of preserving community character and property values. Ironically,
minimum codes had been criticized as methods of discrimination against the poor and
people of color. Nevertheless, Ferguson detractors labeled minimum housing codes as
dictatorial claiming building officials had too much power in assessing properties for
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nuisance or repair needs. They opposed the concept of inspections arguing that matters
concerning conditions of properties should be handled by the buyer and seller.189
Most notable was that Ferguson’s bill did not involve periodic inspections.
Ferguson’s policy language stipulated inspections be performed preoccupancy or upon
resale. The bill did not affect existing residences. Nevertheless, officials repeatedly tabled
the bill until it died. Three years would pass before the city adopted Bill 4607 enacting a
new housing code to become effective on March 1, 1977. However, before Ferguson’s city
codebook could bear any resemblance to University City’s and Jennings’, a majority of
voters needed to approve the measure in a November 2, 1976 special election. Ferguson
voters rejected minimum housing by a vote of 6,398 in favor to 4,452 opposed.190
Failing to garner constituent support for minimum housing standards in 1973 and
1976, Ferguson officials set out to construct and present more palatable alternatives. Early
polling for the exterior appearance program showed residents favored this type of policy
three to one. In a supplemental election held November 6, 1979, voters approved the
exterior appearance program. The 3,613 to 3,164 tallies contradicted the polling numbers,
and the narrow margin reflected citizen division on such issues in Ferguson.
Notwithstanding, the city instituted the program on February 6, 1980. Shortly after the
implementation of Ferguson’s exterior appearance program, complaints of inequitable
application and targeting began to accumulate.191
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Officials maintained claims of discriminatory targeting were untrue and that all
houses and properties were being inspected. However, Ferguson archives indicate that
officials were in fact directing inspectors to specific areas. Closer examination also reveals
more supporting evidence of discriminatory treatment. Although the program was written
to apply to the entire city, Ferguson only funded the program through HUD funds.
Therefore, inspections were required to be limited to low to moderate-income areas only.192
In 1984, Ferguson instituted a change of occupancy permit requirement and density
regulations. Density controls were an effective housing preservation tool. The measure also
helped alleviate overcrowding in schools. However, the tool proved to be largely
ineffective for Ferguson as its enactment was woefully delayed and the policy lacked the
accompanying components needed to make the policy effective. Without rigorous and
reliable inspection and enforcement mechanisms to compliment it, occupancy restrictions
were rendered pointless. For example, absent periodic inspections, Ferguson depended
heavily on sources like school enrollment to help surmise occupancy levels.193
This method was problematic as school districts were usually not contiguous with
city boundaries. In some cases, family members and friends claimed residency for students
that did not physically live on the premises. Interviewee U5 explained, “Many kids lived
with grandma. It became less a nuclear family than a group of people living together out
of necessity.” Stereotypical assumptions disallowed legitimate, founded, and equitable
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inquiries about occupant status and encouraged overaggressive, excessive, and
disproportionate use of the law instead.194
A 1992 referendum election repealed Ferguson’s exterior appearance program
further weakening the city’s defenses against blight. Not only did Ferguson reject authentic
minimum codes, it was now without one of the best tools it had at its disposal. The
referendum was followed by a 4,773 to 2,115 defeat of a 1994 property preservation
proposition. At this point, Ferguson’s overall housing stock was still in better shape than
many of its neighbors. However, failure to strengthen housing codes, perform impartial
enforcement, and dedicate more reliable resources helped lay the groundwork for problems
to come.195
Lacking the tools provided in true minimum housing policy, housing stock
maintenance began to deteriorate rapidly in certain sectors of Ferguson. This was
particularly true for areas containing clusters of apartment dwellings. As conditions
worsened, Ferguson chose not to amend their policies. Instead, the city turned to a different
source and style of enforcement to address problems. Ferguson relied on its police to
monitor, control, and deter housing deterioration. However, police were trained to combat
crime not housing code violations.196
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This is not to imply that police were incapable of executing fair, effective housing
code enforcement. In fact, it was common for cities to utilize police, fire, and other city
departments in housing code enforcement, particularly those with stringent codes and
thorough inspection mechanisms. However, these measures were usually temporary
assignments to augment services in response to staff shortages. University City, for
example, frequently utilized employees of its fire and police departments for duties such
as code inspections. Jennings even appointed a former police officer as special building
inspector in 1985.197
In the case of Ferguson, however, police were not assigned to perform inspections,
and housing codes were not what they were instructed to enforce. Ferguson failed to
implement meaningful policy, delayed implementation of basic measures, and reverted to
ineffective alternatives. The city relied on draconian methods to control aspects of
community life having little to do with housing code compliance. Exponential growth in
black residency, low-income residents, and renters introduced social dynamics that
Ferguson was not only unwilling to embrace but were committed to isolating and restricting
to the cities’ edges.
For decades, housing codes and enforcement proved essential to protecting the
integrity of a cities’ housing stock. But acute changes in resident demographics challenged
municipal officials to consider and reconsider approaches to preserving the characteristics
and value of homes and the implications associated with various approaches. Growth of
rental properties complicated compliance enforcement, and it became more difficult to
identify property owners and occupant status. Cities implemented different methods to
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evaluate, maintain, and improve housing conditions. Some policies like landlord
registration were effective and well-liked, while others like family definition and policing
created resentment and tension which intensified over time.198
Early and true implementation of minimum housing did not eliminate problems for
cities. Jennings and University City each implemented the tool early and completely.
Nevertheless, each city still struggled with deterioration in neighborhoods. Areas contained
condemn properties, vacant lots, and until cities passed ordinances requiring they be
removed upon change in occupancy, aesthetically displeasing security bars on doors and
windows. Housing codes and enforcement decisions, especially in the early period of
suburban transformation, were difficult tasks requiring consideration of a complex array of
competing and complementary factors.199
Consider Hazelwood’s case. City officials first began exploring minimum housing
ideas as early as May 1971, when they obtained copies of both Berkeley and University
City’s minimum housing bills for comparison purposes. Three years later, in November
1974, the council adopted an occupancy permit requirement. However, a decade later in
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May 1984, the city still did not have minimum housing and enforcement on the books as
Hazelwood voters rejected the 1976 proposition.200
Public records demonstrate low civic involvement among Hazelwood’s
electorate— particularly relative to other study cities. Therefore, citizen preferences were
not easily examinable. Nevertheless, in general, people want less government and the
original occupancy permit issue ignited a firestorm. Hazelwood officials adopted the 1976
measure without public discussion or education. Citizens petitioned for a referendum and
voted 1,400 to 904 to repeal the law. Hazelwood officials made the mistake of
underestimating the controversial nature of the policy, citizens’ issue attitudes, and voter
capacity to mobilize against the law.201
Although some cities chose not to adopt minimum housing codes and some faced
staunch citizen opposition to tools like occupancy permits, by 1976, 30 St. Louis County
communities had housing codes with occupancy permit provisions and suggested others
adopt the tool. A 1976 East-West Gateway Coordinating Council survey of the 30 St. Louis
County municipalities with housing codes and occupancy permits found that 100 % of the
30 communities would recommend the procedure to other cities. The report further stated

200

For more about the beginning of Hazelwood’s occupancy permit efforts see, City of Hazelwood, MO
archive May 13, 1971; City of Hazelwood, MO November 6, 1974; and Hazelwood, MO archive November
29, 1974.
201
See, Referendum Petition regarding occupancy permits in transcript of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session
dated December 1, 1976. See also, Hazelwood, MO February 18, 1975; City of Hazelwood, MO August 18,
1976; City Hazelwood, MO Special Session dated February 18, 1975; and Hazelwood, MO Regular Session
August 4, 1976; Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated August 4, 1976: Bill 1220 Housing, occupancy permit
provisions unanimously adopted as Ordinance 1192-76. See also, archives Hazelwood, MO Special Session
dated June 22, 1976; and Hazelwood, MO dated July 7, 1976.

130

that 97 % of cities felt the occupancy permit had a positive effect in preventing or slowing
neighborhood deterioration.202
Of all the suburbs surveyed, the only community that did not feel as though
requirements had slowed deterioration was Wellston. This further reinforces the point that
stringent code enforcement measures were more effective at preventing decline than
stabilizing or reversing the trend. The tool was largely ineffective once an area had already
exhibited a great deal of deterioration. Thirteen years after Hazelwood officials first
considered the tool, they were preparing to reach out to Ferguson officials to ascertain how
Ferguson managed to recently get an occupancy permit law adopted.203
Relative to both threat level and adoption difficulty, Hazelwood faced an uphill
battle from the beginning. As in some neighboring suburbs, Hazelwood contained resource
rich areas where maintenance quality was superb, and the dangers of deterioration were
nonexistent. Expensive homes and newer developments dawned these sections of
Hazelwood’s landscape. Conversely, a significant portion of Hazelwood still consisted of
properties which contained old deteriorated accessory buildings formerly utilized in
farming.
Minimum housing ordinances required property owners bring buildings into
compliance with new standards and for many Hazelwood residents, this was financially
unfeasible. While most municipalities faced a similar dilemma, the dynamics of
Hazelwood’s housing stock included an additional quandary. In addition to homeowner
compliance, Hazelwood’s residents would be required to repair, maintain, or demolish and
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clear structures which in most cases were no longer operational. Consider these elements
and it becomes obvious why the issue garnered such a high level of involvement from an
otherwise apathetic electorate.204
Hazelwood officials recognized destabilization threats from their housing stock
circumstance, leveraged the available tool of minimum housing codes, and authorized
budget expenditures to cover the salary of a building inspector and enforcement services.
However, voters rejected the tools through a successful referendum petition, and officials
were back at square one. At this point, officials had several options: 1. They could elect to
do nothing, 2. They could mount a minimum housing codes education campaign to try to
gain more voter support, or 3. They could seek alternatives.
Hazelwood officials chose to explore other available tools for combating
deterioration. Alternatives to minimum housing codes were not as effective, as they had
less teeth. Nevertheless, they were usually more palatable to voters, and contained some of
the elements of minimum housing. These factors made them more adoptable and much
more effective than doing nothing. As one Hazelwood policymaker put it, “A half a loaf,
or third of a loaf is better than none at all.”205
Hazelwood ordinances at the time only authorized the city to require property
owners correct deficiencies posing a threat of physical injury to the public. Such a law was
minimally effective at addressing the most prominent contributing factor in municipallevel decline— structural decay. Hazelwood officials needed an additional tool and they
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set out to identify which tool met or exceeded both the adoptability and impact thresholds
the council agreed upon.
In August 1977, Hazelwood adopted an exterior maintenance code, and began
leveraging CDBG funds and other funding to support inspection and enforcement
activities. The exterior maintenance code served to mitigate some of the defects in the city’s
existing code. However, it was essentially an expansion of nuisance and demolition codes
which were already on the books. The exterior maintenance code did little to empower the
city to address the real deficiency in the existing code. Inspection and enforcement
mechanisms were what needed to be addressed.206
Nuisance orders relied on reporting or inspector discovery. Also, conditions of
many properties were beyond help and would have to be demolished anyway. An
occupancy permit system would provide the additional mechanisms for prompting
inspections thereby expanding enforcement opportunities and multiplying impact.
Hazelwood’s minimum housing proponents understood this and since the 1976 repealing
of the law, officials had remained steadfast in promoting the adoption of an occupancy
permit requirement.
During the preparation of Hazelwood’s 1984 comprehensive plan, disagreement
emerged between two groups of councilpersons concerning reintroduction of occupancy
permits. One lawmaker was especially adamant as she represented a ward in which the
signs of decline were beginning to subtly show. A fellow lawmaker, also a proponent of
the measure, encouraged colleagues to, “Face the future and view the effort as a challenge
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to make Hazelwood a little bit better. It will be difficult, but the council has to determine
if the advice of the professionals is in fact for the good of Hazelwood.”207
Hazelwood officials were proposing adoption of the Ferguson version of an
occupancy permit which provided for inspections at the time of rental or sale of property.
This new Hazelwood proposal had less controls than the one voted out in 1976. That
version of the ordinance instituted ongoing inspections and enforcement procedures.
Nevertheless, some policymakers remained skeptical, citing reports that other cities such
as Florissant had the periodic inspection version of housing code and it increased the cost
of homes in the municipality.208
Hazelwood’s council had been working on the new plan since July 1983, and the
issue of whether to include an occupancy permit served as the only notable source of
disagreement. While the council unanimously agreed stronger codes and enforcements
were warranted, several lawmakers feared they may be once again traveling the 1976 road.
Proponents pointed out the weakness of the existing exterior code, citing 75 percent of
citations were for beautification rather than health and safety violations. This amounted to
a beautification program, and beautification was not mentioned in the established code.209
Nevertheless, several officials viewed the 1976 referendum as a clear message and
mandate from Hazelwood voters to their elected representatives. While the new proposal
varied from the 1976 law, it was still an occupancy permit and voters had issued a
resounding no to occupancy permits. Although this was a different version, some officials
lacked the will to test its palatability on voters. Further, survey data revealed that more than
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90 percent of residents favored the exterior code and did not want an interior code.
Ultimately, Hazelwood’s completed 1984 plan did not include the implementation of the
occupancy permit inspection and code enforcement system.210
Hazelwood produced a plan that included the implementation of communication
techniques and instruments designed to stress the value of the existing exterior maintenance
code and strengthen its effect. The program included voluntary services and free interior
inspections. At the close of the 1980s, five years after the implementation of the
accentuated exterior maintenance code and programs, Hazelwood officials authorized an
assessment of its overall effectiveness on the conditions of the city’s housing stock.
A 1989 University of Missouri-St. Louis area municipal housing codes and housing
survey looked at the conditions of Hazelwood’s housing stock for the years 1980, 1983,
and 1985. The report showed the housing stock deteriorating in 1980, but years 1983 and
1985 showed Hazelwood’s housing stock to be improving. At the time of the report,
Hazelwood officials still favored adoption of occupancy permits. They were still gauging
voter temperature, structural atmosphere, and monitoring windows of opportunity.
Nevertheless, as the report indicated, the 1984 enhanced exterior maintenance compromise
garnered positive results.211
Hazelwood’s 1984 comprehensive planning process resulted in several innovative
additions to the city’s exterior maintenance code, and the city would continue seeking ways
to improve and strengthen the measure in future decades. According to a December 2009
issue of the Missouri Municipal Review, the City of Hazelwood Code Enforcement
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Division was the first municipality in Missouri to deploy mobile wireless software to assist
in assuring code enforcement and to improve productivity.212
The article highlighted how the city partnered with an information technologies
firm to develop the module which could be integrated with other computer systems and
provided code enforcement personnel access to “real time” information. The tool allowed
for more instantaneous creation of post-inspection citations utilizing laptop computers. The
initiative was part of Hazelwood’s efforts to create a paperless office environment which
was more environmentally friendly, decreased bureaucracy, and saved taxpayer money.213
Over the course of the entire study period, Hazelwood officials attempted to
implement minimum housing and over the entire period, they failed to do so. Hazelwood
entered the era as a nonprofessionally operated village equipped with outmoded codes
which were powerless to affect decaying old farm properties and structures. After
establishing a charter form of government, city officials set out to institute more adequate
measures for controlling the city’s structural health. Voters rejected those measures, but
officials never lost sight of their original objectives and goals. They reassessed, adjusted
plans, instituted alternatives, and continued to improve those tools.
Exterior maintenance codes did not equip Hazelwood with the full mechanisms of
minimum housing leveraged by Jennings and University City, or the inspection prompting
device of change in possession permit requirements employed in Ferguson. Nevertheless,
Hazelwood officials not only maximized the tools available to them, they also enriched
them— making the tools more effective. Hazelwood offers an example of a cooperative
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approach to policymaking. Despite enjoying council consensus related to identifying and
prioritizing threats, needs, and options, Hazelwood policymakers exhibited an intriguing
mix of idealism and pragmatism.214
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Chapter 6. Land Use Policy
Introduction
Housing codes and enforcement were fundamental to early municipal-level
stabilization efforts. Minimum housing policy proved effective in areas that utilized the
complete tool in combination with other methods. Some municipalities chose to use only
certain components of the tool while electing to levy various other prevention and
enforcement mechanisms. Regardless of which housing preservation method officials
employed, owner-occupied homes and property values continued to decline. While
adjacent mature suburbs like Clayton, Ladue, and Florissant flourished, locals looked to
municipal leaders to govern their respective towns to similar success.215
Suburban governments needed to rethink land use policies, and options were
limited. The unique character mentioned earlier was established before some areas were
even incorporated. While some cities like Ferguson and Hazelwood grew geographically
over time, annexed areas usually retained existing zone rights. Suburban boundaries and
designs constrained officials to operate within the parameters set by location, historical
function, and city founders.216
Land reutilization in inner suburbs was not simply a method employed to handle
deterioration, it was one of the most critical elements in suburban survival. Localities
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competed for homeowners and businesses, and competition was fierce. Location, physical
characteristics, and function defined these areas in the past, but staying competitive often
required redevelopment which frequently required rezoning. Lot sizes and designations
had to be amended to accommodate demographical, environmental, market, and industry
changes. Consider a Ferguson resident’s 1983 perspective, “We don't need to encourage
people to move into shiny new carefree houses in St. Charles because we are being too
picky.”217
Through land reutilization decisions, municipal leaders chose whether to reinforce
their identity or redefine it for the future. For example, University City boasted a reasonable
level of commercial activity, but the lifeblood of the municipality resided in residential
property. Unlike commercial centers and industrial suburbs who generated revenue from
economic activity, property values were especially critical to the stability of bedroom
communities. University City garnered revenue primarily from property taxes paid by
homeowners and did not enjoy much space for new development which further restricted
options and increased dependency on property taxes.
Interviewee U1 explains, “We’re a very built out city. We have minor strips in our
neighborhoods. We have the kind of neighborhoods with a corner grocery store or little
pockets of commerce.” While bedroom suburbs like University City were particularly
vulnerable to decline due to diminishing property values, other types of mature suburbs
were also susceptible to the destabilizing activities of the era.218
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Historically, streetcar suburbs like Maplewood could better afford to keep
homeowner property taxes low. Enjoying a retail rich commercial sector, Maplewood
relied more on revenues generated from economic activity than property taxes. However,
by 1970, the mature inner suburb was no longer a commercial retail hub enjoying robust
economic activity. Fairly insulated from the destabilizing activities occurring in northern
areas of the county, Maplewood offered a unique opportunity to enrich my examination of
post-fair housing era decline and stabilization in mature St. Louis inner suburbs.
Maplewood entered the post-fairing housing era reeling from a collapse in
commercial activity and corruption in local government. Decline in commercial and retail
businesses generated less tax revenue resulting in increasingly higher property tax rates for
Maplewood homeowners. Poor management of city affairs and fiscal fraudulence
exacerbated the city’s decline. Interviewee M3 recalls, “Maplewood really struggled in the
1970s, business was hurting, bad politicians, and all.” Fiscal stress increased, city services
suffered, and conditions deteriorated.219
Despite not facing the negative impacts of resegregating neighborhoods,
discriminatory housing and lending practices, and concentrated HUD activity, the city
faced municipal-level decline, nonetheless. According to HUD’s action grant criteria,
Maplewood’s age of housing, per capita income, and population lag met the three
requirements needed to qualify as a distressed city. Consequentially, Maplewood’s
revitalization activities resembled stabilization measures being enacted in HUD-focused
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areas. However, with no discernible black in-migration, there was no white flight. Despite
higher taxes and declining city services, most core residents remained.220
At the height of its commercial retail prominence, Maplewood never lost its smalltown appeal. Residents clung to that identity, and it helped the city get through the tough
times. Suburbs’ historical identity and appeal did not always remain fixed, however. As
technology, transportation, and tastes evolved, some suburbs took on new identities. By
the post-fair housing period, some suburbs had transitioned from their original function
and were a mix of their past and present selves.
Jennings, for example, was a bedroom suburb before the arrival of two malls. The
advent of two large retail shopping centers, one in 1955 and another in 1961, transformed
the municipality’s function, financial fortitude, and municipal priorities. Despite remaining
largely a bedroom suburb, by 1970, the city depended less on property taxes to fund city
services and efforts to preserve the city’s retail activity rivaled efforts to protect property
values. While some suburbs experienced a blending of functions, others experienced
multiple functional transitions.221
By the time highways emerged and automobile use skyrocketed, Ferguson had
become a streetcar suburb. However, by 1970, the former railroad suburb attracting wealth
and affluence had transitioned yet again. Although no longer serving as a retreat for railroad
commuters or a streetcar shopping destination, Ferguson’s well-established business sector
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attracted prominent clientele. While Ferguson experienced several transitions in function,
the mature suburb still fared well physically and financially. The origins of its founding
solidified the suburb’s identity and factored prominently into policy decisions throughout
the study period.222
When Interviewee H5 moved to Hazelwood in the late 1950s, “There wasn’t much
other than farmland and old Highway 66.” However, within the next 20 years, Hazelwood
officials were citing “[lack of buildable land]” as their number one challenge and were
considering adding more land, property, and residents through annexation. Issue positions
ranged from believing the city existed at a nice community size to believing the city needed
to grow by annexing areas. According to one Hazelwood policymaker, “This item should
be determined by the philosophy of the city.” As such, by 1983, the city had acquired
several large parcels of undeveloped land.223
Suburbs varied in size, function, and identity. There was no standard bearer one
could model one’s own suburb after. Nevertheless, feasibility studies and comprehensive
planning processes helped cities better understand their situation, available tools, and
implications of decisions. Philosophies impacted decisions but characteristics limited
options. Factors for landlocked cities differed from those with unincorporated areas
bordering their city limits. Impact of rezoning residential to commercial varied between
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cases. Despite these variations, however, city lawmakers’ decisions could render these
unique characteristics valuable assets or costly liabilities.
Parks
Hazelwood assessed its conditions and produced a “very aggressive and
challenging plan” for land reutilization. Utilizing land use maps of the city, Hazelwood
integrated prospected annexations into existing area reutilization goals, and zoned parcels
in accordance with well-defined objectives. While activity was robust, officials created and
maintained an environment in which policy dictated development as opposed to the other
way around. The city’s ambitious undertaking required creative methods of procuring
resources and supports to implement.224
Prior to the 1970s, the Hazelwood Parks and Recreation Commission actively
explored various methods of land acquisition for parks. However, the Village of
Hazelwood Board of Trustees continuously turned down their recommendations. By 1971,
however, the city was no longer a village and Hazelwood councilpersons were in
unanimous agreement that the city needed parks and facilities for recreation. Officials
began affirmatively seeking to acquire land for park development by contacting
landowners and collecting land availability and pricing information.225
Hazelwood’s parks development began with a resident designating 13.28 acres of
land for use as a city park on the condition the city properly insured and maintained the
area. City officials accepted the resident’s benevolence and proceeded to add city-owned
parks to the area as well. By leveraging various financing instruments including 50 %
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matching grants, a million-dollar bond issue, a sales tax levy, and paying property owners
in installments, Hazelwood transformed its landscape. And on January 5, 1974, Hazelwood
became the first municipality to participate in the St. Louis County matching funds for
parks acquisition program.226
By June 1980, less than a decade after beginning its parks development efforts, the
suburb of 14,082 residents boasted 10 parks, over 130 acres of parkland, two swimming
pools, and bike/jogging trails. Although Hazelwood officials, administrators, and city
personnel changed over the study period, the city’s commitment to its parks and parks
development remained steadfast throughout. The city continued to develop parks and
recreation amenities through land purchases, county park acquisitions, and annexations;
and CDBGs and other public funding always included allocations designated for parks and
public spaces.227
By the end of the study period, Hazelwood’s parks and recreation portfolio
consisted of 16 community parks covering 160 acres, an 18-hole disc golf course,
bike/skate park, aquatic center, sports complex, and two recreation centers. Note, the city
has struggled to achieve equitable accessibility for all its wards as early investments
disproportionately dedicated facilities in certain areas. Notwithstanding, Hazelwood’s
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parks development program demonstrates an example of suburban land transformation
through effective goal setting, planning, and land reutilization.228
While Hazelwood began the period with an evolution in objectives, Maplewood
focused on improving and reinforcing established norms. One of Maplewood's best
strengths was its walkable traffic. Maplewood historically enlisted the services of architects
and planners who specialized in the creation of small-town and family-centric designs.
Maplewood demonstrated continual devotion to developing and retaining its public spaces
by allocating notable percentages of its financial resources to the category, appointing
professional engineers, and ensuring adequate maintenance staffing.229
Amid decline in the city’s fiscal health, governance performance, and
administrative professionalism, improving Maplewood’s parks and recreation offerings
became a way to curb decline and spark a renewed interest in the suburb. The city’s strong
history of accentuating pedestrian friendly spaces established a reputation which
transcended the difficult period and helped the city retain its attractiveness. Low intensity
park developments provided natural habitat preservation, encouraged community
interaction, and required modest management and maintenance. These were ideal settings
for tree planting, concerts, and picnics.
Maplewood’s zoning for parks policies adhered to well-defined parameters
frequently rejecting proposals which infringed on greenspace while lauding developments
proposing multiuse aspects. Despite the city’s desperate need to rejuvenate its retail
economy, policymakers seldom considered rezoning areas established for public use and

228
229

According to City of Hazelwood, MO website hazelwoodmo.org accessed on March 28, 2019.
See, City of Maplewood, MO Regular Session: Resolution No. 16, year 1978.

145

enjoyment. Instead, they focused on redeveloping existing infrastructure and revitalizing
areas by incentivizing investment and supporting private efforts.230
As an early participant in the St. Louis County Municipal Cooperation Financial
Assistance Program for development of neighborhood parks, Maplewood began leveraging
grants to help support its parks acquisition and development efforts in 1974. After
establishing a parks and recreation department the following year, the mature inner suburb
began increasing expenditures for parks and recreation. Neighborhood parks, youth
programs, bike paths, senior citizens' programs, special events, inclusion specialists for
individuals with disabilities, and a parks and recreation brochure followed.231
In April 1985, the city received its first US Land and Water grant which funded
aquatic improvements and continued to utilize various financing methods including a 2001
$5.6 million bond issue to improve its aquatics facilities. City officials addressed decline
through a method of land reutilization which focused on protecting and leveraging its
existing small-town appeal. From expansion of bicycling/walking trails to the 2002
formation of a joint parks and recreation department with neighboring Richmond Heights,
Maplewood continued to improve and expand its parks and recreation selections over the
remainder of the study period.232
While Maplewood enhanced its parkland and Hazelwood transformed its landscape
through parkland development, other study group suburbs boasted impressive parks and
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recreation offerings and consistently sought to improve them. By June 1970, Jennings’
parks and facilities improvement fund was nearly depleted. With a surplus in the general
operating revenue fund, Jennings’ council increased the parks and facilities budget. At first
glance, one may ascertain Jennings was underfunding the account and needed to increase
the allocation just to sustain it. However, subsequent policies challenge this notion.233
Jennings officials demonstrated a firm commitment to parks and recreation through
its land reutilization decisions. Allocations continued to increase as the advent of CDBGs,
capital equipment funds, and revenue sharing provided more revenue for improvements.
Jennings designated substantial portions to financing parks, playgrounds, equipment, and
programs. Despite narrow defeats, officials energetically lobbied citizens to support bond
issues to finance land acquisition for the purpose of constructing a community recreation
center and related facilities.234
Bond issue elections were one of the few avenues where Jennings’ citizens’
preferences were accurately portrayed. As mentioned earlier, Jennings’ mayor and council
enjoyed consensus and relative policy liberty. Following the failed bond issue, officials
immediately adjusted. And by 1975, a park survey for the site of the new skating rink was
complete. The council authorized the park committee to proceed with installation of the
rink as well as a new bicycle path. As the building commissioner prepared a bulletin
displaying the new bike route to be distributed throughout the city, the street commissioner
secured bids to purchase signs to be posted along the route.235
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By the time Hazelwood began developing its first 13 acres designated for park use,
Ferguson residents already enjoyed over 100 acres of parkland, and city officials were busy
acquiring more through land purchases. While Ferguson benefited from the benevolence
of its founder and other wealthy landowners over the decades, the municipality also
enjoyed knowledgeable, skilled professionals and resource purveyors which compounded
benefits. With keen awareness and understanding of opportunities and available tools,
Ferguson remained positioned to secure maximum resources and leveraged the latest
devices when the city so desired.236
With its resource richness and professional fortitude, Ferguson garnered the
admiration of its neighbors who considered the city an attractive partner for projects.
However, with its high-level of self-sufficiency and self-containment, citizens endorsed
only the proposals with the least amount of Ferguson contribution and largest returns.
When Berkeley’s city manager approached Ferguson with a proposal for a joint park
development in October 1970, council majority members agreed with Ferguson’s mayor
that, “This joint venture is a practical idea.” Nevertheless, a Ferguson Homeowners
Association petition killed the proposal in park board committee.237
Although a significant amount of Ferguson’s parkland originated from land
bequeathed prior to 1970, an examination of ongoing parks and recreation policies offer
glimpses into the city’s land use philosophy. Ferguson acquired a great deal of land through
tax lien acquisitions, purchases, dedications, and annexations. Officials were routinely
divided, and active citizens opposed certain uses and the use of public dollars. While
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Ferguson’s land use policies remained consistent with their philosophy, other policy
patterns reveal striking contradictions.238
Despite its expressed opposition to accepting and using public funds to finance
developments, the city regularly participated in public funding programs like the US Land
and Water Conservation Fund and St. Louis County’s matching funds for parks program.
While opposition to these programs existed in each of the study cities, Ferguson’s
opposition tended to be larger, more organized, and deeply visceral. Public hearing
transcripts reveal a citizenry philosophically devoted to the principals of individualism and
personal responsibility, but notably selective regarding the concepts of collective goods
and communal developments.239
Ferguson’s land use policies demonstrated minimal collective will to finance items
such as recreation centers which are designated for community use. This ideology was
further exhibited through rejection of environmentally friendly efforts. When a 1979 bike
route proposal met fierce opposition, one supporter said, “Ferguson has many oldfashioned residents who do not see the benefit in things like bike lanes and increasing bike
usage.” By 1992, however, bike routes were more common in cities and significant
transition in Ferguson’s citizenry had occurred.240
Transportation improvement and bicycle education programs had become a popular
tool for addressing automobile related problems in urban areas. Nevertheless, Ferguson’s
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1992 proposal died. Another proposal failed in 1998 with one Ferguson citizen exclaiming,
“I don't know of one person who rides their bike to work.” Ironically, in September 2009,
thirty years after the reading of its first bike path proposal, Ferguson was one of three St.
Louis municipalities recognized by a membership-based bike/walk association for its
participation in living well programs. Two years later, Ferguson established a bicycle
pedestrian plan.241
Ferguson’s journey to bike/walk paths offers one illustration of the city’s identity
but fails to provide the nuances necessary to present a more complete and accurate
description of that identity. As with Jennings, Ferguson’s policy patterns were misleading.
However, in Ferguson’s case, policy aligned more with the citizen majority’s preferences
which frequently conflicted with the council majority’s preferences. Also noteworthy was
the imbalance of power. Although both groups held only slim majorities, the citizen
majority wielded disproportionate policy influence over the council majority.
Results of an August 1998 parks and recreation proposition vote help demonstrate
this point. Proposition two proposed a sales tax and bond issue to finance a community
center. The issue attracted much more harsh criticism, well-organized, and well-funded
opposition than proposition support and financing. However, the issue was defeated by
only 162 votes. Of all the study cities, Ferguson provides the most intriguing blend of polar
opposite ideologies and identities among residents and officials. The suburb was home to
a prominent number of, what some Ferguson residents referred to as, radical social and
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environmental activists. Yet these “radicals” enjoyed minimal influence in the
policymaking sphere.242
Ferguson’s dichotomy created a confounding environment. With a broad love of
parks and recreation driving interests in the category, divergent beliefs, attitudes, and
resources resulted in dramatic inequity of expression and realization of preferences. This
chasm splintered Ferguson along an easily identifiable line with little room for
misinterpretation. Residents were either very inclusionary or very exclusionary in their
policy preferences. The city park board consisted of members from both sides, but the
private parks committee enjoyed definitive consensus.
While many were open to allowing nonresident use of parks, slightly more strongly
opposed. This resulted in legislation allowing use by Ferguson residents only. Subsequent
compromises included granting fee based and resident guest use to nonresidents, and defeat
of a bill proposing the posting of signs which read, “This park and its facilities are provided
by the City of Ferguson for your enjoyment. Leave it in the same condition as you found
it.” Note that exclusionary preferences were not exclusively grounded in racial bigotry.243
Perceived threats of increased crime and vagrancy and economic ideology fueled
some citizens’ public park opposition well-before any significant number of black citizens
began moving to the municipality. Racial transition in the suburb only served to bring
existing phobias and philosophies more prominently to the surface. Since the early days of
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its founding, Ferguson has been home to taxpayers who often equate investment in items
like public parks to inviting structural, social, and economic decline.244
Ferguson’s parks policies evolved dramatically over the study period. The mature
suburb demonstrated a lack of interest and will to commit adequate resources to parks and
recreation in the first 30 years of the era. However, by the turn of the millennium, the city
was investing substantial resources to parks and recreation and by 2003, the park fund
totaled close to a million dollars. The city’s 2006 comprehensive parks and recreation plan
and project produced new objectives, goals, guided decision making, and tasked the city to
develop new park facilities, recreation programs, and services.245
One Ferguson official explained, “It was about helping residents invest money and
resources in the most effective manner possible and focusing on the quality of life for the
community.” At study’s end, Ferguson parks projects had produced an impressive array of
offerings. New park trails, multipurpose courts, playgrounds, aquatics center, family
community center, and variety of special events and adult and youth programs now
accentuate the city’s 10 parks. An examination of the 2000s’ expansion of communal
amenities along with the commemorative theme park honoring Ferguson’s railroad history,
completed in 1997, reveals a city delineated by two discernably diverging eras of land use
for parks philosophies.246
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Despite sharing striking similarities in historical prestige, resource richness,
professional competence, and citizen activism, Ferguson and University City’s land use for
parks policies demonstrate intersecting trajectories. Both cities’ were established by wealth
and influence, benefited from visionary founders, and emerged as desirable destinations
and places of residency all while exhibiting stark contradictions of opulence and
concentrated deprivation. However, during transitions in the 1960s, University City
distinguished itself, not only from Ferguson, but from most mature suburbs in the country
by aiming to address these contradictions.
By the start of the study period, University City’s professionalism and evolution in
inclusionary policies had already empowered the city to secure resources most inner
suburbs were yet to begin seeking out. In instances in which awareness of available
resources was shared among neighboring municipalities, University City was usually better
positioned. Officials’ and citizens’ acceptance and acknowledgment of diverse needs and
interests expanded the city’s search and use of resources and tools and prepared and
qualified the city to capitalize on opportunities.
Funding programs regularly required cities possess a certain professional and fiscal
capacity, and University City had been leveraging funding from programs like the Land
and Water Conservation Fund since its inception in the early 1960s. This put the city in a
favorable position to multiply impact and leverage various streams for existing projects
and provided the latitude to maximize 1970s conceptions like CDBGs. For example, city-
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operated youth recreational and enrichment which offered year-round programing were
primarily supported by grants.247
Much of the city’s parks and recreation development was made possible through
grants and by 1970, University City’s commitment to land use for parks was already wellestablished and influencing land use policy. Creative leveraging of federal, state, and
county dollars empowered the city to approach land use funding project agreements already
poised to expand beyond the original purpose of the funds.
For instance, the city expanded its bike paths during publicly funded street
renovations by cutting shoulder aprons creating natural bicycle lanes. University City
enjoyed a citizen majority which supported city investment in parks development, facilities
designated for communal use, environmentally conscious projects, and increasing
pedestrian friendly spaces. While there remained a steady stream of opposition to public
financing of such items, particularly during fiscally stressful periods, support remained
notably higher than opposition.248
After a 1972 bond issue passed 4,090 to 2,503, officials increased revenues
dedicated to parks and recreation facilities, field night lights, and approved a park complex
pavilion. By the time county voters approved the 1977 bond issue establishing the
municipal park area purchases matching program, University City had already acquired
and developed over 240 acres of parkland and by 2012, University City boasted 18 parks
including a golf course, renovated community center, and 10 bike and walking trails.
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However, bond issues had been replaced with increasingly higher parks use, membership,
and activities fees.249
University City’s parks and recreation selection was second to none. However,
since the 2000s, the city has been embroiled in a struggle for retention of the social and
economic philosophy which earned the inner suburb the moniker, “pioneer of suburban
racial integration policies,” in the 1960s. While the municipality offers many of the finest
amenities like a state-of-the-art recreation facility, golfing professional and pro shop,
museums, and a symphony, a significant proportion of residents cannot afford to enjoy
these amenities.250
Despite University City’s allure, the suburb has always been home to a substantial
population of poor people who did not have the disposable income to access fee-based
attractions. Parks, recreational facilities, services, and activities programs serve as ideal
enrichment options for lower-income residents. However, fiscal stress caused by increased
poverty, less property tax revenue, and nominal commercial and industry challenged
University City to continue supporting these resources.
Officials were effective at mitigating this dilemma by levying bond issues and other
financing options to supplement resources. These strategies kept costs of accessing
communal amenities low for users by dispersing expenses throughout the entire tax base.
However, some contemporary officials do not favor this model and have lobbied with some
success to implement policies which decrease accessibility to the city’s parks and
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recreational amenities for many residents. While these policies do result in less taxpayer
spending overall, these policies could turn out to cost University City more in the end.
Through my examination of land use for parks policy in five mature St. Louis inner
suburbs, I observe conditions impacting philosophy which result in era-specific policy
divergence. The impact of these philosophical evolutions on city conditions in the future
is unknown as consequences are usually not realized and observable for some time after
implementation of policies.
Nevertheless, in examining policies of five cases over 45 years, exhibiting
variations in philosophy, conditions for cases experiencing no philosophical divergence,
cases which experienced philosophical divergence, and conditions at the point in which
philosophy diverged, I identify planning, zoning, and redevelopment philosophy as a
significant predictor of subsequent conditions.
Planning, Zoning, and Redevelopment
Between the 1970s and 1990s, status quo policymaking of the pre-fair housing era
was no longer sustainable in mature inner suburbs. Some cities adopted more receptive
attitudes towards changing demographics and demands. Officials authorized feasibility
studies, planned for impending changes, and enacted relevant ordinances. Nevertheless,
loss of tax revenue, poorer residents, and increasingly higher tax rates persisted. While
stabilization was yet to be determined, planning and zoning policies significantly impacted
municipalities’ vulnerabilities and defenses against decline.
An exponential increase in land and property redevelopment accompanied the black
suburbanization era. Municipalities needed a broader tax base, so officials launched efforts
to attract a bigger variety of new commercial development. However, when executed
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improperly, such undertakings may result in spot zoning further decreasing property
values. Additionally, commercial overdevelopment could fundamentally change the
character of a city. As one University City resident asserted, “If I wanted to live in Clayton,
I would have moved there.”251
Adequate rezoning, on the other hand, disperses and lessens negative impacts of
alterations in and around single-family neighborhoods. Some neighborhoods contained
larger pre-WWII homes built in accordance with lots zoned at a 10,000 sq. ft. minimum.
Others consisted of smaller post-WWII homes constructed on 5,000 sq. ft. lots. Some
neighborhoods offered a variety of homes which were architecturally designed to fit
together. Other areas consisted of similarly designed and virtually identical homes such as
one-story ranch style dwellings.252
Altering heights and mass of existing structures like adding a second story to singlefamily homes, building larger homes, and subdividing large lots with infill housing could
also fundamentally change the character of a community. Cities utilized planning and
zoning regulations to guide their decisions regarding approval and denial of redevelopment
proposals. Zoning policies demonstrated as well as influenced cities’ preferences and
served as a good indicator of cities’ demographic, structural, and fiscal conditions.
Some cities planned for and adjusted to the evolving environment by rezoning to
accommodate certain conversions, some reinforced existing zones, and some instituted
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stricter compatibility zoning polices restricting even the slightest deviation from
surrounding home sizes and styles. While a healthy mix was good for stability, diversity in
zoning did not always mean equity in real space. Disproportionately zoning for large
minimum lot sizes could dwarf areas allowing smaller lots. And since subdivided
residential redevelopments were prohibited in large lot areas, space for construction of
more affordable homes was limited.253
By the late 1970s, building homes on large lots had become much less financially
feasible. Costs of housing had skyrocketed, and it was no longer sound business practice.
Although zoning regulations did not dictate the monetary value of homes to be built,
building homes consistent with the surrounding properties meant developers needed to
build fewer, larger, more expensive homes. However, this would have resulted in homes
costing twice as much as homes in many of these areas were garnering at the time thus
creating disincentive to developers to build.254
It was often difficult for municipal officials to come to terms with the
transformation happening. One mayor shared, “I couldn’t help but feel that [Mr.
Developer] was trying to put as many homes on the land as [he] could.” Locals feared a
proliferation of substandard, smaller, tract homes. While there were areas in inner suburbs
consisting primarily of these post-WWII type homes, some stressed such structures would
stand out dramatically in other parts of communities. Public hearing discussions in each

253

See examples in Ferguson for 77 single-family lots on 20.48 acres in Ferguson Regular Council Session
dated August 22, 2006, page 3; and Ferguson Regular Council Session dated June 26, 2007, page 5 and 13.
Reference to home prices of the era taken from City of Hazelwood, MO March 16, 1977.
254
According to housing price figures in City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated March 16, 1977. Example: A
Marketable home in the was $50, 000. The new home was $90,000 or $100, 000 and would not sell in the
area.

158

study city conveyed a consensus of suburban idealism revealing distinct delineations in
desirable and undesirable use of land and property.255
City officials responded to community interests, market indicators, or both.
Compromises reclassified zones as planned development districts which deemed areas
suitable for specific variations in types of redevelopment or reuse. These mixed-use
regulations were intended to allow more multifamily, commercial, and industrial
development in and around neighboring areas zoned residential. Plans included goals to
increase, preserve, and not negatively affect existing property values. Various safeguards
were implemented to further extend stronger protections to neighboring properties.
Traditionally, some areas received robust attention from developers while others
garnered few inquiries and requests. Multiple factors contributed to activity levels but
cities’ planning and zoning policies significantly impacted types and amount of
redevelopment. Some cities’ planning and zoning policies inhibited redevelopment. Others
dissuaded redevelopment as vague plans and goals created uncertainty and speculation.
Events of the era forced some suburbs to revisit, revise, and clarify their planning and
zoning philosophies, strategies, and goals while some elected to reinforce existing ones.256
The post-fair housing era saw an explosion in private redevelopment proposals,
city-operated beautification, revitalization, construction projects, and direct-to-city federal
funding of renewal programs. Meeting specific demographic, spatial, structural, and
financial criteria and possessing a completed comprehensive plan qualified cities for more
state and federal funding which mitigated cities’ financial obligations to projects. Strategic
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meetings produced plans that included designating residential areas more economically
marketable for redevelopment, use of various financing tools, and levying eminent domain.
Each study city aimed to decrease low-cost rentals and increase homeownership.
However, cities employed different methods to control the impact of these low-income and
subsidized homes and apartments on single-family neighborhoods. Some inner suburbs
planned and zoned to isolate and restrict them to particular areas. Others prioritized
spreading low-income and subsidized housing throughout the city to prevent them from
concentrating in one neighborhood. Interviewee U1 says, “You don't want to concentrate
it in one place. That becomes the ghetto and the walls go up around that. You have to
disperse the wealth throughout the entire area.”257
Maplewood municipal governance’s decision to reinforce its identity ultimately
resulted in a revitalization of the suburb’s shopping district. However, it is important to
highlight some notable elements of the process. By the time Maplewood officials amended
objectives and plans to include parks and recreation development as a stabilizing tool in
the mid-1970s, the city had undergone enormous transition. Faced with aged housing and
infrastructure and insufficient revenues from retail activity, the city’s land reutilization
activity expanded and accelerated rapidly.
Through the city’s housing corporation, Maplewood began negotiation, purchasing,
and condemning significant combinations of both residential and commercial properties
and land. Maplewood’s volume of rezoning for redevelopment grew comparable to cities
facing suburban challenges more frequently associated with the era. The suburb’s past
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commercial success, however, still guided policy and reaffirmed beliefs that commercial
activity was the city’s best way to stabilize.258
Officials looked to stimulate new private investment by leveraging grants and tax
increases to improve the city’s garage and commercial retail parking for a shopping mall,
medical building, and clinic. Maplewood’s land use philosophy was demonstrated through
numerous amendments repealing residential districts and replacing them with various
commercial designations. These policy actions vested more of the city’s financial solvency
in the success or failure of commercial activity than in the protection or decline of property
values.259
While the strategy was risky, it was not surprising given the city’s demonstrable
commitment to regaining its position as a retail hub in the area. More notable and
surprising, however, the strategy also included rezoning large single-family districts to
multifamily ones. Archives reflect, Maplewood officials beginning the decade of the 1970s
unanimously approving multiple development projects consisting of large multifamily
dwellings. One 1970 development involved six separate 24-unit buildings alone.260
Maplewood’s physical identity transformed, and the transformation would have
lasting implications on the city’s landscape and homeownership rate. Nearly fifty years
later, one young Maplewood resident observed, “We’re like 65 % renters here in
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Maplewood which is really interesting.” While this type of activity was not unique for the
time, the volume occurring in Maplewood seemed to conflict with the city’s population
density and plans to revitalize commercially. The contradiction did not reside in the
removal of single-family districts but instead in the districts’ new designation to
multifamily.261
Upon closer examination, however, additional elements emerge which
simultaneously crystalizes Maplewood’s strategy and coincides with the concept that
socioeconomics replaced race as the dominant driver of suburban policymaking in the postfair housing period. Maplewood needed revenue and was committed to generating that
revenue from commercial activity. Until 1991, municipalities could tax multifamily
dwellings consisting of four or more units as commercial property. Although multifamily
properties were not the traditional primary source of commercial tax revenue for
Maplewood, they generated commercial tax revenue nonetheless.262
Maplewood’s rezoning strategy did not place the municipality on the road to
revitalization as that process would be administratively led and would not begin until the
following decade. The strategy did, however, provide the suburb with ideal conditions for
segregated concentrations of underserved, low-income subsidized areas. These areas
accounted for less of the city’s population and land usage and were less problematic for
Maplewood than its north county counterparts. Nevertheless, they presented major
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challenges to revitalization efforts and warrants an asterisk when celebrating the inner
suburb’s renaissance as an eclectic, pedestrian-inviting little town.263
While Maplewood worked to protect its image, north county municipalities were
being given a new one. Between 1970 and the mid-1990s, the image of north county
transformed dramatically. News coverage of north county was unfair and inequitable.
Media portrayed problems in north county areas differently than issues happening in other
county locations. According to one resident, “We were trying to build the image up and
the newspapers seemed to be tearing it down.”264
As conditions worsened, it became increasingly difficult for some north county
suburbs to attract new private investment for development. New sidewalks, trees, public
parking lots, or state-of-the-art libraries would not be enough to offset the negative
perceptions emanating about north county municipalities. Consider that racist stereotypes
about blacks motivated these negative perceptions, and north county was experiencing the
majority of black in-migration in St. Louis County. Besides preexisting variations in city
identity, no other discernable dissimilarities between north county and the rest of the
county justified the evolving view of north county.
North county areas were unjustly devalued, sectioned off, and considered to be
racked with toxic assets. Transformations in the suburban housing market were
multilayered and introduced variables municipalities had very little experience addressing.
Missouri Highway and Transportation Department’s inequitable funding and resource
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dedication for right of way improvement, maintenance, and beautification further
demonstrated disparities.
North county areas experienced less frequency of road repairs, resurfacing, and
landscaping. Despite thousands of travelers entering the state from Illinois via Interstate
270 and utilizing area highways, north county received less crew, equipment, and attention
than other county areas, and highway quality suffered as a result. Deficiencies in county
owned and maintained roads did not differ much from state-owned and operated ones.265
North county municipal officials often complained the county maintained a “take
it or leave it” attitude and used municipalities for its own ends and in some cases, “to the
detriment of communities.” As with HUD, state and county actions served to further
reinforce discriminatory treatment in the private sector. Records indicate that as early as
1972, insurers were notifying residents, “We are not able to renew your homeowner’s
insurance due to changing neighborhoods.” Such practices not only compounded problems
for north county municipalities but increased inequities, accelerated decline, and greatly
hindered stabilization in some areas.266
The county recognized the motives for opposition to certain HUD practices.
However, the county administered a large HUD program. While administrators advocated
by educating municipalities about implications, the agency replicated HUD’s
concentrations in north county through its own public housing program. St. Louis County
Housing Authority purchased a disproportionate number of units in these municipalities
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for use as public housing, removing the properties from city tax rolls (although the county
paid fees to the cities), and contributing to the proliferation of low-income subsidized
housing in north county.267
During this period, there was incredible change in the housing market. In addition
to discriminatory housing practices in both the private and public sector and steady decline
in land and property conditions, the county lost its CDBG funding because of poor financial
reporting. Cities without housing authorities began exploring whether to form one.
Jennings’ leadership expressed, “The city is not interested in forming a housing authority.”
Jennings officials believed its planning and zoning policies and code enforcement system
would prevent further decline in conditions.268
Jennings did not make the mistake of failing to implement best-practice property
preservation methods or practical zoning laws. Instead, Jennings’ mistake was to depend
too much on the tools to protect against and address decline. Officials looked to the building
commissioner to execute objectives and reach goals without the tools necessary to do so.
The city lacked the mechanisms for acquiring, rehabilitating, leasing or selling deteriorated
properties. No land reutilization plan could be executed as there existed no city agency to
execute it or sufficient revenue to finance projects managed by private firms.269
In April 1981, Bill 1396 unanimously passed as Ordinance 1373 declaring the need
for a housing authority to function in the City of Jennings. Nearly a decade passed before
267
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the city-initiated activities resembling those performed by such an apparatus. By not
establishing a housing corporation, Jennings officials deprived building officials effective
tools and options from which to choose. Without these tools and options, Jennings’
buildings personnel ramped up code enforcement to compensate for the deficiency. Code
enforcement became arduous, authoritarian, and unreasonable.270
Code violations were administered for some items inherent to the original
construction of homes, and corrective repairs were expensive. Citations contained
threatening language like, “If repairs are not concluded in…, the city will initiate
condemnation proceedings.” Some homeowners began to feel as though they were being
punished for the “changing neighborhoods” issue. Others believed elements were
conspiring to condemn properties to purchase at lower prices. By the 1990s, Jennings was
acquiring some of these same homes, authorizing their demolition, and donating the vacant
lots left behind.271
Jennings officials worked diligently over the years to attract and promote private
residential and commercial development to the area but were unsuccessful. Assessment of
Jennings’ situation reveals several potential reasons for its lack of success in stabilizing the
physical character of the city. As covered earlier, Jennings lacked a professional city
manager to oversee the city’s daily administrative operations. The absence of a city
manager in and of itself did not prevent the city from accessing the tools and resources
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needed to design and execute an effective land reutilization plan. However, having the
mayor serve in both the legislative and administrative leadership roles placed the city at a
disadvantage.
Although the city enjoyed strong and long serving mayors, competing duties
created by the dual role disallowed fulltime administrative commitment required to address
the elements of municipal destabilization. Consider city border problems, for example. City
limits did not necessarily delineate neighborhood designs and uses. As reviewed earlier,
many of these areas had not been modernized and uses were obsolete. Some
neighborhoods’ proximity to other struggling neighborhoods such as those in north St.
Louis city required robust time, attention and collaboration— the likes of which part-time
city officials usually cannot devote.272
Stabilizing these areas required vigorous land reutilization planning, an authority
to manage projects, and administrative oversight. Without these components, Jennings
zoning patterns lacked refined objectives resulting in commercial, industrial, and
residential replacements that decreased the desirability of each. This placed the city in a
perpetual cycle of land usage transition and continuous property value decline which led
to more revenue loss making it more difficult to fund studies, finance improvement
projects, and pay for marketing to attract investors.
Many of the operations the city elected not to take on in the 1970s (acquisition,
rehabilitation, lease, sale, tax abatement), the city ended up performing by the 1990s
anyway. However, by this time, the problem had mushroomed into a much bigger set of
challenges. Many more derelict properties and vacant lots existed and were in worse shape
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than in the 1970s. As areas remained unimproved, physical and fiscal conditions worsened.
Degeneration spread to surrounding areas further accelerating the suburb’s residential and
commercial health. Former revenue generating sources became structural, social, and
economic liabilities.
Confronted with such debilitating and insurmountable circumstances, municipal
officials were left with few options. Any effort to reverse conditions required substantial
investment of resources of which the city did not possess. Jennings turned to state
redevelopment programs which authorized the city to offer incentives like tax abatement,
tax increment financing (TIF), and eminent domain to attract developers. While these tools
can be effective in certain situations, Jennings’ position made the city vulnerable to
dependence and overuse. As one Jennings mayor frame it, “If you don't offer the abatement,
you don't get the development.”273
Jennings’ housing redevelopment project involved acquiring many of the apartment
complexes in Jennings which were mostly county housing authority units. After the
apartments were acquired, the city invited developers to rehab the properties and administer
the management of the apartments. Once Jennings’ housing transformation was complete,
the city was never able to recapture the homeownership and housing quality it once
boasted.
Home building involved mostly low-cost houses targeting low income families.
While redevelopment projects consisted of some positive exceptions, the city’s land
reutilization measures were largely unimpactful in improving the overall stability of the
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municipality. This does not mean all the new homes needed to be big beautiful houses for
the redevelopment program to be deemed a success. The true value in these inner suburbs
rested in their mix.
All levels of homebuyer could access suburban living. Interviewee F2 asserts:
“When I came to Ferguson, there were houses for families who were just starting
out and houses you couldn’t afford. You had people who worked a 9 to 5, but also
those who were high level engineers, doctors, and lawyers. This was due to the
diversity of homes, lots, and plots.”
Given the enormity of negative attention Ferguson garnered towards the end of the study
period, one may find it difficult to fathom that for some the suburb served as one of the
more peaceful, eclectic, and desirable places to reside in the area.274
Converse to Ferguson’s advantages of historical prominence, position, and
professionalism were the disadvantages created by the city’s post-fair housing era planning
and zoning policies. While policies saved money, processes saved time, and practices
preserved treasures, the mature inner suburb’s contemporary policymakers would lose a
great deal of each of these due to the inherited disadvantages. The insulation, interests
protection, and policy control combined with the capitulation and caterings of 1970s to
1990s administrations provided Ferguson’s slim citizen majority disproportionate
preference power, marginalized poor people, and produced a powder keg.275
By the 2000s, Ferguson’s lawmakers were producing policies that bore little
resemblance to those of the previous 30 years. Over the next decade and a half, officials
navigated a complicated policy arena in which the municipality suffered from a firmly
embedded root problem while available tools empowered policymakers to only treat the
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branches. Some have referred to Mike Brown’s death and the subsequent Ferguson uprising
as a culmination of decades of discriminatory policies and practices. This description is
largely inaccurate as it omits important contextual elements which indicate the culmination
actually occurred much earlier making the efforts in the 2000s futile.
As in many suburbs, Ferguson of 2010 exhibited stark inequities and other
problems in multiple sectors. Nevertheless, the municipality had entered its second decade
of enormous progress in addressing these issues through more inclusive planning processes
and policies. Notable advances in proportionate representation, multivariate interests, and
environmental awareness had resulted in some important accomplishments. Note that
Ferguson was not only fighting an uphill battle established by its policy past, but the suburb
also carried the north county identity.276
A simple contrast of 1999’s Maplewood and Ferguson better illustrates Ferguson
contemporaries’ policy starting point. Although Maplewood had more multifamily
dwellings than Ferguson and its own eastside segregated concentration of low-income
renters, the communities surrounding Maplewood were stable and the city’s appeal and
image remained largely intact. Ferguson’s eastside concentration was more challenging as
the north county image, proximity to other struggling areas, and the city’s policy approach
for addressing issues only intensified problems.
While Ferguson had more overall professional staff, the economic development and
community relations departments operated under the same designation. Maplewood
designated separate professional staff to focus on the city’s most critical area which was
recruiting businesses. Maplewood exhausted all avenues of taxation, Ferguson voters
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repeatedly rejected tax increases to finance projects and services. Ferguson implemented a
change in possession occupancy permit 14 years into the period, Maplewood’s interior
occupancy inspections system dates back to the early period.277
Maplewood Housing Corporation played a critical role from the outset of the city’s
stabilization projects. Ferguson originally took the same position as Jennings and elected
not to establish a housing authority. Nearly halfway through the study period in spring
1988, Ferguson municipal leaders approved the formation of the Ferguson Housing
Corporation. Despite this scorecard however, by 1994, only a minuscule percentage of
Ferguson’s over 6,700 single-family houses exhibited deterioration and there was no
notable vacant lot problem.278
Towards the late 1980s, without a functioning authority to manage housing
challenges in the municipality, Ferguson began to experience an increase in abandoned
properties. The city’ noninterventionist policy of the post-fair housing era had allowed
discriminatory housing activities to go unchecked. Besides modest home rehabilitation
grants, loans, rebates, and the occasional HUD home purchase, Ferguson extended minimal
resources or services related to equitable housing, dispersing low-income housing, or
property ownership.279
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Arguing market dictation of housing as best practice, Ferguson policy drafters
expressed no interest in establishing an apparatus for obtaining, rehabbing, selling, or
leasing properties, opting to defer these activities to private investors. This philosophy was
problematic for the era. Given the extenuating circumstances, housing market theory was
turned on its head. Stabilization required intervention. Housing authorities helped cities
better account for and address the most pressing factors contributing to destabilization in
municipalities. Ferguson’s 1988 housing corporation establishment signaled an evolution
in philosophy, but its narrow focus and targeted benefits delivery made it clear the new
agency was just another reinforcement arm of the suburb’s existing philosophy.280
Ferguson officials met in 2012 to discuss the results of the West Florissant corridor
study. Staff members, residents, and elected officials from neighboring Dellwood, Country
Club Hills, Flordell Hills, and Jennings joined them. Ferguson’s increased need, interest,
and willingness to collaborate had replaced the admiration, self-sufficiency, and selfcontainment mentioned earlier. The strategic meeting concerned plans for redeveloping a
four and half sq. mile stretch of West Florissant.281
In 2010, the neighboring suburbs had begun exploring collaborative ways to
leverage collective resources and secure grants and other financing tools to support the
project. Officials established a steering committee made up of members from each
community. Through public meetings, interviews, and focus groups, the committee
solicited feedback from a wide range of interests. Plans included increasing accessibility,
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connectivity via pedestrian friendly improvements, and making the area more suitable for
walkers, bikers, and public transit.282
New developments were to serve the community with an array of unique shopping,
dining, and entertainment, provide an assortment of housing to all income levels, and create
physical environments that support healthy and active lifestyles. Ironically, the 2012
collective’s plans were practically identical to Ferguson’s 1970s plans for its westside
downtown district. While it was logical for the city to dedicate resources to improving its
downtown, the city’s history of divesting resources from the eastside corridor lends irony
to the 2012 goals. Ferguson’s 1970s westside plan was considered innovative, holistic, and
proactive. The suburb’s 2012 West Florissant corridor project aimed at improving
conditions on the eastside was not much more than overdue.283
West Florissant did not only serve as the crossroads to the City of St. Louis and
north St. Louis County, the road served as a clear delineator guiding Ferguson’s post-fair
housing planning and zoning policies. Over the three decades leading up to the millennium,
policies had sectioned the eastside off from more single-family home friendly areas by
concentrating low-cost rentals, commercial and industrial developments, and further
reinforcing the city’s agenda to preserve its westside.
By the 2000s, however, West Florissant was particularly important to Ferguson’s
economy as it connected several major commercial centers. The city’s late 1980s and early
1990s model vested a large stake of its financial health in sales tax revenue generators
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located in an area where the city historically lacked the will to invest resources.
Consequentially, 2000s policymakers inherited a dilemma of financial dependence on a
corridor plagued with major barriers to thriving and would make a valiant effort to
overcome those obstacles. The segregation, poverty, aging infrastructure, and obsolescence
was not their doing. Nevertheless, 14 years into the new century, they would have to own
it.284
In 2004, governing a vastly different Ferguson than their predecessors (52 % black,
16 % single-headed, 33 % renter, 12 % poverty, 30 % under 18, per capita income $17,600),
officials began adopting policies establishing new neighborhood goals based on residents’
visions for Ferguson’s future. Officials hired a planning and development director,
instituted a community wide network of neighborhood associations and organizations,
helped each neighborhood design its ideal living environment, and designated target areas
for infrastructure and pedestrian improvements.285
The process resulted in neighborhood plans and strategies, implementation of
improvement programs, and progress monitoring mechanisms. Officials’ expressed aim
was to increase livability and quality of life, maintain high community standards, and
stimulate interest and demand in Ferguson. Officials authorized the restructuring of the
city’s community redevelopment financing model increasing the category’s prominence in
economic development decisions and spending.286
The new neighborhood agenda targeted low and moderate-income neighborhoods
for improvements and enhancements. Officials authorized redesigns and installation of
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various signs and monuments, initiated restoration projects, and implemented
communications and PR techniques designed to repair the image, identity, and character of
these neighborhoods. Lawmakers approved increased community-focused allocations,
strengthen and expanded their financing toolbox to better service community
redevelopment debt and capital improvement projects, and lobbied state officials to
approve a special benefit districts amendment.287
Missouri’s proposed special benefit districts amendment would empower
municipalities to finance local improvements such as streets, off street parking facilities,
sidewalks, parks and sewers by issuing bonds in which only benefiting property owners
were required to repay. The tool would help ensure more equitable financing of
neighborhood revitalization and mitigate the city’s quandary of governing a bifurcated city
where one half was viewed as barons and the other burdens.288
Consider by the 1990s, Ferguson’s slim citizen majority were beginning to feel the
pinch created by their policy preferences. In refusing to accept, prepare, and adequately
manage the inevitable, Ferguson failed to prevent their fears from materializing. In fact,
policies of exclusion increased the likelihood of these fears materializing, intensified their
effects on the city, and made addressing subsequent problems much more daunting
challenges for future administrations. As the end of the 1990s drew near, new Ferguson
homeowners’ properties were being assessed for less than they had paid for them just
several years earlier.289
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North county had transformed and even though Ferguson kept the suburban persona
longer than many of its north county neighbors, cracks were clearly visible at this point.
Older middle and upper-class residents, who the city had effectively shielded from the
eastside degradation, had remained in their homes over the years. They were steadfastly
loyal to Ferguson and its identity which did not coincide with general perceptions about
north county. However, decades of policy implementations adhering to the preferences of
a slim majority had created an environment less attractive to younger home seekers and
had given way to new more pressing demands.
While the homeowners’ exodus was notable during the decade, population decline
was not as dramatic as in the early period of the era. Owning a home in Ferguson was still
relatively more attractive compared to other municipalities in the area, and a sustained
influx of renters kept population numbers fairly stable. However, Ferguson’s lack of
preparedness for addressing changing socioeconomic dynamics made the city especially
vulnerable to losing its rank as a first-class suburb. Increasing dependence on sales tax
revenues and murmurs of a property tax increase to fill the gap of slumping receipts
signaled to some residents, the time had come to relocate.290
An examination of archives revealed through early-era planning and zoning
patterns, Ferguson’s post-fair housing policymakers dealt future officials a very bad hand.
The city’s professional prowess and capacity to leverage expertise and additional services
of planning firms made discrepancies in focus areas more prominent as implementations
were executed effectively and efficiently. Policies such as Bill 4746, which passed as
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Ordinance 74-1444 on November 12, 1974, set in motion a chain of events that would have
far reaching and lasting implications.291
Revisions and updating of zoning ordinances authorized developments which
transitioned working-class single-family neighborhoods as well as multifamily units into
commercial uses. This in and of itself was not necessarily problematic. However, new
zones failed to fully account for diminishing effects on the stability of other nearby singlefamily neighborhoods and the city’s continued unwillingness to commit adequate resources
to this area meant economic vitality of the area would eventually be threatened. These
choices created a volatile feedback loop.292
Overdependency on economic generators and mushrooming threats to the bottom
line had begun a generation before the formation of the 2012 collective. Historically,
Ferguson used a discriminatory barometer for weighing developers’ answers to the critical
question, “How will this proposed land use development interact with adjacent residential
areas?” Development designs and acquisition maps from the early post-fairing housing era
illuminate a city intent on preserving select sections of the city while sacrificing other
sections in the name of economic development.293
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Perhaps quality of developer pitches and the majority of professional opinions
played more of a significant role in producing these land use patterns than my initial
analysis attributes. I considered this possibility and examined Ferguson’s expressed
priorities when accessing development proposals’ residential impact. I found strict
minimum requirements for buffering, an extensive schedule for distancing, boundaries, and
landscaping, and rigid limitations for institutional uses.294
When comparing approval rates among similar projects in various areas,
accounting for conflicting contributing factors, institutional proposals were deemed
compatible with eastside residential areas disproportionately more than westside areas.
Further, divergent views of areas’ value informed planning which extolled developer
investments like traffic signals and new sidewalks as great improvements to some areas
and inconsequential add-ons to others. Essentially, Ferguson’s post-fair housing era
policymakers posed distinctly different questions for different residential areas. For the
eastside, officials simply wanted to know, “Will the city receive a significant amount of
income through the return of sales tax?”295
Ferguson’s model continually exhibited instability. Nevertheless, making
investments to implement improvements like those outlined in the 2012 collaborative plan
did not align with 1970s to 1990s Ferguson philosophy and objectives. Ferguson’s
contemporary policymakers worked diligently throughout the last decade and a half of the
study period to realign land use policy to better address challenges. However, events would
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essentially erase many of their gains, expose the city’s policy history, and provide present
and future lawmakers even greater challenges to stabilizing the mature inner suburb.296
The Village of Hazelwood began the study period with 36 % of its land area utilized
by commercial and industrial businesses. Hazelwood’s transformation from 1950s
farmland to a 1970s urbanized environment qualified the city as an ideal case study. In a
little over a decade, the city had experienced significant transitions in landscape,
population, function, and identity. Pre-era planning and zoning policies had carried the
village to its 1970 transition into a city. And given Hazelwood’s 1950s landscape, I was
surprised to discover, by 1970, “Service stations in Hazelwood had reached the saturation
point.”297
Hazelwood’s planning and zoning committee entered the post-fair housing era
considering and recommending approval of a large number of proposals. This was not
surprising as I concluded the city’s rapid growth and development in such a short period
was most likely the result of lax proposal vetting and generous granting of requests.
However, if the board of trustees’ meticulous reviews and exhaustive discussions regarding
recommendations were any indication of pre-era processes, my assumption was incorrect.
Hazelwood city officials retained this practical and methodical style of deliberation
in planning and zoning throughout the entire study period. This does not mean every
decision reaped only rewards. Hazelwood officials realized, early in the period, the
dilemma their land use policy patterns were creating. While taxpayers appreciated the low
property taxes made possible by the large volume of commercial and industrial activity in
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the city, businesses increased demand on city services thus siphoning services away from
residents. According to one Hazelwood lawmaker, by 1972, “Commercial development
had created problems as well as advantages for the residents.”298
As more revenues are needed to adequately fund city services, either property taxes
are raised, or more commercial developments are pursued. Since increased taxes are never
popular, the more plausible decision is to rezone areas to allow more encroachment into
residential areas and the cycle continues— eventually harming property values. Each study
city faced some form of this predicament at one time or another during the study period. In
that respect, Hazelwood was not unique. However, Hazelwood’s quandary shared many
similarities with its north county neighbor Ferguson’s plight, and I found the disparities in
the cities’ approaches fascinating.
Hazelwood’s 1970s comprehensive plan produced, what I found to be, standard
land use permit requirements. Each study city’s policies stated some variation of language
expressing prohibition of developments which “adversely affect the character of the
neighborhood.” While Hazelwood’s policy language, extensive planning process, and
adherence to business interests all paralleled Ferguson’s post-fair housing era
characteristics, Hazelwood distinguished itself both through the goals it set, the effort to
ensure equitable protections and preservations, and the subsequent land use policies that
followed these objectives.299
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While Hazelwood’s early period planning objectives and implementations
resembled the West Florissant corridor’s 2012 goals, this was not the most notable element
in the city’s plan. That label belongs to the city’s expressed goal, “We want Hazelwood to
continue to be the same type of community it has been.” Since blacks represented only four
percent of Hazelwood residents, a scan of archival records may lead one to conclude
Hazelwood’s goal was exclusionary in nature. However, further investigation uncovers a
well-defined and measured vision for the future of the suburb; one that involves specific
measures for preventing the practice of exclusion.300
According to a Hazelwood official, “We were looking for the same balance of ages,
multifamily and single-family residences, and owner versus rental properties to continue
in the community.” Hazelwood identified its city’s optimal mix of residential, commercial,
and industry. This metric would guide planning and zoning policy for the next 33 years.
This did not mean the municipality would remain the same size, and it did not.
Notwithstanding, as the city grew in population, businesses, and land through annexation,
the optimal metric remained the principal influencer of land use policy.301
Utilizing demographic charts, street system diagrams, and land use maps,
Hazelwood officials land use planning employed effective techniques for integrating and
anticipating economic and residential needs while accounting for real time transitory
factors as neighboring municipalities experienced significant change. Hazelwood’s
proximity to the interstate, highways, major thoroughfares, and corridors played a
prominent role in the city’s planning as it served as both an advantage and a disadvantage
concerning some issues.

300
301

Ibid
Ibid

181

Leveraging and remaining dedicated to the optimal metric allowed officials to
establish long-term zoning plans which increased certainty and market confidence and
simplified otherwise complex harmonizing of residential and commercial redevelopment.
As Hazelwood enjoyed major projects and significant business and population growth,
officials continued to identify tools that further empowered the city to thrive and preserve
its balance.
By the 1980s, Hazelwood’s city plan commission recommendations were aligning
more with city council approval rates. Although minimum lot size remained the same at
10,000 sq. ft., amendments were instituted which allowed for new construction to have
more variation from surrounding properties. A 122-acre redevelopment project including
various designs and sizes of homes built on a wider range of lot sizes followed.302
This was not an indication of Hazelwood compromising its position regarding the
optimal metric. Officials understood the fluidity of consequential variables. It was more
helpful to prepare than deny the evolution happening around them. Subsequent approvals
of previously denied rezoning requests were commonplace in each of the study cities.
However, most were the result of minor technical matters that petitioners needed to correct
and resubmit. Approval of resubmitted proposals which clearly conflicted with zoning laws
in place during the time of the original submission indicated either a change in conditions,
philosophy, objectives, or all of these.
By 1982, residents of the northwest quadrant of Hazelwood looked a lot like their
1960s’ counterparts— large families and many children under five years of age. In other
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Hazelwood quadrants, residents tended to be older— over the age of 65. For Hazelwood
officials, these factors denoted possible impact of the previous decade’s policies and were
important to consider in the new comprehensive planning process. Hazelwood’s strategic
plans consistently produced specific objectives, tools required, and implications.303
Hazelwood officials formed an industrial development authority (IDA) and bonded
several apartment projects previously denied by the county’s IDA. Hazelwood’s leadership
promoted the decision as an important and useful tool for development and continued
growth and prosperity of the city’s economic welfare. Nevertheless, officials recognized
the bonds were designed to be used for expansion of industrial resources which could
provide additional jobs in the area. Further, using IDA bonds for housing projects meant
more low-income housing. To qualify for the bonding, developers were required to set
aside 20 % of the housing units for low-income families.304
Jobs are critical to a community’s economy. Therefore, city-initiated apartment
complexes requiring designated low-income housing minimums may appear to be a
problematic use of the IDA tool— particularly for a north county suburb during the 1980s.
However, an examination of special planning sessions revealed the projects were consistent
with Hazelwood’s strategy. There was indication of transitioning demographics, fiscal
characteristics, and demands. Officials planned, secured the necessary tools, and executed
plans according to the metric.305
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Consider that despite transitions, Hazelwood still enjoyed a stable per capita
income, an optimal ratio of businesses to residences, and low property tax rates. At this
point, neither population growth nor land expansion was a major goal for the city. Officials
prioritized balancing sufficient adherence to high quality living spaces and protecting
residents’ property with ensuring the business community viewed local government as a
cooperative force supporting economic growth and sustainability.
Community enrichment like parks, recreation facilities, and pedestrian-friendly
amenities remained just as important to city officials as infrastructure improvements that
ensured adequate traffic flow and access to businesses. Hazelwood’s policymakers
authorized extensive studies and performed in-depth reviews of rezoning requests,
consistently applying qualifying criteria equitably and reserving original objectives for
protection of adjoining properties.
Officials applied a principled approach in considering projects and programs
varying in type, size, and other distinctions across a broad range of descriptors. Whether
proposals requested developments in single-family residential areas, commercial or
industry centers, near multifamily complexes housing low-income tenants or high cost
condominiums occupied by the financially stable, specifications were clearly outlined in
the zoning codes and officials were unwavering in trusting those codes to adequately assess
compatibility.306
One could argue that Hazelwood was better able to maintain balance because the
city did not face the acute changes like the ones occurring in suburbs with closer proximity
to St. Louis city. While this argument may hold true, it does not diminish the quality of
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Hazelwood’s policymaking process, policies, and impact on stabilization. In fact, the
argument serves to support the notion that Hazelwood applied the highest principals in
policymaking and produced quality policies as a result. Hazelwood’s planning and zoning
patterns were proactive as officials monitored not only internal transitions but problems
emerging in neighboring locales.
While Hazelwood did not face the acute transition experienced by other study cities
earlier in the period, Hazelwood officials proactively instituted ordinances designed to
combat destabilizing effects of that level of transition. It is impossible to know for sure if
and how much these policies impacted the degree of transition in the city. What is
discernable, however, is the city’s high level of preparedness for addressing challenges as
transition threats rose in the following decades.
As late as April 1981, advisers were still dissuading Hazelwood officials from
establishing a housing authority. Several years earlier, without one registered HUD
foreclosure in the municipality, Hazelwood enlisted the expertise of a local forum to
monitor HUD activity in the city. Despite the absence of foreclosures, officials authorized
an allocation of CDBG dollars to help fund the group and lobbied neighboring
municipalities to utilize the services and contribute to funding the group’s operation. When
the first FHA foreclosure was discovered in Hazelwood in May 1981, officials immediately
initiated proceedings to obtain, rehab, and resale the property.307
With Hazelwood’s city manager concurring with the opinion that Hazelwood’s
current housing situation did not warrant the establishment of a housing authority,
lawmakers decided not to institute the apparatus. However, officials did not intend on
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letting their guard down. Officials authorized extensions of monitoring services and
instituted a system for ascertaining advanced HUD foreclosures notifications. When
forecasts predicted transitions challenging the metric, Hazelwood executed land growth
through annexation to increase areas for future development.308
Topically, Hazelwood’s land growth demonstrated attempts to expand its
commercial and industrial pursuits. However, an examination of Hazelwood’s processes
illuminated more context which warrants more admirable attribution to the city’s strategies.
Consider, no policy can ensure complete achievement of goals and no policy is immune
from potential unintended consequences. Forces and factors working outside of municipal
governance’s sphere of influence can have significant impact on policy goals. Hazelwood
officials understood this reality and approached policymaking accordingly.
One example of Hazelwood’s approach includes the 1977 property reassessment
battle in St. Louis County. A recent lawsuit had resulted in a proposed reassessment of
property valuations. The reassessment would most likely result in St. Louis County
residents paying notably more in taxes for similar properties than the City of St. Louis, St.
Charles, and Jefferson Counties. Of course, this would impact Hazelwood as well. As
expected, officials joined the complaint. However, Hazelwood diversified their strategy for
dealing with the matter by also developing a contingency plan as reassessment could
dramatically distort measures utilized in the metric.309
Note, instead of attempting to expand the commercial footprint, Hazelwood’s plan
focused on upgrading its current business recruitment and retention mechanisms. During
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strategic planning sessions it was determined, while the city effectively secured
information regarding what businesses were moving in and out of the city, officials had
very little information to design measures to better understand important determinants to
this activity. Officials constructed a system in which ongoing analyses could be performed
utilizing specific identifiers like types, sizes, and locations of businesses and contributing
factors for transitions.310
The system improved Hazelwood’s business recruitment and retention efforts,
better mitigated and predicted fiscal fluctuations, and equipped the city with more effective
tools for anticipatory corrective measures and attracting new businesses. The process also
helped the city improve planning and zoning policies which enhanced codes for regulating
land use edges, abutting, and segued zoning districts. While many factors played a role in
Hazelwood’s growth and stability, planning and zoning policies were definitely among the
most influential.311
Unrealized and failed urban renewal projects, growing clusters of multifamily
complexes, and a proliferation of public housing and rental properties may not sound like
an accurate description of University City. However, for parts of the city during the postfair housing era, this was an apt account. Some residents referred to certain areas as, “the
slums.” Further expounding on the situation in University City at the time, one resident
recalled:
“Conditions were deplorable and overcrowded with overflowing trash dumpsters.
In some cases, apartment residents were putting bulky items next to dumpsters
which often stayed there for weeks. Sanitation services treated apartment
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complexes like they were rows of single-family homes and in many cases, multiple
families were occupying single-family houses.”312
With all the proactive and innovative policies University City adopted, the city still
faced decline in neighborhoods. Residing in University City’s popular eastern-end Loop
district, by the start of the study period, was no longer desirable. Businesses in the area
were struggling and the housing was aged and outmoded. Residents of the time recall the
apartment buildings resembling old tenements. Longtime residents asserted, “When we
came back in 1971, the Loop was not nearly as good as it is now. It had gone downhill.”313
As explored earlier, preserving property taxes was University City’s priority as a
bedroom suburb. Consequentially, the city’s planning, zoning, and redevelopment policies
tended to focus on and favor residential interests— often at the expense of business
development. Codes regulating land use hampered growth of established businesses and
discouraged emergence of new businesses and relocation of businesses into the city. For
instance, University City required that alcohol serving establishments be at least 200 feet
in distance apart. This made it difficult for restaurants in the area to compete for customers
while making it nearly impossible to attract new establishments.314
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Members of the business community argued, “No vibrant business strip would ever
come to pass in University City unless it amends several zoning ordinances that are too
restrictive.” University City officials stood by the restrictive zoning, however. Lawmakers
argued it gave the city some assurance of control and avoidance of strip-type developments.
There were several municipalities that did not have any distance limitations, and officials
felt those municipalities were paying a significant price as they experienced proliferations
in alcohol serving businesses.315
Cities like Webster Groves had a limitation of one liquor by the drink establishment
for each 10,000 people. With a population of 30,000, Webster Groves had only three such
establishments. Although University City officials opposed such a restrictive limitation for
its city, it did value its existing distance requirement. Nevertheless, the city’s restrictive
commercial zoning inhibited the ability of landowners to fill vacancies which further
contributed to the decline of areas like the Loop. Vacancies increased, crime rates
exploded, and citizens’ faith in their municipal leaders’ capacity to effectively manage the
city’s affairs deteriorated.316
Although University City’s location insulated the suburb from the negative imaging
plaguing its north county neighbors, the city’s proximity to struggling municipalities
increased vulnerability and accelerated decline in certain areas of the suburb. Further
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challenging University City was its minimal access to the major interstates, highways, and
thoroughfares enjoyed by their north county counterparts.
Despite receiving inequitable attention, north county roads and highways provided
major arteries for transporting people and goods across the area which better supported
commercial activity and economic growth and sustainability. Entering the start of the study
period, University City lacked a north-south artery. As a city of over 46,000 residents,
University City depended largely on Big Bend Road. The street spanned a short distance
between the southern city limits and main east-west road located near the southern edge of
town. At the time, Big Bend was narrow, aged, and worn.317
Exacerbating matters, the county outlined several changes along the east-west road
which included prohibiting parking in certain locations. The changes were especially
impactful as this was the failing Loop business and residential district near the eastern edge
of town leading into the City of St. Louis. Officials hoped to revive this area as it was
critical to the city’s stabilization. University City officials vigorously lobbied the county to
help with the situation. After a county-wide bond issue passed in November 1970, these
areas began to see road improvements.318
The suburb also benefited from a federally assisted traffic signal program resulting
in improvements to important intersections. Two years later, the Missouri State legislature
authorized the establishment of a county arterial road system. St. Louis County designated
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15 University City streets, including the newly renovated north-south artery and the
popular east-west strip, to its arterial road system. The arterial improvements were sorely
needed but did little to address the problems with shared, private, and city-owned and
maintained streets.319
Battles between neighboring municipalities over shared streets were a common
occurrence. Traffic problems and street damage were usually at the root of disagreements.
University City shared five streets with the City of St. Louis, and tractor trailer traffic
flowing from the city repeatedly ignored the suburb’s 11-ton maximum restriction.
Consequentially, University City’s new street overlays were often broken up within two
years of being laid. Several of the shared streets were residential and neighborhoods often
controlled their own streets. However, maintaining them was very costly.
Deterioration of the economic sector further impacted the already declining
residential property values further exacerbating the fiscal stress University City was
encountering. Officials began to adjust their planning and zoning policies to meet the
challenges of the changing environment. They began by focusing on the Loop area. In
leveraging city resources along with private interests and resources, the city developed
partnerships to maximize their revitalization efforts. Partnering with proprietors organized
as a business association, University City undertook various projects to upgrade the Loop
area.320
The city duplicated this multi-interest model to address decay and stabilize other
areas throughout the municipality. Officials enlisted the services of various planning firms,
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conducted studies, and established plans which instituted 211 changes to the city’s zoning
codes, classifications, and districts. Rezoning several districts from high density residential
to arterial business accommodated new commercial development. Most industrial uses
were prohibited in the new plan, and various safeguards were implemented that would
extend stronger protections to neighboring properties.321
Developers were required to not only garner the approval of the plan commission
and the council but also nearby property owners. The council also stressed the importance
of giving all concerned parties an additional alternative when considering development
requests. Areas where zoning had previously prevented the placement of businesses were
now eligible for business development. Some stretches of road consisting of outmoded and
deteriorated residential properties could now serve as vibrant economic corridors.
Streets that had evolved to symbolize class and racial divides were targeted for
reutilization. According to Interviewee U2, “There was more of a focus on making sure
that Olive was not a racially divisive area. We recognized the importance of the Third Ward
for all of University City.” The era marked a period in which the city began modifying
plans for old urban renewal projects. New plans involved changing proposed uses like
multifamily residential to uses ranging from office research and warehousing to retail.322
Officials approved controlled mixed land use zones aimed at stimulating economic
growth while retaining the overall residential character of the city. City officials capitalized
on new and innovative engineering designs and mechanisms which resulted in modern
renovations and new structures with more environmentally friendly aspects and functional
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uses. Project financing techniques included leveraging private investments with public
funds. Costs were reduced by partnering with local trade schools who provided students to
work on development projects through hands-on training programs.323
Redevelopment resulted in vast improvements in pedestrian areas, retail facilities,
and office buildings. New developments proved helpful, but the stability of University City
still depended on the health of residential areas. In an era of concentrated HUD activity,
housing stock decay, and declining population, the city needed to address the issues of
vacant homes and lots increasing by the day. With most of the city’s derelict properties
consisting of non-adjoining 40-foot plots, there were few opportunities for land banking to
better attract developers. Further, properties were usually located in neighborhoods no one
other than nonprofits with only modest building capacity were willing to build.324
Officials turned to the University City Land Clearance for Redevelopment
Authority (LCRA) to lead the reutilization efforts. Established in 1961 to execute the city’s
general neighborhood renewal plan, the LCRA helped empower the city with the capacity
to effectively manage the complexities associated with private, city, state, and federally
owned land usage. Although the LCRA was a separate and independent body, the city
funded the operation, and certain LCRA actions had to be approved by the council. The
city’s government and LCRA collaborated effectively, operated efficiently, and vested a
great deal of trust in one another.325
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Officials elected to use city resources to address the problems with repossessed
HUD properties and leveraged the LCRA to oversee the construction of projects and
redevelopment of blighted areas. The city authorized a rehabilitation and property sales
and leasing program and began selling buildings rather than tearing them down. However,
there were frequently no takers on buildings because of the rehabbing costs. Conditions of
the buildings made it difficult for prospective owners to borrow money to rehab or purchase
properties. When borrowers were successful in securing loans, they had to pay exorbitant
interest rates.
Without policy change, properties could remain vacant for years. The county's
policy involved selling properties for $100 while waiving all county taxes owed. Although
the city was hesitant to grant tax abatement, there were several advantages in getting the
lots into private ownership. 1. The owner would be responsible for all maintenance; 2. The
city could bill the owner if the city performed any of these services; and 3. The property
would be back on the tax rolls.326
University City enacted a charter amendment, in 1978, authorizing the council to
wave back taxes. Immediately following the enactment, the city began receiving requests
from buyers for the vacant properties. This was tantamount to the city basically subsidizing
the redevelopment of a notably sized segment of its housing stock. The policy turned out
to be largely successful in some areas. Consider that prior to policy implementation, many
buildings had stayed vacant for up to five years. After implementation, similar buildings
averaged less than two years vacancy.327
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Shortly thereafter, the LCRA was selling properties at their appraised value.
University City executed a five-year plan which included a 13-acre redevelopment near the
city limits shared with the City of St. Louis. While the original 1964 general neighborhood
renewal plan proposed an industrial redevelopment, over a decade had passed and
significant market, demographic, and geographical changes had occurred.328
Current demands called for clearing of some of the land, rehabilitating other
sections, and redeveloping the area residential. Increased business activity, LCRA
redevelopments, and supplemental funding spurred renewed developer interest in the city.
Corporations and individuals began buying up more property. New, more modern singlefamily homes, garden homes like duplexes and townhouses of up to four-bedrooms, and
high-rise apartment developments followed. Others rehabbed houses, developed
multifamily complexes, and converted existing apartments into condominiums.329
Zones controlled building heights as to provide buffers of low-rise buildings next
to single-family homes. Designs led to an aesthetically pleasing effect of buildings
becoming gradually taller toward the city’s main thoroughfare. Experts and publications
lauded University City’s planning and rezoning for demonstrating ingenuity in city
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designs. However, the municipality was known historically as a city designs innovator, and
officials recognized that praise would not stabilize the city.330
Housing conditions improved but fiscal stress remained. The city’s LCRA
strategies were effective at slowing decay but did little to regain its tax base. University
City’s dilemma centered on how much economic development was necessary to improve
and protect the fiscal health of the city. Despite actions to address the proliferation of vacant
homes and lots, property values had not returned to pre-decline levels. City officials needed
to once again rethink the city’s economic philosophy.
With minimal public backlash for certain plan modifications, officials began
applying classifications more liberally. The city rezoned a seven-acre site from high density
residential to industrial commercial. Over the years, there had been inquiries from
developers regarding this area but nothing concrete materialized. The inactivity was partly
because of the zoning. There was no way to know what would happen in terms of allowable
uses in the future. As soon as the area was rezoned, developers began expressing interest
in surrounding properties.331
Administrations in the 1980s and 1990s governed during a period in which the tax
base transitioned notably. Officials had to decide to uphold, amend, or completely change
certain policies that had served to protect and improve city conditions in previous decades.
Most of the city was zoned for 5,000 square foot lots. However, the city fielded its share
of infill housing requests in areas zoned for larger lots. By the time a major developer came
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before the council to present a proposal for a multifamily development in 1996, lawmakers
were staunchly divided on the issue.332
The developer had been involved in the development of more than 200 luxury
condominium units in Old Town Clayton. Most of the multifamily buildings were put into
single-family areas. The proposed development would extend this type of housing into
University City. Officials had denied the development proposal 10 years prior because of
strong objections from neighborhood residents.333
Heralding the Clayton developments as great successes, developers claimed
adjacent properties dramatically escalated in value due to the developments in neighboring
Clayton, and assured skeptics that any change in density was imperceptible. Motion to
approve the new multifamily development carried four to three. Approving a high-density
development located in the middle of an area zoned for single-family homes signaled a
significant transition in the council’s aggregate philosophy.334
Building heights, loss of trees, and other potential impacts on neighborhoods were
becoming secondary priorities. Economic circumstances predominated matters in officials’
decision-making. However, some residents feared this was now happening at the expense
of the city’s character. University City had fought to preserve its neighborhoods and it
thrived as a residential community. Neighborhood preservation had been the council's
primary goal for decades. Now it was more concerned about the economic tax base
shrinking than preserving the unique character of neighborhoods.
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One such unique neighborhood was Parkview. Parkview was well-documented in
local guidebooks and had numerous books written about it. The subdivision was laid out
in 1905, one year before the city’s incorporation. One-third (80) of its houses was located
on the St. Louis side and 2/3 (170) in University City. It was a typical city neighborhood
with large houses close together, curving streets, beautiful landscaping, many old trees,
and a vast variety of housing styles. The St. Louis part of Parkview received its local
designation as a historical preservation district in 1978 and by 1986, all of Parkview was
on the National Register of Historic Places.335
When an increase in foreclosures led to more than 30 buildings sitting vacant in the
Parkview area, the city helped fund the Parkview Gardens Association and its 35 programs
designed to improve the neighborhood. Officials worked closely with the association who
established itself as a property management company overseeing 60 units and purchasing
at least three of the vacant buildings. When the 1990s arrived, the city’s financial
commitment to the area was well-established.336
Parkview represents only one of many stories of University City’s unique
stabilization story. Often omitted from the story, however, has been one of the biggest
challenges to the city’s planning, zoning, and redevelopment efforts and serves as the most
consistent thread throughout every decade of the study period. Before city leaders could
realize positive effects of policy implementations, an old nemesis would always make its
return.
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When planning, rezoning, and redeveloping in University City, one always had to
consider proximity to the River Des Peres as an important factor. Storm sewers near
developments often became clogged and flooded when it rained. Results from a July 1981
Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) study of flood control in University City concluded
that, of the more than 850 construction projects with estimated costs of $450,000,000, there
were 306 areas which lie in parts of University City. Out of the 14 total watersheds located
within MSD boundaries, three of them were in University City.337
Although MSD was responsible for all of the River Des Peres, it could not afford
to do all the work. During the 1980s alone, the city along with the state, county, and MSD
spent over $2,500,000 on projects associated with River Des Peres flooding. By 1988, city
officials were hoping for a big breakthrough with an Army Corps of Engineers project that
was supposed to stabilize the entire river up to 82nd Street at an estimated cost of $13 to
$14 million. While the Corps committed to paying 80 % of the cost of the project, the city
continued working on problems upstream using whatever funds were available.338
For the next twelve years, there were no substantial changes in conditions of the
river flooding and no notable policy changes related to sewer line maintenance. In July
1999, an emergency Bill 8437 was introduced. The bill called for an ordinance to authorize
an annual fee for the repair of lateral sewer lines on residential property. The fee applied
to properties having 6 or less units. The measure passed unanimously becoming Ordinance
6212 and established the sewer lateral protection fee.339

337

According to City of University City records Session 1273: April 27, 1981, page 13; According to figures in
an MSD report submitted to the city council in Session 1282: July 6, 1981, page 2.
338
According to figures submitted into City of University City record Regular Session 1469: May 18, 1988,
page 4.
339
Bill development, ordinance information, and initial fee figure taken from archive Regular Session 1761:
July 26, 1999, page 7.

199

There was only so much the city could do to address the challenges brought on by
the flooding and an aged sewer system. When new officials had the opportunity to put their
stamp on the way the city should address problems, some categories experienced
considerable change. Nevertheless, despite numerous changes in character, composition,
and philosophy of city leadership over the course of the entire study period, River Des
Peres continued to serve as the one issue officials from of all walks of life could agree, no
policy drafted could fix.
While each study city faced similar dynamics, sequencing of elements differed.
City officials were charged with navigating challenges of structural decline and fiscal stress
while trying to protect neighborhoods’ unique character. As Interviewee U2 explains, “In
these neighborhoods, you have a house like this that is 50 years old or more and a developer
will come in, tear this down, and build a house that’s worth $455,000.” Land use decisions
could potentially move a city closer to decline for the sake of protecting the character of a
neighborhood or sacrifice a city’s lifeblood in pursuit of economic gains which may never
be realized.340
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Chapter 7. Fiscal Policy
Introduction
Missouri cities entered the post-fair housing 1970s facing financial crises which
threatened significant reduction in quantity and quality of services provided to citizens.
Revenue sources were inadequate, and cities needed to develop and implement creative
strategies for meeting fiscal demands. However, state statutes restricted cities’ authority
requiring they adhere to certain parameters. Up to that point, cities had not been successful
in persuading the rural-dominated state legislature to adopt policies addressing issues
unique to areas with higher populations.
Missouri courts had interpreted the state constitution to imply that home rule cities
only had powers explicitly authorized by state statues. Under this interpretation, matters of
authority were often called into question. For example, when a new industry was created
which had not been specifically named in state statutes, cities did not technically have the
right to tax businesses operating in that industry. City officials needed greater flexibility
and freedom for local governance. They advocated for more local control to determine the
mechanisms by which services were delivered to residents and the power to choose the
agency that delivered those services— city, county or other public authority.
A joint group of lawmakers, referred to as the Home Rule Group, put forth
legislation to restore the notion that municipal home rule granted cities all powers not
specifically denied by state or constitutional law. By November 1970, cities were seeking
a favorable vote on the home rule amendment which would grant municipal officials
privileges to express their preferences on each individual service and clarify cities’ taxing
rights. Local lawmakers understood how policies at each level of government impacted
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conditions and tools for dealing with conditions, and they were advocating to expand their
toolbox beyond the traditional taxing measures.341
Tax levy propositions were often highly contested affairs which required expending
a great deal of political capital and could culminate in voter rejection. Due to financial and
taxing concerns of citizens, it was highly unlikely that cities could obtain adequate
revenues through tax increases. Expanded taxing authority and state and federal funding
would need to be secured to help with budget shortfalls. St. Louis County’s inner suburbs
were at the forefront of lobbying for more taxing rights and other revenue generating
strategies.
Missouri had taxed retail sales of tangible personal property and certain specified
services since 1934 and in 1959, the state enacted a use tax to complement the sales tax.
State legislators believed this model should be duplicated at the local level. The idea was
that a local sales tax would help solve local financial problems. Coined “creative localism”
by proponents, the tax was presented as a valuable financial tool that would empower
municipalities to control their own fiscal destiny. Only cities in which a majority of
residents voted favorably for the imposition could levy the tax.342
The local tax on sales and use combined with state sales taxes garnered more
revenue from purchases made within municipal boundaries. While adopting a local sales
and use tax empowered cities to levy additional forms of tax, it did not automatically equate
to increased revenues as levels of income depended on economic activity. City officials
needed to explore other options for dealing with the difficult economic environment.
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Advocates lobbied for a long-range financial aid to cities program to address fiscal
crises in cities. One study group official served on a national committee lobbying Congress
to enact a revenue sharing program. Revenue sharing would distribute a portion of revenues
generated by federal income taxes to state and local governments. These funds could be
used for any purpose by recipient governments. Supporters viewed revenue sharing as a
long-term safeguard that would strengthen intergovernmental fiscal structures.343
On February 12, 1973, the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act passed into law.
Revenue sharing along with county-wide road improvements, funding for urban renewal
projects, community development, and increases in matching grant programs resulted in
notable enhancements to cities and increases in overall budgets. By the mid-1970s,
however, cities’ dependency on aids had increased as supports did little to offset
inflationary squeezes on resources or the effects of the oil crisis.344
In October 1973, only eight months after the implementation of revenue sharing,
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) proclaimed an oil
embargo. Economic uncertainty made city budget forecasting difficult as revenue streams
became more unpredictable. Discrepancies in assessed valuation of properties, flattening
wages, dwindling reserves, and rising costs of health insurance intensified fiscal stress for
cities.345
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The phasing out of urban renewal projects led to more reductions in cities’ income.
Policy stipulated that once urban renewal projects generated proceeds from the sale of land,
those monies would be returned to the CDBG program. When federal funding through Title
II of the Public Works Employment Act of 1976 began, it was a welcomed stopgap to
reductions in cities’ operating forces. Title II funding involved the U.S. Department of
Labor issuing grants to jurisdictions to assist with the costs of compensating public
workers. St. Louis County received funds from the program and study group inner suburbs
received funds through the county as sub-grantees.346
City officials were quite familiar with these types of employment programs having
participated in programs authorized by the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 and the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Administration (CETA) previously. These
programs allowed municipalities to receive the benefit of payroll supports which provided
valuable assistance to their operating forces. Cities eagerly integrated new workers and
trainees into the fold as individual workloads had ballooned following layoffs.347
Employee compensation assistance programs were much needed costs savings
measures as inner suburbs struggled to protect their fiscal health amid multiple threats to
their bottom line. Conversely, if Missouri’s 1976 tax cuts amendment passed, it would
exempt food and drugs from local sales tax and would mean substantial reduction in
revenues. Although the measure failed, funding cuts in January 1977 led to the government
suspending the employee assistance and revenue sharing programs.348
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Local officials mobilized to oppose the programs’ suspensions and in June 1977,
the CETA employee and revenue sharing programs were reinstated. Suburban lawmakers
then set out to affect change in the way revenue sharing funds were distributed. They fought
for the right of cities under 50,000 in population to receive revenue sharing funds directly.
As it were, cities with less than 50,000 residents had to apply to the county for a share of
the revenue. Inner suburbs’ officials were honing crisis management skills metro city
officials had sharpened for decades.349
As officials worked to address inner suburbs’ problems, planners were developing
exurbs further away from the core and surrounding suburbs. Increasing sprawl exacerbated
fiscal strain for inner suburbs. While exurbs attracted homeowners and businesses away,
inner suburbs’ dependence on public supports and tax increases intensified as many areas
had very little economic diversification. Lost income intensified pressures to generate more
revenues from property taxes and remaining local sales tax streams. City leaders scrambled
to fill voids left by higher income earners, retail chains, and corporate offices.
Equipment, infrastructure, and service deliver further eroded as local officials
lobbied for more public assistance, raised taxes, and vied for shoppers. Tax hikes, bond
indebtedness, and damaged credit ratings led to more residents exiting inner suburbs in
search of newer exurban developments and lower tax rates. Federal policy evolved to begin
encouraging cities to develop more economic focused agendas placing a higher priority on
attracting business investments and generating more commercial capital.
Tax base decline, funding cuts, resource shortages, and infrastructure challenges
helped reveal some underlying inadequacies in inner suburbs’ fiscal structure. Heated
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debates ensued over the causes of suburbs’ increased dependence on government aids and
evolution to business-centric approaches to remaining solvent. The era marked profound
change in inner suburbs’ political atmosphere and deep political divisions developed.
While some citizens championed changes, other residents’ frustrations and distrust of local
government intensified.
Neighborhoods were rapidly changing, and some residents blamed officials’ fiscal
policies for further spurring exoduses and hindering growth and sustainability. Some
citizens questioned the motives and philosophies driving officials’ fiscal policy decisions.
Local governments’ fiscal policies and responses to changing economies occupied the
center of passionate debate and disagreement; and increased polarization served as the
primary motivator of referendums and recalls. Qualifications for public office, term limits,
and conflicts of interest were all called into question. Municipalities composed charter
review committees to study matters and propose charter revisions.
While study cities like Hazelwood and Maplewood struggled to professionalize
their city governments during the era, Ferguson, Jennings, and University City possessed
variations of governance stability and experience. Nevertheless, these cities’ wellestablished institutional structures did not insulate them from financial woes as officials
responsible for managing their cities’ finances faced volatile environments. Declining
revenues and intense pressure to increase and stretch budgets required frequent adjustments
in personnel, priorities, and performance.
Economic Environment
Just as individuals’ incomes and expenses change over time, so did inner suburbs’.
Cities were operating in rapidly evolving economic environments and for some, revenues
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were not keeping pace with operating expenses. Municipal governments began capitalizing
on tax laws that allowed cities to earn income through other sources of revenue. As cities
began adopting new taxing laws, economic environments continued to shift. Variables
influencing those shifts fluctuated. The implications of these interrelated dynamics shaped
cities’ economic environments for decades to come.
By the post-fair housing 1970s, Maplewood was no longer garnering massive
revenues from a vibrant shopping district and the suburbs’ citizens were paying $.80 per
$100 assessed in property taxes. Maplewood taxpayers had not enjoyed a reduction in
property tax rate in nearly a decade. The City of Crestwood, on the other hand, had the
second largest shopping center in St. Louis County. Its city government operated
comfortably on $.40 per $100 assessed paid by its taxpayers and were looking to further
reduced the tax down to $.33 per $100 assessed valuation.350
Crestwood and Maplewood were not unique contrasts. Property tax rates varied
between St. Louis County inner suburbs. These variations could increase or decrease in
short periods of time as municipal governments adjusted rates and voters approved
measures according to internal and external changes in conditions. Crestwood had
instituted a local tax on sales and the suburb was reaping vast sums from retail activity at
Crestwood Plaza Shopping Mall. The local sales tax revenues enabled officials to keep
property tax rates low for citizens of Crestwood.
Cities could impose either a half cent or a one cent tax on retail sales occurring
within their borders. About a year into the study period, local sales tax had become the
norm throughout the county. The cities of Brentwood, Richmond Heights, and St. Ann had
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recently adopted the provision while cities like Crestwood, Clayton, St. Louis, and
Wellston entered the era already charging local sales tax. Communities with large shopping
districts could set lower property tax rates as they collected more revenue through local
sales taxes.351
Local sales tax revenues could also generate substantial income for cities with no
large shopping center. By 1971, a significant proportion of the budget in Wellston, a city
with a population of 7,050, were revenues collected from the one cent sales tax. The advent
of the local sales tax meant even bedroom suburbs like University City were impacted.
Despite possessing a relatively modest level of commercial activity, and although property
taxes remained the primary source of revenue, the local tax increased competition for sales
within taxing boundaries, costs differentials, effects on local merchants, businesses, and
consumers.352
Declines in property tax revenues resulted in increasing reliance on sales tax
revenue for bedroom communities like University City. The transition was not inherently
negative, however, as local sales tax had its benefits. Unlike property taxes, local sales tax
granted suburbs the opportunity to glean tax revenues from nonresidents. However, as
reliance on the tool increased, events like the closing of major retail and grocery store
chains became more of a threat to cities’ economic health than in previous eras.
Although Maplewood was struggling, the suburb was still home to some
commercial businesses. Facing fiscal year projections indicating significant budget
shortfalls, Maplewood officials could choose to continue raising property taxes and making
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cuts in city services or ask voters to approve a local sales tax measure. On January 25,
1971, Maplewood Bill 3765 authorizing a special election passed unanimously and on
Tuesday March 16, 1971, Maplewood voters accepted the imposition of a local sales tax.353
Hazelwood followed suit imposing the tax after voter approval in a November 1971
special election. Maplewood and Hazelwood had now joined Jennings and University City
as local sales tax levying cities. Voters in those mature inner suburbs had approved
adopting local sales tax with overwhelming majorities in special elections held the previous
year.354
Wide-spread adoption of the local sales tax fueled competition for attracting
commercial activity and further highlighted differences in suburbs’ economic
environments. Revenues generated in cities with shopping centers dwarfed cities without
them, and small municipalities did not stand a chance. Ferguson officials argued against
the taxing tool, citing revenue distribution as inequitable, unfair, and unrelated to municipal
services rendered. Ferguson officials favored a county-wide sales tax instead.355
Using a distribution formula, revenues from county sales tax would be refunded to
cities based on population. Ferguson officials believed a population-based county sales tax
would be a more just system of taxing sales in St. Louis County municipalities. Ferguson’s
position on Missouri’s 1970 House Bill 141 was in direct opposition to the position held
by cities like Jennings. Jennings had just instituted the local tax and a new county-wide per
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capita distribution formula could mean less revenue than what the city could collect in sales
tax dollars independently.356
While smaller municipalities, municipalities with minimal commercial activity, and
unincorporated areas stood to benefit from the change, cities like Jennings could be
adversely impacted. Jennings had already allocated anticipated revenues from their city
sales tax for municipal improvements and accommodations for commercial establishments.
Jennings officials opposed a county-wide tax distribution pool and urged county
government to seek legislative authority to establish their own county sales tax to garner
revenues from the unincorporated portions of St. Louis County.357
When cities’ local sales tax provision went into effect, officials were unsure how
much money they would realize. Some cities’ revenues exceeded expectations, and local
sales tax became the preferred target of tax relief measures as state legislators went after
the tax with proposed exemptions for food and drugs. Many local officials favored the tax
as it allowed them to offer their residents tax relief through property tax reductions. By
1977, the economic environment for some municipalities had improved a great deal. For
others, with or without a local sales tax provision in place, conditions remained relatively
unchanged or had worsened.358
The Ferguson supported county-wide sales tax measure had failed years earlier, but
support for the tool was now greater as a provision allowed cities who desired to remain
independent to do so. In August 1977, Missouri Senate Bill 234 authorized a county-wide
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sales tax. Soon after installation of the county-wide tax, questions and accusation arose
regarding the levying of too many taxes and cities’ handling of monies derived from sales
taxes. A September 1978 Post-Dispatch editorial about over taxation in St. Louis County
claimed there was a “windfall in quotes from the county-wide sales tax which
municipalities [were] not sharing with the public.”359
Local sales tax served as a critical economic environmental influencer throughout
the study period. Although pre-era differences existed, the spread of local sales tax use and
the advent of the county-wide sales tax combined with the demographic changes to provide
additional complicating elements, scenarios, and implications of decisions for officials to
consider. The economic environment affected economic conditions and available tools for
dealing with conditions, but cities’ institutional structure determined cities’ level of
professionalism, and designated roles and duties in navigating the environment.
Institutional Structure
Spending, borrowing, and investment decisions served as critical factors in
determining cities’ economic health. As allowable taxing mechanisms, revenue streams,
and financing tools evolved, suburbs’ institutional structure became more consequential in
financial management and decision making. Stabilizing and prospering in this economic
environment required advanced knowledge of economic principals and instruments.
In Jennings’ case, until 1993 and in early Hazelwood and Maplewood, neither city
manager nor finance director positions existed. Jennings’ elected officials handled the
city’s finances. The city collector received funds due the city, and the treasurer managed
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city funds serving as the city’s paymaster. However, the council had to authorize spending
and borrowing actions and could also authorize the mayor to initiate financial actions on
behalf of the city.360
Essentially, Jennings’ mayor-council was its own finance director. Jennings’
November 8, 1971 enactment of Ordinance 965 created the office of director of purchasing
and inventory control, but the suburb operated for nearly 50 years without an official
requirement for a finance professional in its government. The 32-hour a week purchasing
and inventory control position would serve as the suburb’s only finance related
appointment until the city instituted an official finance director in 1993. Officials also
established a law which limited the term of the appointment to four years.361
A 1992 University of Missouri study recommended installation of the finance
director as part of a reorganization of Jennings’ administrative structure. Findings found
that the city needed to improve cost efficiency and general operating efficiency. While the
city did not adopt most of the recommendations, officials agreed to implement the changes
in the city’s financial structure by combining the elected offices of collector and treasurer
into an appointed position. Despite the finance director appointment, archives show the
city contracting multiple consultants to assist with budgeting and finance matters
throughout the remainder of the study.362
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Hazelwood entered the period with its chairman of the board of trustees serving as
the city’s director of finance. When the village transitioned to a city in late 1970, the first
question asked of the new city manager was, “When will a finance director be hired?”
Hazelwood’s installment of a finance director was critical to the city’s success. Finance
directors occupied an important role in shaping the suburbs’ fiscal position by researching,
recommending, and calculating varying rate and fee estimates associated with the city’s
robust business sector.363
Before adopting the council-manager structure, Maplewood’s lawmakers worked
as administrative staff. The suburbs’ finances were managed by the superintendent of the
department of accounts and finance which was simply a designated councilperson.
Additionally, the city clerk doubled as the city’s collector of revenue. Council-manager
governments did not guarantee appointment of a finance director nor did the appointment
of a finance director mean fiscal policy was significantly influenced by the director of
finance. However, among the four professional study cities it did.364
Finance directors were well-trained and usually long serving. However, the
professional cities had strong city managers who enjoyed tremendous influence in
policymaking. By the mid-1980s, this was especially true in Maplewood and University
City. Although finance directors occupied an influential role, city managers set the
administrative agenda and financial recommendations reflected that agenda.
Institutional structure indicated the presence or absence of degreed public
administrators and certified public accountants, and designated roles and responsibilities.

363

City of Hazelwood Mo archives April 1, 1970; Hazelwood January 20, 1971; Hazelwood August 18, 2004
Regular Session Special Order of Business.
364
City of Maplewood archives Document 89: Year 1972; Maplewood Regular council session Document 97
November 27, 1972; and City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1973 document 219.

213

Differences in institutional structure demonstrated divergent levels of expertise and
distribution of responsibilities. These differences were most exhibited in cities’ financial
protocols, procedures, and use of best financial practices.
Financial Protocols and Procedures
Under good administrative leadership, finance departments develop effective
strategies for cities to perform as responsible stewards during periods of financial windfall
and to maintain solvency during lean times. City finance department’s financial protocols
should be comprised of procedures designed to encourage integrity, ensure regulatory
conformance, protect cities’ resources, minimize waste, and maximize returns. While
economic environment set the stage and fiscal structure determined roles in navigating the
environment, suburbs’ track record of protocols, procedures, and use of best financial
practices did more to illuminate distinctions in fiscal policy.
Hazelwood and Maplewood began the period without professional administrations,
but by the 1990s, both municipalities began being recognized for excellence in government
accounting and financial reporting. The Municipal Finance Officers Association of
America (MFOA) presents certificates of achievement to cities whose annual reports
achieve the highest standards in comprehensive financial reporting. Once Maplewood
secured its first MFOA certificate in 1994 and Hazelwood in 1998, consecutive annual
recognitions persisted for both suburbs until study’s end.365
Although the State of Missouri did not require cities provide annual comprehensive
financial reports, the practice demonstrated cities’ level of financial accountability and
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indicated professionalism in city government. Ferguson and University City entered the
era with respected reputations for financial accounting and reporting. For these suburbs,
comprehensive annual financial reports were standard operating procedures, and
consecutive financial excellence awards were common. Ferguson and University City
enjoyed finance directors and city managers who earned countless MFOA awards, several
JT Bell Service Awards, and served in leadership roles in local and state associations.366
According to Jennings’ city treasurer, as early as 1971, “The duties of the position
was too much.” To address this issue, Jennings created a purchasing and inventory control
position and assigned the duty of making out checks to the office of the city clerk. Jennings’
institutional structure exhibited several areas of weakness regarding internal procedures.
The city’s controls for financial activities tended to be duplicative, loose, and poorly
defined. Although officials commissioned multiple studies and implemented several key
revisions during the study period, adjustments were often made too late and revisions
caused little substantive improvement.367
Nevertheless, Jennings’ record of audit authorizations and filings of audited
financial statements were consistent with other study cities. The suburb hired industry
reputable independent CPA firms, ensured public accessibility to audited records, and
made countless efforts to comply with auditor recommendations. Jennings earned a
reputation for poor governance in the latter part of the study period. However, my
examination revealed competent officials governing the suburb throughout the study.
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Institutional structure limited the city’s capacity to deal with economic instability which
only served to exacerbate issues and further burden the suburb with fiscal stress.368
Transitions in professional administrators in Ferguson and University City, and in
Hazelwood and Maplewood by the mid-1980s influenced important changes in fiscal
behavior. Archives reflect each suburb implementing new fiscal measures shortly after the
hiring of new city managers and finance directors. One common recommendation involved
cycling auditor teams regularly. Administrators believed cities benefitted from different
perspectives. As early as 1975, Ferguson administrators recommended rotating auditors.
By the time University City implemented three to five-year auditor contracts in 1987, the
city had been using the same auditor for 25 years.369
Officials agreed different perspectives could be helpful, but switching auditors
regularly meant increased fees and skepticism. Extended contracts and longstanding
relationships with firms granted cities reduced rates for services, familiarity, and
confidence. By 1980, Hazelwood was still using the firm that had been performing their
audits since 1957. Although contracts were based on three-year terms, renewals were
merely procedural. Hazelwood’s notable adjustment came in the form of extending audits
to all phases of city operations.370

368

Jennings Regular council meeting November 22nd 1971 page 5; Jennings Regular council session
September 24 1990 Page 3; Jennings Regular council session October 11 1993 page 2; Jennings amended
December 6 1993 CB per KS Document Attached to regular council session October 11 1993 page 2; Jennings
Regular council session January 22 2007 page 2.
369
City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting April 22, 1975 page 4; and Figure taken from City of
University financials submitted into record in archive Regular Session 1436: May 4, 1987, page 7. For more
information regarding the city’s fiscal condition and effects of the proliferation of tax-exempt businesses
prior to the audit see archives: Session 1311: July 12, 1982, page 14; and Regular Session 1624: August 22,
1994, page 4.
370
City of Hazelwood, MO archives special session June 11 1974 City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated June
21, 1978; Hazelwood, MO dated September 19, 1979: Bill 1396 was unanimously adopted as Ordinance
1363 – 79 on September 19, 1979; City of Hazelwood Mo archives regular session January 16 1980; City of
Hazelwood MO archives special session January 23 1980.

216

Whether cities extended contracts or rotated firms, audits required the full
cooperation of officials and staff, and reports consistently pointed out areas of needed
improvement. Findings could indicate cities were relatively debt free with no substantial
weaknesses, and concerns could be as simple as processes for issuing computer room keys
or updating manuals to ensure continuity during staff absences. Or concerns could involve
areas that cost cities a great deal of time and money like internal accounting control
problems, poor monetary handling practices, and errors and delays in financial information
recording.371
A critical difference between professional and nonprofessional suburbs involved
possessing and lacking capacity to effectively implement changes. Having professional
staff enabled study cities to quickly adjust to changes in national standards for municipal
accounting and advise policymakers regarding needs to amend policy to reflect changes in
state law. Professional cities were better equipped to evaluate and respond to acute changes
in income and expenditures and recommend appropriate, proportionate, and allowable
action.372
Best Financial Practice
Requests and recommendations included in finance director reports to city
managers and city manager reports to the council could have major ramifications on fiscal
policy in inner suburbs. Many fiscal decisions made in the early period established cities’
position on issues and embedded dynamics which shaped conditions, places, and policy
platforms for decades to come. Without professional finance staff, Jennings lacked
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procedural integrity and the city’s council was disadvantaged by the absence of in-house
advisement on financial matters.
Jennings did not practice generally accepted accounting principles. The city’s more
simplified “cash basis” system allowed for fewer, less trained staff to perform accounting
duties. However, the city had to pay accounting firms to convert records according to
accepted accounting principles for reporting. While cash basis accounting provided elected
officials easy to understand cash-on-hand and cash flow figures for making financials
decisions, the practice limited the suburb in how it could leverage its fixed assets and
various sources of revenue.373
Conversely, Jennings’ style of financial accounting helped the city remain more
consistent with approved budgets and allowed for more real time comparative analyses
which helped mitigate vulnerability to overextending resources and overspending based on
estimates. Jennings’ lack of economic diversification and leveraging of profit earning
investment tools rendered the city susceptible to acute fiscal stress from decline in tax base
and economic downturns. However, budget shortfalls were rarely a result of the suburbs’
financial practices or speculation.374
Officials did not have to rely on professionals for decisions such as joining the state
purchasing program which allowed units of local governments to consolidate financial
resources for purchasing goods. Such an arrangement made logical sense as it increased
savings through mass purchases. Administrators did not have to convince officials to
participate in the formation of a self-insurance pool. Each study city joined the pool and
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cities realized substantial savings in property, casualty, and workers’ compensation
insurance. These were not the types of decisions where the lack of professional finance
administrators impacted best practice.375
Disparities in fiscal practices between professional and nonprofessional suburbs
were most demonstrated in investment strategies. Professional cities aimed to be better
served by financial institutions managing their investment portfolio. Administrators
advised officials regarding existing arrangements and transferring of investment activities
according to optimal returns. Although higher yield rates were usually the goal,
administrators occasionally advised officials to authorize investments which garnered a bit
less than the going rate to initiate or protect partnerships that included other forms of
financial benefit for the city.376
Establishing daily interest savings accounts were significant changes in fiscal
practice for both Hazelwood and Maplewood. Implementing this strategy allowed the cities
to begin earning maximum interest on idle funds. When savings account balances reached
up to more than half a month's normal cash needs, excess funds were converted to a
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certificate of deposit. Certificates of deposit were arranged so that at least one certificate
matured each month. By using this system, cities were able to grow contingency funds
which better equipped cities for unexpected expenditures.377
With such robust commercial and manufacturing activity, Hazelwood needed
additional implementations to deal with the management of special use permits, business
licenses, and revenues generated from fees. The suburb established separate banks accounts
to enable the finance department to split the duties of payroll check processing and
reconciliation of other accounts. The city hired a fulltime accountant with audit experience
to audit business license applications on a regular rotation.378
University City established minimum reserves to cover cyclical shortfalls. Reserve
funds were adequate in meeting the city’s short-term needs, but additional measures were
required during economic downturns and for long-term stability. Following the recession
of 2008, city administrators were accused of including sales tax money in the budget before
the tax passed and adding employee pension figures to the budget in an attempt to balance
it. A review of financial records revealed several discrepancies in the accounting figures.379
In December 2009, University City’s financials received an “acceptable” rating out
of a rating system of outstanding, acceptable, or unacceptable. While there did not appear
to be any malicious intent, this did illuminate areas of concern for the professional cities’
financial practices. Financial pressures could be overwhelming in professional
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administrations just as they were in Jennings. Instead of limited financial tools, however,
creative accounting and complex financing strategies could lead to problems. Flattening or
declining revenues impact more than just estimates used for setting tax rates.380
Consider that administrators advised lawmakers on fiscal policy that also affected
city personnel. Pay and pensions were embedded in figures and estimates. Whether a plan
was fully funded depended on fiscal strategies. If a city manager boasted, “There is plenty
of money in the pension fund and it does not require any additional funding,” officials
believed no additional funding was needed for the fund. When the study cities amended
contribution levels, set up new investment accounts, or switched plan managers, it was
usually in accordance with recommendations made by the city manager and finance
director.381
Study cities with professional administrations were more adept at securing
additional funds through special grants and foundations and raising capital through various
investment strategies. Ferguson leveraged their professional capacity to garner many
dollars outside the traditional streams of revenue and public funding assistance throughout
the study period. These skills would be especially important for Ferguson to meet the fiscal
demands of recovering from the civil unrests in 2014-2015.382
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While some initial funding was channeled to the suburb from various sources,
funding levels were not sufficient for the city to make all the needed repairs and
improvements. According to one official, “A whole lot of money supposedly came to
Ferguson. However, it did not come through municipal government to work through these
issues.” The city led a great streets application process and received a planning grant, but
the total cost of engineering improvements along the West Florissant Avenue corridor was
estimated to be about $2,000,000 alone.383
It is unknown how Ferguson will manage the acute change in its economic
environment. While securing funding was one of Ferguson municipal government’s
strongest traits throughout the study period, the suburb never faced this type of crisis. Such
a change would have placed any one of the study group cities in a very compromising
position.
Consider that Hazelwood was so successful in securing 50/50 grants from both the
Missouri Division of Highway Safety and federal matching programs that the city often
procured police cars with $0 city spending. Throughout the study period, the City of
Hazelwood practically planned police car purchases around the funding. However, this
skill would be minimally helpful if Hazelwood were in Ferguson’s end-of-study
position.384
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Professional suburbs enjoyed several important advantages over nonprofessional
suburbs. Professionals managed cities’ daily financial affairs and provided expert
consultation and recommendations for financial policy making. While there were
supportive resources which were common among all the cases, and amounts varied
depending on circumstance, Jennings’ structure exhibited less fiscal management capacity
to ascertain certain resources and benefits from various financial practices and tools.385
My examination confirmed that differences in study cities’ institutional structure
was an indication of cities’ level of professionalism and revealed that study cities’ level of
professionalism significantly impacted protocols, procedures, and use of best financial
practices. These differences impacted cities’ financial management, preparedness, and
capacity. However, institutional structure, financial management, protocols, procedures,
and use of best financial practices were themselves fiscal policy decisions. They did little
to account for the fiscal policymaking process.
Although fiscal policy decisions impacted preparedness and capacity, cities’
preparedness and capacity failed to account for fiscal policy. I found that economic
philosophy was more significant than fiscal structure in fiscal policy decision making. I
also found that fiscal policy decisions had significant effects on municipal-level economic
conditions.
Therefore, municipal governances’ role in municipal-level economic stabilization
is best revealed through an examination of local governments’ economic philosophy.
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Economic philosophy was revealed by examining economic environment, municipal-level
conditions, available tools, and municipal governances’ choices and uses of tools in
economic development.
Point of Sale vs. Pool: A Lesson in Economic Philosophy
By 1977, cities like Hazelwood, Jennings, and Maplewood were no longer opposed
to the county-wide sales tax. The new plan allowed cities to continue receiving their own
local sales tax or join the population-based distribution pool Ferguson officials advocated
for years earlier. Cities could decide to join the pool in the future, but once non-pool cities
joined the pool, they could not go back to collecting their own local sales tax. The local
sales tax distribution in St. Louis County divided collections into two groups: 1. Group Apoint-of-sale cities and 2. Group B- pool cities.386
The pool served to help the municipalities with less commercial activity. However,
since Group A cities usually contained the major retail centers and they retained all sales
taxes generated within their borders, the advent of the pool did nothing to mitigate the
inequitable revenue distribution. According to 1983 distribution figures, Group A cities
received approximately $115 per capita and Group B cities received approximately $50
per capita. However, in some cases, Group A cities could receive as much as 400 % more
per capita than pool cities. If every city participated in the sales tax pool, each city would
have received about $70 per capita.387
Resulting allocations allowed Group A cities to enjoy low or no property tax and
low utility tax rates. Conversely, Group B cities were forced to greatly increase their gross
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receipts and property tax levels to compensate for the disparity. Unincorporated areas of
the county became battle grounds as annexation by a point-of-sale city meant the area
would be subtracted from the sales tax pool. The structure placed pool cities at a great
disadvantage. Essentially, Group A cities were able to depend on sales tax monies, much
of which was paid by residents of Group B cities like Ferguson and University City, to
support services provided to their residents.
A coalition of pool city officials formed the Fair Share Coalition to call attention to
the unfairness of the sales tax structure and to lobby for changes in the system. Point-ofsale cities rebutted arguing they needed all their local sales tax to cover expenses.
Organized as Cities for Growth, point-of-sale cities argued they incurred additional costs
connected with the roads and trucks servicing shopping centers and for providing
additional city services like policing, fire protection, inspections, licensing, and community
relations. Group B officials claimed this was a distortion as sales tax revenues and costs of
servicing commercial areas were out of proportion.388
By 1993, the Fair Share Coalition consisted of 35 members representing more than
250,000 people. They lobbied state representatives to pass legislation that would make the
sales tax distribution system fairer. A compromise was reached in April 1993 which
restructured the sales tax distribution formula. Reformers pushed to add Group A cities to
the pool on a “hold-harmless” basis and instituting a grandfather clause. Hold-harmless
proposed including point-of-sale communities in the pool while preventing any loss of
existing income. Only increases in sales tax income would go into the pool. By enacting a
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grandfather clause to existing boundaries, annexed areas would retain their pre-annexation
status.389
Critics remained unsatisfied with the system and in later years, pool cities like
Chesterfield would petition to exit the pool. While cities’ status as point-of-sale and pool
significantly affected fiscal policy decisions, it did not necessarily equate to a causal
relationship with municipal-level stability. In fact, too much dependence on local sales tax
threatened some cities’ fiscal health, and efforts to grow the revenue stream often led to
disproportionate resources dedicated to the category and decisions which compromised the
quality of residential neighborhoods.
By the mid-1980s, revenue from tax on sales was far and away the largest source
of income for the City of Jennings, and officials remained dedicated to protecting the Group
A and B distribution formula adopted in 1978. According to a 1985 Jennings resolution:
“The City of Jennings wholeheartedly endorses the philosophy of allowing those
communities which choose to endure the conveniences and costs of commercial
developments to reap any benefits generated by those establishments while
permitting those communities not desiring businesses to continue as bedroom
communities, provided they fund their own government without jeopardizing the
rights and operations of others.”390
Five years later, the mature inner suburb entered the decade of the 1990s
questioning whether the city would be better off becoming a pool city instead. Although
FY1991 estimates indicated Jennings would lose money by becoming a pool city, continual
decline in monthly sales tax collections resulted in significantly lower year-end earnings.
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Jennings council called for an immediate 10 % pay reduction for all city employees and
scheduled an August election hoping voters would approve a $.34 per $100 assessed
property tax increase. The council had originally wanted to propose a $.55 increase, but
ultimately put forth the $.34 proposition.391
Jennings’ financial situation only worsened as effects of declining revenues further
highlighted items like unfavorable refuse contracts, personnel disputes, and growing doubt
that remaining a Group A point-of-sale city was in the suburb’s best interest. In 1995,
Jennings officials resumed looking into the implications associated with becoming a pool
city. Officials were advised not to make a change because ongoing litigation involving the
county’s sales tax pool cities created uncertainty in the future of the sales taxing
environment in the county.392
While the point-of-sale fiscal strategy backfired for cities like Jennings’, others
flourished establishing vibrant and stable sales tax revenue generating operations. These
Group A cities thrived as strong commercial centers. As point-of-sale cities’ advantage in
revenue generating capacity grew, so did pool city officials’ resentment of Group A’s
economic philosophy. Pool city officials felt some point-of-sale leaders behaved as if their
city was superior to pool cities. According to one official, “We did not think of our
neighbors as an economic resource. We have other values.”393
As a pool city, suburbs like University City often clashed with Group A neighbors
Clayton and Ladue. Disagreements over sales tax beneficiaries drove border wars over
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street closures, freight truck traffic, and commercial business placement. Since University
City had to bear the truck traffic and costs of maintaining roads, officials argued cities like
Ladue should turn over tax revenue to the sales tax pool. One official lamented about Group
A neighbors, “They were treating University City as their backyard.” Another lawmaker
referred to attitudes of point-of-sale cities as, “arrogant beyond belief.”394
Although the University City Loop was a popular shopping district, it was hard to
compete with the shopping centers and large department stores in nearby Clayton. They
provided better parking and more alluring attractions. Interviewee U5 recalls, “Clayton was
booming, big corporations, a lot of high-powered executives, and a lot of money.”
University City’s Loop revitalization increased retail activity and helped restore the area’s
attractiveness. However, success of the project was less evident in the boost to the city’s
financial chest than in the increase in eclectic shops, establishment of a new farmers
market, and the pedestrian-friendly designs.395
University City did not contain the bustling commercial activity observed in pointof-sale cities like Hazelwood. Hazelwood, like Jennings, worked to preserve their pointof-sale status. In fact, Hazelwood officials served as leaders among the advocates who
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successfully lobbied for the point-of-sale amendment to Missouri’s 1977 county-wide sales
tax distribution bill. Hazelwood’s experience was different from Jennings’, however.
Hazelwood enjoyed enormous success as a point-of-sale city. Officials not only reduced
rates but also opted to eliminate sales tax on utilities.396
“We had a moral obligation to reduce taxes,” says one Hazelwood policymaker.
Adding, “We felt we should cut gross receipts tax and then go even further to reduce taxes.”
By 1994, while Jennings officials were being advised that decline in sales tax revenues
resulted from a dip in the overall economy, Hazelwood was experiencing a 21 % increase
in sales tax revenues over only a five-month span. Hazelwood had become a unique hybrid
city. After annexing unincorporated areas, the suburb now held both Group A point-of-sale
and Group B pool city membership statuses.397
Annexations and annexation attempts carried varying implications for cities
executing the annexation and for neighboring suburbs. Unincorporated St. Louis County
areas were often surrounded by multiple incorporated cities. Consider that Hazelwood’s
1991 annexation involved an area surrounded by five different municipalities. While
Hazelwood officials asserted neither Ferguson, Berkeley, Florissant or Calverton Park
expressed any interest in incorporating the area, there were instances of conflict.398
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Hazelwood’s hybrid status is an indication of the city’s economic philosophy, but
how officials responded to major manufacturing closures, commercial debacles, and
dormant retail space revealed much more. Suburbs’ economic philosophy was rooted
solely in self-preservation. Electing to be a point-of-sale city, pool city, or hybrid city by
way of annexation depended primarily on a suburb’s economic environment. According to
Interviewee U1, “University City has always been in the sales tax pool because we haven't
had much economic development.” Fergusons’ abdication of point-of-sale was less about
achieving equal distribution for all and more about which status meant more revenue for
their city’s coffers.399
While it made sense that each study city would exhibit this feature, stark
distinctions were revealed through Ferguson’s philosophical hypocrisy and selfdestabilizing decisions. By 2015, Ferguson officials were eliminating contracts,
authorizing a 23 % reduction in staffing across all departments (approximately 32
employees), reducing salaries across the board by five percent, reducing the employees’
health care subsidy by 30 %, and searching for additional cuts to realize savings. The city
was reeling from recent events which exposed the city to substantial financial stress, and
the suburb’s point-of-sale status was no longer sustainable.400
Twenty years after Ferguson officials lobbied against point-of-sale in favor of a
more equitable sales tax pool system, 1989’s Ferguson officials unanimously authorized
the city’s exit from the pool to become a point-of-sale city. Twenty-five years later,
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Ferguson wanted back in the pool. It was never been about more equitable distribution as
1970’s Ferguson officials claimed. “The reasoning behind becoming a pool city and no
longer being a point-of-sale city,” a Ferguson administrator explained in 2015, “the
revenue is greater, and the likelihood of this reversing is very low.”401
Just as Ferguson’s 1970 economic environment was different from 1989’s, the
mature inner suburb’s 2015 economic environment was strikingly different from them
both. By inequitably rezoning, investing, and servicing neighborhoods, the city had
discarded residential areas in favor of big box retailers and cordoned off sections of the
city through isolation and neglect. Ferguson was not committed to the principles expressed
through the city’s 1970 stance against the point-of-sale tax structure and the city’s
economic philosophy backfired.402
Ferguson’s 2015 return to the sales tax pool not only signified a full circle back to
1970 but helped shed more light on the fact that the very change Ferguson hoped to avoid
in the 1970s, the city’s fiscal philosophy actually helped bring about, and in the worse way.
The following excerpts from Interview F2 help illuminate Ferguson’s modern-day
environment:
“A lot of people were moving out of Ferguson. So, all the taxes and stuff were gone.
People were just abandoning the city. So, now we had to decide are we going to go
to a pool city or are we going to stay a point-of-sale city?”
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“If you look at it from a regional standpoint, Chesterfield basically pulls all of the
malls and all of the jobs out of north county. So, here I am as a resident; I don’t
have these resources in my area. I have to go out to these other municipalities to
shop, to work, do all this other stuff.”
“Then you have the school district that’s suffering as well. So, you don’t have the
people moving in because the school district is suffering. So, all this is going on,
but you don’t have that being discussed. How these fit into a larger set if issues. At
the same time, the government is doing their stuff, and their coming in saying you
can and cannot do this. The county, the state is coming in, doing their stuff. But we
have to basically get it right.”403
Maplewood officials warned against adopting a local sales tax in 1970. They
believed local sales tax hurt businesses and drove more local merchants to relocate.
Nevertheless, the city put the question to voters and since 1971, Maplewood has been
generating substantial local sales tax revenues. By 1974, Maplewood’s budget looked
dramatically different than it did just three years earlier. The addition of public dollars from
programs like revenue sharing and savings realized from assistance programs combined
with sales tax revenues to change Maplewood’s economic trajectory, create a revenue
surplus, and ignited citizen demands for more fiscal accountability and professionalism.404
Purging of Maplewood City Hall and the transition to professional local
government further reinforced the mature inner suburb’s preferred position as a point-ofsale city. As a prominent member of the Cities for Growth group, Maplewood not only
worked to protect their sales tax revenue interests, they demonstrated how to leverage and
maximize the tool amid strife and uncertainty. While Fair Share Coalition challenges, court
battles, and economic downturns threatened Maplewood’s resurgence, the city’s economic
philosophy never wavered.
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Excerpts of quotes in Interview F2: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / 32-year Resident / Ex-Public Official.
City of Maplewood Missouri Special Session budget year June 24, 1974: Documents 3-4.
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Maplewood officials authorized special elections immediately following changes
in taxing laws and utilized the advent of new taxing authority to establish new sales tax
revenue streams. Increased revenues allowed for capital improvements, redevelopment of
the city’s business district, and new developments. The city creatively integrated incentives
into marketing plans designed to attract businesses which helped to offset the disincentive
to companies relocating to areas with more local sales taxes.405
University City voters were promised a $.30 reduction in property tax if they
approved the half-cent capital improvement tax in a 1996 election. Voters obliged, and the
city reduced the general fund tax $0.10 and debt service received a $0.20 reduction.
Economic conditions had been improving in the mature inner suburb since the mid-1980s.
Property tax rates had dropped below $1.00 in 1989, and University City taxpayers were
enjoying a tax rate which was over 50 % less than the rate at the start of the 1980s. As the
new millennium dawned, a five percent increase in revenue and a healthy reserve prompted
further property tax cuts, wage increases, and loan payoffs.406
University City was enjoying the benefits of a booming economy. Property tax
revenues were up from new construction in the late 1990s, there were new revenue sources
from point-of-sale cities that were now going into the pool, and despite the city’s limited
commercial activity, robust increases in sales at local retail outlets were occurring.
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Resolution 93-5: City of Maplewood Missouri archives dated January 26, 1993: Document 479; City of
Maplewood Missouri archives October 12, 1993: Document 75; City of Maplewood Missouri archives
February 22, 1994: Document 112, Resolution 94-9A; City of Maplewood Missouri archives March 8, 1994:
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in archive Regular Session 1665: May 13, 1996, page 1; According to financial records in City of University
City archives Regular Session 1721: May 4, 1998, page 5. See also, Supreme Court ruling, and figures can be
found in records City of University City, MO Regular Session 1569: May 11, 1992, page 1; Session 1570: May
13, 1992, page 12; and Regular Session 1590: May 3, 1993, page 2;
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Additions of the hybrid cities to the pool meant shopping more in one’s own community
or other pool cities was no longer the only way Group B cities earned sales tax. As
Interviewee U2 points out, “We were still going to get the same percentage from the pool,
but overall it helped lift the pool up.”407
Despite some periods of spikes in sales tax pool revenues, University City was
never under the illusion they were built to depend on the sales tax revenue generating
sphere. Uncertainty in the pool structure, its members, and its continued existence furthered
highlighted the city’s need to plan for a time when they may have to make the change to
becoming a point-of-sale city. When asked about this Interviewee U1 responded, “We're
not looking to have that happen. In fact, were fighting that. But we don't know what will
happen, and there may come the day when it's gone.”408
Interviewee U2 believes, “If something like that happened, we get to the point
where we are putting in more money than we're getting out of the pool or the pool starts to
implode, we will have that discussion.” However, the suburb demonstrated throughout the
study that it could not remain debt free for long and experienced notably acute fiscal
wounds which threatened fiscal health. To maintain their infrastructure, meet operational
expenses, replace equipment, and keep a sufficient contingency fund, the city may have to
become more business friendly and more intentional in seeking more economic
development and redevelopment.409
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Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official.
Excerpt from Interview U1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 33-year Resident / Public Official.
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page 5; Bond issue and reserves figures taken from financial records in archive Regular Session 1618: May
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This issue has ignited heated debate during transitions in local government seats
and administrative appointments. Two diverging economic philosophies converged at the
intersection where University City’s status as a bedroom suburb and the city’s fiscal
dilemma meet. While each study city faced difficult economic environments with growing
fiscal demands, University City provided the opportunity to examine a suburb which
remained in the pool since its inception. University City was the only case in which officials
were truly navigating what a January 2009 Newsweek article termed “the suburban
challenge.”410
A significant proportion of University City’s fiscal health remained directly tied to
the fiscal health of many municipalities in a county that became home to 50 % more
working poor than St. Louis city. Inner suburbs like University City struggled with many
of the same challenges as the metro city. “Adoption of Financial Policies,” a piece in the
Missouri Municipal Review, talked specifically about the need to rethink funding strategies
that focus mainly on cities. University City leaders may need to increase new developments
and business activity to protect its fiscal solvency.411
Nevertheless, the mature inner suburb will always retain its attractiveness as it
continues to possess important advantages for luring new residents as well as developers.
Interviewee U4 believes, “With University City, you are addressing a more diverse
audience. If you're a developer, black money is just as good as white money.” If city
administrators and officials continue to remain committed to continuing the city’s tradition
of inclusion and proactively addressing concerns, the city should remain viable.412

410

Reference to Newsweek and Missouri Municipal Review articles in transcript of City of University City
archive Regular Session: January 26, 2009, pages 6 and 9.
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Ibid
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Excerpt from Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents.
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University City weathered severe economic duress without compromising the
city’s identity. Officials demonstrated trust in the city’s professional administration, and
the city’s administration delivered quality best practice recommendations which remained
aligned with the city’s economic philosophy— at least until the city’s economic philosophy
began to change. Just as economic environments, conditions, and tools evolved, so did
some economic philosophies. Reversal or reinforcement of each cities’ economic
philosophy guided economic development decisions throughout the study period.
Economic Development
Environments evolved, institutional structures changed, and as officials and
administrators transitioned, protocols, practices, and philosophies were either altered or
policymakers and administrators conformed to preexisting norms. Early era decisions
established study suburbs’ position. Suburbs’ position helped shape their economic
conditions and stock their economic development toolbox. Just as economic conditions
differed between suburbs, tools and use of tools varied in degrees of strength and weakness
as officials tasked with identifying, developing, and diversifying sources of revenue
selected, levied, and determined frequency of use.
Economic development should garner new revenues; levies need to be
administrable, auditable, and acceptable; and sources need to be impactful, cost efficient,
equitably applicable, reliable, and sustainable. Some suburbs’ overdependence on one
source of revenue made them susceptible to acute fiscal stress by increasing their
vulnerability to external economic effects from economic shifts, market fluctuations, and
inflation. Others lacked economic development, reached the legal taxation limit,
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underfunded pension plans, and depended on loans and bonds to stay afloat. By the end of
the study period, conditions ranged from solvent to debt-ridden.413
Near the end of the study period, in 2014, the City of Hazelwood was the only
municipality in St. Louis County not levying a residential utility tax. Until 1978,
Hazelwood levied a utility tax on both residential and non-residential properties. Amid a
growth boom, officials repealed the tax. Although lawmakers instituted a six percent utility
tax on non-residential property in 1988, nearly 30 years had passed when officials placed
a residential utility tax before voters on an August 2014 ballot.414
Hazelwood boasted low taxes for decades, and its population growth and changes
in resident demographics separated the city’s economic environment from the other study
group cities. Even though the city’s average household size decreased from 3.29 to 2.59
during the early post-fair housing period between 1970 and 1980, total population remained
relatively stable. And between 1980 and 1990, the city’s population and housing units went
from 13,098 / 5,119 to 15,324/ 6,848. While Hazelwood’s population had actually declined
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For bond election results which approved the bond issues see City archives Session 1008: January 17,
1972, page 11; Hazelwood Addendum 2 minutes of regular council meeting of January 19 1972 Page 1 of 2;
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Document 208 resolution number 49; For election results which approved the bond issue see University
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unanimously adopted as Ordinance 2128 -88; and Hazelwood August 15, 1990 Regular Meeting; Hazelwood
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former sources of revenue amounted to approximately $ 300, 000; Hazelwood January 2, 1985 Regular
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four percent since 1983 (16,178), the suburb was still the only study group city with net
increase in population.415
The other study cities operated in economic environments of steadily declining tax
bases and sharp increases in renter-occupancy. Hazelwood’s path to 1,376 (38 %)
nonowner-occupied residences by the end of the study period involved more gradual and
modest increases. Further, Hazelwood did not only stand out from the study group, the
suburb had few economic peers in St. Louis County. Consider, in 1976, while cities like
Jennings struggled with an unemployment rate above the national average of 7.8 % and St.
Louis County’s unemployment rate hovered above six percent, the unemployment rate in
Hazelwood was 5.75 %.416
By 2000, the city’s assessed valuation ranked seventh in the county and property
tax revenues only accounted for seven percent of city income. Hazelwood was home to
some of the largest manufacturers in the entire region, and the suburb was economically
diversified. In addition to property taxes, the city derived 33 % of its revenue from sales
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According to US Census data, NHGIS figures, City of Hazelwood, MO Special Session Hazelwood July 23,
1980; Hazelwood December 17, 1980; Hazelwood November 7, 1984; Hazelwood January 2, 1985; City of
Hazelwood, Mo archives interoffice memorandum, Review of business license structure August 15,1988
page 1-2, 4-5, 13 Page 21; and Hazelwood September 5, 1990.
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October 1, 1975; According to figures in Hazelwood Special Council Meeting—April 14, 2014.
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taxes, 28 % from licenses, 11 % from utility tax, and 21 % percent from fees, fines, and
miscellaneous sources.417
By study’s end, Hazelwood administrators were preparing a budget which officials
assumed would not include estimated revenues from Proposition P’s quarter-cent sales tax
increase. However, voters passed the proposition sending officials a clear message to undue
the cuts made in city programs, services, and personnel. After the restorations along with
salary and benefit increases, Hazelwood’s revised budget for FY2016 still projected a
general revenue surplus and a 26 % reserve. Hazelwood appeared to have stabilized its
economic conditions.418
Despite the suburb’s wealth and solidity, Hazelwood did not escape the fiscal strain
and uncertainty of the 2008 recession. In addition to the foreclosure crisis, county-wide
sales tax had its lowest return in a decade, and cities were forced to adjust their budget
downwards for loss in sales tax revenues. Hazelwood was hit from both sides. Already the
largest portion of the city’s income, sales tax had grown to represent 39 % of Hazelwood’s
revenue sources by 2008, and property tax accounted for 15 % of city earnings.419
Although a two percent increase in property tax revenue was most likely reflective
of recent trends in new construction, it was clear Hazelwood’s position was shifting. The
suburb had fell from seventh to 12th in total assessed valuation in St. Louis County, and
derived a disproportionately large percentage of its sales tax revenue from one outlet mall.
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According to figures taken from archive City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated June 7, 2000.
Financial records indicated an assessed valuation of $432.9 million; City of Hazelwood, MO May 15, 2000
Special Meeting.
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Figures taken from archive City of Hazelwood, MO Council Budget Work Session: April 22, 2015.
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June 4, 2008. See also University City, MO Council Study Session: February 8, 2010, page 5.
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While figures estimated 85 % of the sales tax generated at the mall came from non-resident
shoppers, the suburb’s revenue sources had become less diverse.420
The 2008 economic downturn exposed weaknesses in Hazelwood’s economic
strength. Revenues had peaked and would only flatten and decline for the foreseeable
future. By FY2012, Hazelwood was deficit spending. The suburb’s deficit spending
increased in 2013, and despite a modest decrease in 2014’s deficit spending, the city was
forced to cut city programs and services. Hazelwood was in a different position, navigating
unfamiliar economic conditions, and no longer enjoying a large surplus of capital
improvement funds for improvements and repairs in the commercial and industrial areas.421
While the 2008 recession attributed to increased fiscal stress for Hazelwood, a
closer examination revealed decisions made well-before 2008 had increased the city’s
exposure to economic instability. The events of 2008 only expediated the process. As early
as 1983, Hazelwood had already become heavily dependent on business license fees
generated from manufacturers. The suburb’s business tax strategies included complex fee
structures which were difficult to administer and often ignited legal disputes over double
taxation related to property, tools and machinery.
Business license fees accounted for the second largest source of the city’s general
fund revenue. Combined with point-of-sale local sales tax income, these two streams
accounted for over 70 % of Hazelwood’s total general revenue. Additionally, by not
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levying either form of the utility tax, the suburb further concentrated its dependence on
license fees. Hazelwood officials used the utility tax tool like a zero-property tax. While
this was an attractive measure, it was far less alluring than zero property taxes and the
income hit outweighed the benefit. This was best demonstrated in the city’s reinstitution of
the non-residential form several years later and the resident form in 2014.
Hazelwood officials were committed to keeping taxes low for residents. However,
in doing so, officials hedged 70 % of the city’s fiscal health in fees and sales. The strategy
worked well in the 1980s and into the 1990s. The suburb’s revenues increased with fees
and sales exhibiting the steadiest growth. Nevertheless, these were not only the largest and
most important revenue sources for the suburb, they were also the most vulnerable to
external threats.
Hazelwood began the study period borrowing money to meet expenses and making
installment payments to purchase land for parks. As the village transitioned into a
professionally run city, officials adopted new taxing laws and structured fee agreements
with businesses. The city grew in population, land, and wealth. As Hazelwood’s success
increased, so did the number of businesses, business success, and business fees. Companies
began to challenge the fee structure as they found increases in their contribution to city
coffers and the pay schedule unacceptable.422
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The production expansions and facilities’ upgrades generated enormous sums of
revenue, attracted scores of residents employed or seeking employment at factories, and
provided thousands of local jobs. However, these benefits began to be replaced with major
downsizing, relocations, and closures. The turn of events rendered the suburb’s financial
projections of annexed areas useless. Although through annexations the city acquired land
for a community center, parks, and easy access to main arteries, the large empty industrial
areas, strained relations with neighboring suburbs, and boundary commission battles
flipped the acquisitions from benefits to detriments and liabilities.423
By 1995, Hazelwood had become the fifth most populous city in St. Louis County
with 26,829 residents. The suburb had maximized tools like industrial development bonds
and TIF. Nevertheless, the city was borrowing money and requesting payment extensions
on lines of credit in lieu of the city’s receipt of business licence revenues. Just five years
earlier, Hazelwood was still enjoying steadily rising revenues and low bonded
indebtedness. New economic considerations tempered the suburb’s optimism borne of
consecutive decades of growth and stability. Early decisions established an
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overdependence on sales and fees and resulted in mid-1990s fiscal stress. However, it may
have been for the best.424
By the time the 2008 recession hit, Hazelwood had endured their first economically
challenging decade of the study period. Spared the fiscal destruction of early post-fair
housing era economic conditions, the suburb had little experience with acute declines in
revenues. The exit of major manufactures during the latter half of the era, however, forced
the city to rethink their economic model and adjust. While the city could not be expected
to totally revamp, there were concerted efforts to better diversify streams. Economic
development plans now focused more on business parks, commerce centers, hospitality
and services, and recreation and entertainment.425
University City officials worked throughout the study period to retain existing
commercial businesses, generate more commercial activity, and attract new commercial
investment. Officials aimed to increase the utilization of local businesses and increase the
city’s economic competitiveness. Strategies included marketing and promoting the city’s
resurgence, conducting code enforcement information analyses, and evaluating areas for
redevelopment. The city contracted consultants to provide in-depth reviews of existing
retail and other commercial facilities to better assess existing businesses and their
accessibility to neighborhoods throughout the city.426
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University City’s approach to economic development projects involved three
different type of processes: 1. Formal, 2. Informal, and 3. Quasi Formal. The city’s formal
process included strategic planning sessions with policymakers, contracted consultants,
and administrators such as city manager and directors of planning and finance. Boards,
focus groups, and public hearings were convened to elicit citizen input. Requests for
proposals were rarely issued in advance as officials usually identified potential developers
through the informal process.
Inviting developers to meet informally and submit proposals was customary
behavior. No written rule governed the activities, and businesspersons often approached
the city unsolicited or circumvented boards and commissions review processes. The
informal process often resulted in an imbalance in information and background.
Policymakers and administrators, through which the project made entry onto the agenda,
were usually well-informed and very much in support of the project while others were
skeptical. This challenged continuity in making development decisions.
Quasi formal processes included staff involvement and boards and commissions
reviews. However, policymakers were seldom aware of critical details related to how these
groups arrived at their decisions to recommend approval or denial. While administrative
supervisors could elaborate on staff roles and involvement, information from boards and
commissions was not as readily available. Boards and commissions were comprised of
non-city employed citizens, and although councilmember and citizen liaisons served as the

7115 passed as Ordinance Number 4964. Refer to archives Special Session 1123: January 23rd, 1976, page
1. For more information regarding the firefighter’s petition see City of University City archives Session 1032:
November 20, 1972, page 3.
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go between, there was no rule or official process for taking meeting minutes or forwarding
information to the council or administrators.
When revenue figures and finance department’s estimated projections began
exhibiting substantial discrepancies in the late 1970s, officials assumed the lower than
anticipated revenues were attributable to lower property assessments. However, a
proliferation of tax-exempt properties within the municipality’s borders had resulted in a
significant number of properties being removed from the tax rolls. The suburb had always
been home to many churches and other nonprofits delivering services to residents, but most
organizations usually leased space and buildings. Only nonprofit-owned properties were
removed from the tax rolls.
University City had become “saturated with nonprofits,” and some officials
believed the suburb was a “target for tax-exempt operations.” City officials assessed the
situation and determined conditions warranted a new economic development strategy. In
1977, the city created a municipal officer position to monitor commercial and industrial
development and assist those looking for properties to redevelop. Officials authorized the
formation of an industrial development corporation in May of 1979. In October 1980,
University City established the special business district commission and began designating
special business districts.427
Special business districts permitted the city to levy a tax for exclusive use in
improving taxed areas. Officials also applied an additional 50 % fee to merchants’ business
licenses for the same purpose. By 1984, the tool had generated enough revenue that the
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city was able to begin making small loans to district merchants. Officials then began
phasing out the city’s department of human resources and established a public affairs
department.428
By the mid-1980s, attitudes regarding economic development had shifted, and the
practice of contracting outside firms “equated to buying advertising.” To initiate and
sustain substantive economic development activity, the city needed in-house personnel
dedicated to the category. Utilizing economic development staff instead of consultants
granted administrators and officials better access to ongoing activities. The implementation
of the public affairs department expanded the city’s capacity for economic development by
cultivating relationships, project plans, and proposals. Nevertheless, developer interest
remained lower than desired.
University City had long been credited as being a self-starter, but “It’s difficult to
develop when the city is landlocked.” University City projects were often delayed awaiting
interest from developers. Early period University City officials had remained reluctant to
turn to tax incentives to attract developers and to finance projects. Local lawmakers
believed, “The city should be very careful in matters concerning TIFs and tax abatement.”
Officials remained confident, “The city could secure a developer of land without offering
any tax incentives.”429
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The mature inner suburb had no shortage of blighted areas that easily qualified for
TIF, and University City officials’ unwillingness to authorize tax incentives drew harsh
criticism both internally and externally. It was common for TIF requests to involve areas
where several municipalities shared boundaries. Such occasions mandated developers
secure approval from each jurisdiction. Refusals sparked contentious battles and pitted the
suburb against county, state, and federal elected representatives, private developers, and
neighboring municipalities.430
During the city’s 1986 comprehensive planning process, however, city officials
began to exhibit more favorable attitudes and views regarding the use of TIF. Although
most citizen input was not as supportive, property owners and most business owners were
onboard. Officials determined the increased interest from the business community
warranted instituting TIF districts. Additionally, results from a 1989 market study
confirmed that level of developer interest in University City was contingent upon the use
of TIF.431
University City established a TIF commission to field requests, manage accounts,
and make recommendations. Interviewee U2 explains:
“We needed to bring some economic stability to University City. If you don't have
a good healthy economy, you can't do anything. We needed to have money to be
able to do these things and we needed to have a good economy to help stabilize
neighborhoods. So, we started looking at TIF when a developer came to us and said
I would like to put in a development in this area.”432
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Officials set a use policy that TIF would only be considered to assist in new
development and rehabilitation of blighted properties with extraordinary costs. Projects
were required to conform to objectives outlined in the city’s comprehensive plan and
demonstrate substantial tax revenue for the city and schools during the subsidy period and
result in major increases at the conclusion of the subsidy. Projects also had to provide jobs
for University City citizens. Eminent domain could only be employed when it was
necessary to complete projects in or immediately adjacent to designated redevelopment
areas listed in the comprehensive plan.
Traditionally, University City officials discouraged the use of TIF. However, by
the second half of the study period, evolving attitudes were affecting change in University
City’s position, toolbox, and decision-making. The early post-fair housing era shift in
University City’s fiscal health highlighted vulnerabilities in the bedroom community
model and created an environment of less resistance to divergent economic philosophies
and provided more opportunities for more business-centric ideologies to be politically
represented, acquire more policy impact, and affect change in the suburbs’ economic
development strategy.
Economic ideological disagreement reintroduced University City’s government
and its citizenry to a level of divisiveness not experienced since the 1960s. Some city
officials and citizens accused officials of using TIF to bribe large merchants to relocate
into the city, and opponents claimed major commercial retailers put smaller stores out of
business. “The TIF is corporate welfare,” exclaimed one former official. “They basically
take any taxes we generate and give them to the developer. I think it's an abdication of
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power.” Lack of continuity in processes and approach further exacerbated disunity in the
city’s economic development strategy.433
University City’s TIF commission was often inactive and unaware of the city’s
economic development goals and objectives, and city officials were unclear of the
commission’s role in economic development strategy and execution. Some officials
believed the TIF commission presented a “roadblock” to progress, and it was common for
the economic development board and TIF commission to engage in activities which were
not aligned with the council’s philosophy— some of which increased expenses for the city
and delayed activities.434
While business growth did occur along the city’s popular southern strip, projects
were realized despite no special planning and minimal public financing. Further, there was
little economic development occurring in other areas of the city as projects were
concentrated in the popular district. According to Interviewee U2:
“Young people have nowhere to go to spend their daily dollars. When they need to
go to the grocery store or go buy stuff, they go to Maplewood, to Walmart, or to
Target, Richmond Heights, and spend their money. That money is not in the pool.
I want people to stay in University City and spend their daily dollars.”435
University City decision makers continued to push for more use of tax abatements
and TIF and began advocating for the use of the Maplewood method of economic
development to spur activity in the other areas. The Maplewood model included aggressive
and multilayered measures of attracting businesses and investment. Like University City’s
public affairs department, Maplewood established a community development department,
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hired staff, and assigned personnel to contact developers and specific businesses. Personnel
initiated contact, cultivated relationships, and promoted the city’s attractiveness.
Maplewood’s model, however, included incentives for businesses to relocate,
initiate, or expand operations in the city. Maplewood’s pitch included business loans,
grants, and access to specialists and brokers who assisted in identifying location, securing
agreements, and completing requirements. University City officials felt the revival in
Maplewood could be copied in their city. With a pro-business mission and the right sales
broker, they believed they could develop a larger commercial retail base and stand as a
point-of-sale city should the time come.
Although the Maplewood model has been lauded for its walkability, small eclectic
shops, and annual events promoting the main street business district, many disagree with
other elements of Maplewood’s economic development strategy. Interviewee U2 points
out:
“When we do redevelopment, we don't just say ok bring us big box development
projects. We say we want to do something that's really going to help people and get
better jobs for the people that live over there.”
Conversely, “I don't view this as gentrification,” exclaims Interviewee U1. “I view
this as an opportunity to get some better prices to shop in places.”436
University City’s economic ideological debate continued through to the end of the
study period. Some officials still aligned with the city’s early period view of tax abatements
and TIF and preferred financial assistance sources such as special business districts (extra
property tax and license fee), neighborhood improvement districts (special assessment /
property tax), and transportation improvement districts (added sales tax). Additionally,
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where permitted by law, officials advocated obtaining tax credits and lower interests
financing at no cost to the city. Other officials stood firm in the position that the only way
to generate any substantial activity was TIF.
Meanwhile, the “forgotten corridor” and international district of the city became
home to payday/title loan establishments, rent to own, and DWI traffic clinics. Officials
were responsible for issuing business licenses and despite their expressed belief in the need
to limit such operations, they continued to flourish. Although a joint redevelopment
agreement between University City and the City of Olivette instituted plans limiting certain
types of businesses moving forward, prohibition of car washes, resale thrift shops, tattoo
parlors, drive-through food chains, and short-term lenders did not extend restrictions into
much of the city’s own part of Olive.437
As the study period neared the end, University City had multiple special business
taxing districts, TIF districts, and scores of TIF-assisted properties. One TIF district alone
contained nine undeveloped properties and four LCRA-owned properties. One TIF district
had no money, a TIF district owed the city approximately $1,000,000, and assets of TIF
districts were in the process of being transferred to the city.438
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Other than some private investment and public-private partnership success in the
city’s Loop district, University City officials struggled to spur economic activity in other
areas of the suburb. The city’s Olive area was still not conducive to pedestrian shoppers
and was plagued with vacant store fronts, poor street lighting, and the state-owned road
lacked adequate maintenance, landscaping, and designs. Officials leveraged various tools
to attract developers but ultimately only managed to improve some facades, signage, and
landscaping.439
Several successful redevelopments resulted in a warehouse and business park, and
entry of several large commercial retailers into the city. However, use of highly
controversial financing tools such as tax abatements and TIF further divided the city and
complicated its economic development process. Since attaining consensus became much
harder, the city’s projects received less support, tended to be less beneficial for the city,
and were often delayed or abandoned. This has resulted in perpetual periods of economic
bliss routinely interrupted by increased fiscal stress.
In 2000, University City was deriving 30 % of its revenues from sales taxes, 20 %
from utilities tax, 10 % from property taxes, 40 % from refuse collection and miscellaneous
sources, and the suburb had six million dollars in reserves. A decade later, according to
one University City official quoted in a St. Louis Post-Dispatch article, “City finances were
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in abysmal shape.” Findings in citizens’ petition-initiated Missouri State Auditor, city's
annual audit, and independent financial consultant examinations confirmed the assertion
by attributing a number of issues to poor financial management.440
The consultant's report alone included 47 recommendations for improving the city’s
finance department. University City had 22 different bank accounts that were accruing
thousands of dollars in bank fees, clerks were adjusting customer bills without receiving
prior approval, and financial records were disorganized which caused the city to incur
additional charges for extra accounting during audits conducted by private firms. Amid
financial strife, the wedge that had previously been serving as an economic ideological
partition matured into a bitterly divisive tool used to identify, call out, and attack
opponents.441
Vitriolic infighting within local government was intensified by watchdog groups
and citizens accusing officials of conflicts of interest and sunshine law violations and
demanding more transparency. A Post-Dispatch editorial referred to what was happening
as “[U City] shenanigans.” A longtime city employee described city hall as, “A hostile
work environment.” Another lamented, “There was a lack of respect, common courtesy,
and professionalism; [the environment] was one of distrust, suspicion, and oppression.”442
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Interestingly enough, the apex of University City’s economic ideological divide
and the city’s dissent into civility deficiency coincided with the hiring of the mature inner
suburb’s first black city manager. Notwithstanding, most observers attributed tensions to,
“The warp speed with which changes were occurring within city government.” A
reorganization of the city’s finance department and cuts in personnel and spending
produced a balanced budget by FY2012. Interviewee U3 said, “One of my proudest
achievements was with members of the council and our former city manager. We were able
to put [U City] on a stable path.”443
University City’s 2012 comprehensive financial report showed that the city’s assets
exceeded its liabilities by approximately $74 million— a two-million dollar increase from
the previous year. By the end of the study period, however, the city needed to levy two new
special tax funds as 69 % of voters said no to two bond issues, and the city’s FY2016
budget estimated only a $60,000 difference in revenue over expenditures. Interviewee U3
commented on the city’s economic future adding, “I am concerned our outlook financially
is not good.”444
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University City was established as a residential community and the suburb’s
strength remains its residential offerings. However, this strength also serves as a liability
for the city as revenue is vulnerable to acute changes in the housing market and officials
are limited by law in terms of how high they can increase the property tax. Officials are
dependent on property owners approving property tax rate hikes that exceed the maximize
allowed rate. This increases the city’s vulnerability, decreases municipal government’s
fiscal tool options, and further highlights the need for the city to improve its economic
development strategy.
While the divide among divergent economic development philosophies in
University City centered on the use of TIF to attract developers, mature inner suburbs like
Maplewood were leveraging the tool to become one the largest retail shopping areas in the
region. Maplewood first began using TIF as a central tool in its economic development
strategy in 1990, and a decade later, officials feared changes to TIF standards could
eliminate TIF from communities who could take advantage of the established standards of
blight.445
In early 2000, proposed limits to the statewide availability of TIF were designed to
end abuse of the “but for” rule which required reasonable justification for officials claiming
developments would not take place without TIF. By redefining the term “blighted” to
include some measurable, unambiguous standards, framers aimed to prevent the funneling
of taxpayer money into private development in places that did not exhibited characteristics
like derelict properties, loss of population, pervasive poverty, and unemployment.
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Economic benefits from TIF were to be area-wide and limited to expenses that would not
be covered by private investment without this kind of assistance.446
Maplewood’s economic development model proved effective and controversial as
the city received many responses from business and developers ready to take the city up
on offers. Critics challenged the city’s TIFs, and courts interpreted the legalities. While the
suburb’s business grants and loans program was popular among smaller merchants, large
corporations wanted TIF. Controversy ensued regarding Maplewood’s 2002 agreement
with Walmart when developers expressed the development would not require the $34
million TIF originally requested.447
Walmart had not undertaken a project in the St. Louis area without the use of TIF,
and the question arose, “If Walmart could construct a store in Maplewood without the use
of TIF funds, should all the other Walmart projects in the area have been granted TIF?”
Competing developers threatened Maplewood officials with possible legal action against
the city and warned if the Walmart developers did the project without TIF, the development
would not be feasible and could be closed in a few years. However, threats were ineffective
as Maplewood had spent the first 30 years of the period stocking its economic development
toolbox for moments like this.448
Just a little over a decade earlier, Maplewood had lost a large sales tax revenue
generator in Kmart, and abandonment and deterioration of several defunct factories had
left a 62-acre cavity in the suburb’s landscape. Maplewood, not yet in the attractive position
it would assume in the last decade of the period, was desperately trying to get the area
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redeveloped and secure a new tenant. Officials authorized the hiring of a consultant to
assist the city in finding a tenant to occupy the old Kmart building.449
Maplewood designated both sites TIF redevelopment project areas, established
boundaries, and began inviting developers to take advantage of TIF to redevelop land and
properties in the designated areas. Execution of redevelopment contracts, management
agreements, and construction soon followed. Maplewood’s position had not changed since
the early post-fair housing era. In fact, in replacing Kmart after the retailer’s exit from the
city in 1990, officials only needed to revisit Kmart’s entry into the city 16 years earlier.450
In 1974, although the municipality was not yet a professionally governed city,
Maplewood’s economic philosophy and economic development strategy was already
embedded. After meeting with developers and property owners regarding the Kmart
development, officials still had one unanswered question: “How can it be financed?”
Usually, the process involved large commercial retailers and a construction company,
which serve as the developer, purchasing, developing, and leasing the property to the
retailer.451
Before the retail business would commit to a lease, specific requirements for
buildings, total land space, and large parking area had to be met. Parking is critical to large
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retailers’ business success. Ironically, parking was also one of Maplewood’s top priorities.
Early era officials identified lack of parking in the city’s business district as a major
inhibitor to competing with fellow retail sales tax revenue-oriented suburbs like
Crestwood. As part of the development, officials required the Kmart project developer to
include a large parking facility for its downtown business.
This created a dilemma for the developer, however. To secure financing from a
lender, the developer had to demonstrate the project was feasible and profitable. This model
required the developer to meet the Kmart parking requirements, which were substantial, as
well as provide additional parking according to the city’s specifications. Statutes prohibited
a leasing arrangement between the developer and the city. Therefore, the only incentive for
the developer to provide the additional parking was the original one— leasing to Kmart.
Maplewood got the extra public parking for its downtown business district in the
form of a two-level parking deck under the Kmart building. Consider that the ground
underneath the property was owned by the city, and Maplewood leveraged that ground and
the developer’s desire to execute the development to expand the city’s parking options and
strengthened its downtown. Maplewood accomplished something that was unheard of at
the time and would serve as a model upon which other cities around the country based their
development negotiations.452
Maplewood’s victory did not come without notable costs, however. Developers
wanted certain areas containing residential properties rezoned commercial and wanted the
city to secure and retain ownership of the land. Nevertheless, officials were pleased with
the deal. They had successfully secured a large sales tax revenue generator and even if
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Kmart closed, they still would have a public parking garage for the business district.
Conversely, the city’s rezoning of residential areas proved problematic.453
In addition to rezoning single-family residential to commercial, officials rezoned
old historic properties from residential to heavy industrial districts. As expected, citizens
opposed these decisions and petitioned the council to reconsider rezoning these areas.
However, a closer examination of the issue revealed other pertinent elements to consider.
The city’s decision to rezone these areas for business purposes was not only problematic
because it sacrificed the character of neighborhoods, but it did nothing to address the
problems facing the struggling district.454
Unless Maplewood addressed issues of abandonment, obsolescence, and
deterioration in the city’s business district, benefits of the new garage would be minimal.
Many stores had closed, and if the trend of decline in the district continued, businesses
would continue to exit, and buildings could remain vacant for some time. Up to that point,
the city’s focus was to provide ample free parking to attract more shoppers to the area. The
city’s planning and zoning commission had identified parking as the top priority in efforts
to save the central business district from further deterioration.455
With the goal of expanded parking achieved, the city needed to focus its attention
on revitalizing the existing business district and making substantial improvements to the
city’s infrastructure to help drive traffic to the area. Bridges needed replaced, streets needed
new paving and signage, and intersections needed synchronized light signals. The city’s
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budget could not support these projects through recurring income and there was no
significant nonrecurring capital anticipated. Maplewood began applying for public
assistance, and with funds from the Missouri’s Office of Community Affairs, paid for a
housing inventory and streets needs study.456
To increase accessibility to the business district for shoppers using public transit,
Maplewood officials petitioned the Bi-State Development Agency to relinquish right-ofway on properties at the bus loop, allocated funds for construction costs, and installed two
passenger shelters. By the time Maplewood adopted its charter and professionalized its
local government, in 1978, the mature inner suburb had laid the groundwork for a
resurgence. All that was needed was a replenishing of resources, acquiring of new tools,
and effective use of tools.457
Maplewood’s first economic development decisions as a charter city established a
land clearance and redevelopment authority, declared a substantial portion of the city’s
land mass to be blighted, and designated the area a redevelopment zone. Bounded by the
city’s eastern city limits shared with the City of St. Louis and the centrally located major
north-south artery, the redevelopment zone was subject to the convenience and necessity
of the Maplewood Development Corporation (MDC).458
Through a contract agreement with the City of Maplewood, the MDC possessed
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain, establish land use restrictions for certain
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property, and carry out other relevant activities outlined in the redevelopment plan. The
city made the next major addition to its economic development toolbox, in 1980, when
officials authorized an agreement with St. Louis County’s industrial development authority
to finance the cost of an industrial development project. The partnership with the county
allowed the city to leverage a financing tool which had not yet been added to its economic
development toolbox.459
By 1981, Maplewood officials agreed that solely hiring economic development
consultants was no longer meeting the city’s needs. To address this deficiency, officials
instructed the city manager to appoint an economic development director. The original
appointment involved a reassignment of internal personnel and was voted down by the
council. A year later, officials approved the appointment of the same internal personnel as
an officer in the department. The rejection a year earlier and the filling of the director’s
role with a new hire demonstrated officials’ desire to add new viewpoints, ideas, and
capacity to the city’s economic development strategy.460
The era of a bustling, self-sustaining central business district requiring only the
basic services of local government had passed for Maplewood. For the mature inner suburb
to have any real chance of rebounding and achieving vibrancy and longevity, Maplewood
officials had to adjust the city’s historical approach to economic development. Planning,
setting goals, and working with the remaining businesses would not be enough to save the
district. The city needed to build on the success of landing the major retailer and parking
garage in the previous decade.
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The Kmart deal came about as a result of the developer approaching the city.
However, Maplewood did not have the luxury of waiting for developers to express interest
in developing in the redevelopment zone. Officials needed to take an active role in
promoting the area, recruiting developers and businesses, and leveraging economic
development tools to incentivize projects and increase interest. Maplewood officials
decided to amend the city’s approach to economic development by first establishing the
central business district’s new image.
Involving local business, the local chamber of commerce, and other community
stakeholders, the city established the Maplewood Community Betterment Foundation and
developed a revitalization plan for the central business district which included detailed
goals and specifications for the desired image of the area. The group, along with city
personnel, began promoting Maplewood to the types of businesses identified as aligning
with the preferred image detailed in the plan. In anticipation of new types of businesses
and to ensure compatibility, officials began adjusting zoning codes and exploring
relocation options with existing stores.461
By 1984, with a new administration in place, Maplewood was primed to take its
economic development to the next level. The city strengthened its economic development
toolbox by establishing its own IDA. In utilizing the county’s IDA, the city was at the
mercy of the county’s decisions regarding projects. By establishing their own IDA,
Maplewood gained the freedom to independently approve or deny industrial development
projects. The city’s first independent IDA authorization involved the granting of bonds for
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the redevelopment and rehabbing of the 62-acre tract of land and properties mentioned
earlier.462
In continuance of the city’s efforts to revitalize the central business district,
Maplewood formed special business districts which allowed the city to increase the
property tax and license fee assessed on businesses in the district. The additional revenue
was then used to promote businesses and create renovation grants issued directly to
business owners for physical improvements to establishments. As stores’ appearance
improved through accentuations like fresh paint and new facades, the city strategically
expanded special business district boundaries to increase eligibility for the storefront
renovation grants program.463
While improvements were notable and consumer activity began trending upward,
some vacancies remained. One official recalled, “It was like throwing a party and no one
comes.” To fill remaining vacancies, the city designed a rebate program for business
district building owners. Property owners received 25 % of the sales tax generated by new
retail establishments that located to the district and remained for at least three years. The
strategy further demonstrated Maplewood’s superior prowess in the economic
development space. The program did not only address vacancies by incentivizing owners
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to get the property occupied and fully leased as soon as possible, but it also incentivized
property owners to only extend occupancy leases to sales tax revenue generators.464
By the time Kmart exited in 1990, Maplewood was still years away from achieving
its renaissance. Notwithstanding, the mature inner suburb was much better positioned,
equipped, and professionalized than it was when the retailer arrived. The unveiling of the
new business park and the groundbreaking ceremony for the next phase of the 62-acre
redevelopment demonstrated this best. In less than 20 years, the City of Maplewood had
designed and executed an economic development plan which revitalized the city by
converting an old model that left only liabilities from a bygone era to a modern major
revenue producing model.465
Maplewood progressed through the remainder of the study period strengthening its
economic development strategy and accentuating the efforts through increased focus on
improving the housing stock and attracting younger homeowners and families.
“I never saw a 20 something parent with a stroller the first six or eight years I was
in Maplewood,” says Interviewee M4. “But in the early 90s, people started looking
for affordable housing, maybe it was late 90s, a lot of the good stuff started kind of
happening and it sort of fed off each other.”466
Official agreements with the local chamber of commerce formalized and clarified
revitalization goals, functions, and services. This strategy significantly improved and
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expanded Maplewood’s capacity to promote the city as a prosperous, economically viable,
and desirable locale for businesses and residents alike. Efforts resulted in further
accentuation of the city’s image by attracting unique businesses like microbreweries that
produced significant amounts of sales tax dollars for the city and sponsored events like art
fairs.467
Maplewood cultivated and leveraged relationships to develop partnerships which
greatly increased the suburb’s ability to execute maneuvers far beyond the scope of the
city’s capacity to perform independently. By explicitly promoting citizen involvement in
economic development efforts, Maplewood benefitted from the wide range of expert and
creative input represented on its civilian boards and commissions. Maplewood was not
only effective at attracting new businesses, but the city developed innovative programs for
retaining and helping grow existing businesses.
Maplewood created a pro-business atmosphere in which existing businesses helped
promote the city and recruit new businesses to the area. Officials affirmatively sought out
joint ventures with neighboring municipalities and worked collaboratively to develop
projects and institute methods to help ensure that the adjacent and surrounding
neighborhoods were not compromised by decline or traffic from redevelopments.
Maplewood’s economic development model proved effective, efficient, and sustainable.
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However, as the city’s first big economic development win of the period demonstrated,
Maplewood’s model contained embedded costs.468
According to Interviewee M3, “Maplewood is the place where people want to live,
but it's a double-edge sword.” The suburb’s commercial activity ultimately exceeded levels
experienced in the city’s pre-mall era success, and old nemeses reemerged. Parking
shortages became more pronounced than before. Challenges with maintaining and
upgrading the parking garage became a politically divisive topic. Tensions in the business
sector ensued from parking lot expansions and encroachment disputes, and served as
constant inhibitors to achieving economic development, preservation and expansion
goals.469
By 2000, the Kmart property was sitting idle and Maplewood’s strategic planning
meetings were producing few ideas for addressing the matter. Maplewood would have to
institute a tax increase to raise the money to buy the old Kmart property and demolish the
parking garage. Despite vast improvements in the business sector, the city still faced the
dilemma of budget concerns, increased pressure to continue expanding the sales tax
revenue stream, and citizen backlash from leveraging TIFs and compromising more
residential area for the sake of economic development.470
National tragedies, busted stock market bubbles, and broken commitments served
to expediate the dissolution of agreements and exacerbated anxieties regarding
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Maplewood’s financial future. The suburb’s model was built and reinforced over decades
to survive, thrive, or decline on sale tax revenues. The small eclectic shops were great, but
the new model required major retail chains. Officials remained committed to the model
and over the final third of the study period, the city attracted a new tenant for the old Kmart
building and attracted some of the biggest retailers in the industry to the area.471
Kmart’s 1990 departure from Maplewood was not a unique occurrence for inner
suburbs by the early 1990s. Evolving consumer demands and economic transitions were
challenging the sustainability of large-scale retailers and mall developments. The River
Roads Mall had served as a dependable sales tax revenue engine for Jennings since the
early 1960s. However, 30 years later, Jennings officials began the process of blighting the
mall, plaza center, and surrounding properties. From 1985 to 1991, assessed valuation of
the property had declined 48 %, and a steady outflow of retail tenants resulted in the city’s
sales tax revenues plummeting.472
The mall’s last occupant vacated in 1994, and the facility closed for good the
following year. Five years later, officials blighted “St. Louis County’s first ultra-modern
retail village, Northland Shopping Center in Jennings, Missouri.” By 2006, both sites were
the malls once stood as symbols of suburban prosperity, modernity, and stability served as

471

City of Maplewood Missouri archives June 8 1993 document number 25; City of Maplewood Missouri
archives January 8th 2002; City of Maplewood archives August 27 2002; City of Maplewood Missouri
September 28, 2004; City of Maplewood Missouri archives December 13, 2011: Bill 5844 as Ordinance
number 5646; City of Maplewood Missouri archives January 24, 2012 archives; City of Maplewood archives
October 12, 2004; City of Maplewood archives April 12, 2005; City of Maplewood Missouri archives March
8, 2011.
472
Figures taken from archive of financial records in City of Jennings, MO. See also, Regular Council Session
1219th meeting dated March 25, 1991, page 1.

267

visual and fiscal reminders of colossal failures, a bygone era, and the suburban realism that
had replaced suburban utopianism.473
In April 2000, the city clerk of Jennings invited business and property owners from
the city’s downtown business district to meet with the city council. Prompted by a letter
advising the council of “the serious situation that is rapidly developing in Jennings’
business district on West Florissant,” officials instructed the clerk to schedule a meeting.
The district had long been a shell of its former self. For decades, as Jennings vested most
of its economic development focus in the malls, the remnant of the district’s retail and
service businesses struggled to stay afloat amid a divested environment inundated with
structural deterioration and substantial vacancy rates.474
Jennings’ fiscal strain began long before the decline of the malls and the business
district. To fully understand how Jennings reached a financial position which prompted
officials to levy the maximum property tax rate allowed by law in 1993, we must return to
the start of the period. Based on the total operational costs for fiscal year April 1, 1969 to
March 31, 1970, the City of Jennings established a property tax rate of $.5579 per $100
valuation. One year later, Jennings increased the property tax five cents. Combined with
$.20 garbage and $.10 police and firemen's retirement fund, by 1971, Jennings’s taxpayers
were paying $.90 per $100 assessed in property taxes.475
With projected increases in property tax revenues from higher property assessments
between 1984 and 1985, officials adjusted the tax rate down from $.90 to $.84 for tax year
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1985. By FY1987, Jennings tax rate was up to $.94, and to maintain the same amount of
revenue by FY1991, required the tax be set at $.99 and raising the trash fee from $30 per
year to $50 per year. This trend continued for Jennings as the tax rate reached $1 per $100
assessed valuation in 1993. To raise the rate any further, lawmakers needed two-thirds
voter approval.476
The City of Jennings’ economic development model has never allowed the mature
inner suburb to enjoy low property taxes or to achieved decades of sustained fiscal
solvency. The advent of the revolutionary malls attracted scores of shoppers to Jennings
and provided the city sales tax revenues but did not set the municipality on a course for
wealth and sustainability. Any excitement about the modest surplus found in the city’s
1971 general revenue fund was soon tempered with the reality that the capital equipment
fund was nearly depleted. Although Jennings had been populated as far back as before the
emancipation of slaves, the Jennings, MO that entered the post-fair housing age was still a
fairly new city.477
Up until 1947, a local volunteer fire and improvement association provided fire
protection for Jennings, and a county deputy sheriff served as the area’s police protection.
In late 1946, the scattered settlements of Jennings, Woodland, Jenwood, West Walnut
Manor, and farms north of the railroad tracks designated the area for incorporation.
Neighboring Country Club Hills and Flordell Hills had recently incorporated and began
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laying claim to the promising commercial potential on West Florissant Avenue. Property
owners on and around the old James Jennings plantation quickly followed suit, formalized,
and began laying their claim to the revenue engine.478
By 1972, a one cent sales tax had replaced the city’s one-half cent tax implemented
just two years earlier. Records reveal why Jennings doubled the rate to the maximum
allowed at the time. Exactly half of the sales tax revenue received during the fiscal year
beginning April 1, 1972 and ending March 31, 1973 was allocated to defray costs
associated with the building of a police department building and municipal court room.
The following September, officials formed a bond issue committee, commissioned a
feasibility study, and began promoting a bond issue to raise funds to construct a community
center.479
When Jennings officials met with the new director of the Jennings Chamber of
Commerce in March 1975, the first order of business was to form an investigative
committee to determine the needs of the community. By November, federal and state
officials were receiving letters expressing Jennings’ desire to have a federal or state
government agency located in their city. By July 1976, the group included officials from
the City of Flordell Hills. The group’s new focus involved a joint effort to revitalize the
West Florissant Business District.480
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During the 13 years between 1947 (Jennings incorporation December 1946) to
1960, the suburb experienced steady economic growth. However, beginning in 1960,
Jennings began to experience gradual economic decline. While Northland’s 1955 arrival
and River Road’s entrance less than a decade later provided a boost in the city’s income,
they also punctured the city’s cord which funneled a steady revenue stream from the
commercial strip along West Florissant Avenue. By the mid-1970s, the malls had all but
driven the final death nail in the business district. Jennings officials along with their
suburban neighbor Flordell Hills hoped together they could revitalize the struggling area.481
Almost 30 years to the date before Jennings blighted Northland Shopping Center
in 1999, as officials prepared the city’s FY1979-80 budget, Jennings’ mayor described the
mature inner suburb’s economic situation as, “Robbing Peter to pay Paul.” Jennings
officials concluded the city needed to formalize its work with the Jennings Chamber of
Commerce by hiring the organization to help the city develop an economic development
plan, promote the business sector of the city, and attract new businesses.482
In addition to executing promotions efforts, chamber personnel coordinated the
city’s business loan program, which made loans available to businesses located in HUD
homestead project areas. Meanwhile, a Jennings liaison stayed in communication with the
organization and reported back to the council. By September 1980, West Florissant
business owners were petitioning the city to establish a special downtown business taxing
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district. Officials obliged and formed a downtown special business district steering
committee.483
Jennings extended a loan to the district to develop administrative staff services,
imposed the increased tax on assessed valuation of property in the district, and instituted
the 50 % increase on merchant licenses. Once the additional taxes and fees reconciled the
loan, the district planned to use the designated funds for the creation of a business directory
and farmer’s market, renovations, installation of lighting, special patrols by the Jennings
Police Department, and the sponsoring of special events like crime prevention seminars for
merchants.484
Besides authorizing loans and imposing tax and fee increases, Jennings officials
had little time to dedicate to the downtown business and property owners’ efforts to
revitalize the area. Jennings’ housing situation had been deteriorating for some time, and
as early as midyear 1980, housing concerns demanded the lion’s share of officials’
attention. Jennings’ stock of automobile-age friendly homes were being replaced with new
apartment buildings and citizens wanted to know, “If Jennings’ residents got preference in
rentals and sold their homes to get into the housing, what guarantee do they have that young
people will be moving into Jennings?”485
A decade into the post-fair housing era, the City of Jennings consisted of a
population comprised of 38 % senior citizens, and Jennings officials faced a serious
dilemma. In an effort to increase retention of the city’s longtime residents, officials
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authorized new apartment developments and apartment building rehabilitations to
accommodate the senior population cycling out of their homes into smaller units.
Conversely, many of the seniors’ children, who were raised and attended school in Jennings
and who had purchased their own homes in the suburb, desired to continue living in
Jennings but opposed the city’s proliferation of rentals.486
As Jennings officials spent the decade of the 1980s focused on housing projects
leveraging newly added tools like industrial development authority and local development
corporation, the city’s downtown business district faded into obsolescence, major retail
occupants began abandoning the malls, and rental properties lost 47 % of their assessed
value. Jennings entered the 1990s under severe fiscal stress, blighting large redevelopment
districts for TIF, and found the city beholden to developers for economic development.487
Failure of the malls, housing stock decline, and tax base transitions delivered
notable shocks to Jennings’ fiscal health. By the mid-1990s, the city’s financial status and
economic development prospects made fiscal recovery unlikely. Interview J1 shares the
following:
“When these companies started shutting down and moving due to crime or
whatever, the people followed. At that point, it was probably 30/70, 30 being black
African American. Groceries stores left, there were no hospitals in the area.”
“You know we make all these wonderful plans, and everything looks good. We
wanted to be a bikeable and a walkable area but how can you connect your city?
You know you can't go in a community or a neighborhood and tell these people
with different types of communication what they should or need to be doing in their
community. But if you're going to make this work not only do you have to be
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inclusive, you have to make it equitable. We don't want our neighborhoods to look
like Chesterfield. We want our neighborhoods to look like our neighborhoods.”488
The advent of the City of Jennings in 1947 reflects traits of many rapidly expanded
post-WWII outposts of metro cities. By the time River Roads mall opened in 1962,
Jennings’ economic growth had peaked. The housing construction that saw nearly 80 % of
Jennings’ homes built after WWII had slowed by 1970, and Jennings entered the postfairing housing era already on the decline. The model was flawed from the outset and
officials found themselves navigating perpetual cycles of fiscal stress and temporary
periods of solvency and surplus.489
Jennings’ housing stock and tax base did not evolve to become an inadequate source
of revenue to support the city; the city was established with inherent flaws in institutional
structure, structural design, and fiscal model. This placed the mature inner suburb in a
position where economic development decisions were efforts to correct for these flaws as
opposed to realize growth and sustainability. While the 1970s white flight, housing
discrimination, and housing stock deterioration receives the bulk of attention, consider as
late as 1990, Jennings still enjoyed 16,000 residents, 50 % white / 48 % black residency,
75 % owner-occupied homes, and $111 million in taxable sales.490
Early era economic development decisions increased the city’s vulnerability to
economic decline. Decisions compromised economic diversity by concentrating the city’s
financial dependency in the unproven revenue stream of retail malls and diverting
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resources from other budget categories to accentuate the stream. The lack of direct city
involvement in protecting and growing the downtown business district served as a fatal
missed opportunity to strengthen and expand the stream.
Jennings’ downtown business district was not a small collection of eclectic shops.
Covering 39 acres of Jennings’ landscape and offering 1.68 million square feet of real
estate, the district comprised several large anchor businesses including retail and
commercial service-oriented businesses, various food and industrial manufacturers,
supermarket grocers, and a large Catholic church. With direct city involvement leveraging
all relevant tools at the city’s disposal, attempting to stabilize and revitalize the area would
not have been considered a futile endeavor in 1980. However, by the 1990s, many of the
business and property owners who were attempting to save the area a decade earlier had
all but cycled out.491
Jennings had not positioned itself as a highly desirable locale for businesses or
residents, and the suburb had not developed an effective economic development plan or
apparatus. Consequentially, business closures often resulted in long-term vacancies,
obsolescence, and structural deterioration. Areas descended into low trafficked, high crime
areas. Any chance of resurgence required substantial investment of dollars and resources.
Economic development investments in cities like Jennings carry disproportionately
high risks and no reasonable or serious investors were willing to take those risks without
substantial investment on the part of the city. The mature inner suburb was at the mercy of
investors, developers, and lenders. If any one of the study cities met the “but for” test for
TIF redevelopment, Jennings certainly did. In 1991, Jennings and the St. Louis County
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LCRA began developing a plan for attracting developers to the suburb, designating large
portions of the city’s landscape as redevelopment areas, and leveraging the TIF tool as the
incentive.492
Blighted for redevelopment and carrying a seven-million-dollar improvement price
tag, River Roads garnered numerous proposals from interested parties. Suiters requested
100 % TIF to redevelop the 57-acre tract of land. Authorized to negotiate from a starting
point of 40 %, Jennings had minimal leverage and the city’s fiscal condition was rapidly
worsening. Debt spending was not a traditional practice. However, Jennings would become
very familiar with the technique during the middle third of the period; taking out loans to
cover city operations, authorizing budget transfers to pay monies owed to pension plans,
and drawing upon lines of credit until depletion.493
Jennings’ fiscal health steadily deteriorated as taxable sales plummeted from $111
million in 1990 to just over $65 million by 2000. Results from the 2000 census resulted in
further reductions in the city's revenue. Jennings’ economic development during the final
fourth of the study period was led by a contracted economic development consultant,
financed by the taxpayers of Jennings through TIF, and resulted in the redevelopment of
both malls. Developments included a mixture of retail strips, government offices, single
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and multifamily dwellings, senior apartments, convenience store gas stations, and fast food
restaurants.494
Before Jennings officials entered the 1990s using the TIF tool from a position of
dependence, Ferguson officials ended the 1980s wielding the tool in preparation of their
exit from the sales tax pool. Scores of Ferguson citizens filed into the city’s August 10,
1987 special council meeting to oppose the city’s rezoning and use of TIF for a large
Walmart development surrounding their residential subdivision. Of course, residents did
not want the commercial development near their residential neighborhood, but more
notable, residents disagreed with the council’s assessment of the area as blighted and
insisted the target area did not meet the “but for” test.495
Residents accused Ferguson’s local government of using TIF “because they are
pro-commercial.” Another resident felt, “They’re too buddy-buddy with the business
community.” According to one Ferguson Third Ward resident:
“I objected to most things proposed for West Florissant, but it was like the residents
was wasting their time speaking to the council. We were being treated like second
class citizens. [Councilmember] had Walmart on the same agenda.”496
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Unlike Jennings, Ferguson did not have failing malls, impending insolvency, or
nonprofessional government. Ferguson entered the post-fair housing era already a wellestablished, professionally governed city. By the time Jennings and the chamber began
lobbying for a government office to locate to Jennings, a Missouri State license office had
already been located in Ferguson’s central business district nearly 20 years. The office
attracted many people from the north end of St. Louis County and served as an anchor
helping to keep Ferguson’s business district viable. Ferguson was not only more
established as a city, the mature inner suburb was wealthier than its neighbor.497
Ferguson entered the era a debt free city offering a competitive salaries and benefits
package. The suburb retained quality personnel and residents enjoyed the second lowest
property tax rate among study cities throughout the study period (Hazelwood was lowest).
Commercial expansion and transition to a point-of-sale city flushed the city with increases
in capital allowing officials to further reduce rates periodically. When the city elected to
increase the merchants’ and manufacturers’ license tax and replace the fixed fee with a
variable rate system in 1981, it was the first modification to the tax and fee since 1951.498
Consider when Ferguson began using the TIF tool in the late 1980s, the city enjoyed
impressive economic diversification. Receipts from utilities taxes accounted for 28 % of
the suburb’s revenue while income from the sales tax pool represented 24 % of earnings.
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Intergovernmental services pulled in 15 %, property taxes added 11 %, and licenses, permit
fees, and assessments rounded the city’s intake accounting for 22 % of total revenues.
Ferguson was a highly self-sufficient, well populated, resource rich city. Like other suburbs
of comparable size and history, Ferguson had its challenges and suffered economic hits.
What separated Ferguson, however, the suburb was better equipped than other mature
suburbs and the city’s most devastating blows were entirely self-inflicted.499
While other study cities spent the early period of the post-fair housing era
developing, growing, or redefining their city’s identity, Ferguson officials adhered to the
will of a slim citizen majority demanding preservation of their city’s identity through
insulation and exclusion. When it became clear by the mid-1980s that efforts to preserve
municipal-level racial homogeneity had failed, the modus operandi the city would become
infamous for received reinforcements. As Ferguson’s black residency nearly doubled from
13 % in 1980 to 25 % by 1990, the suburb’s policies, economic development decisions,
and fiscal behavior adjusted accordingly.500
Planning and zoning strategies exhibited features consistent with efforts to
reinforce, establish, or support isolation and control of particular areas of the city. A failed
1983 attempt to garner voter approval of a municipal court costs hike demonstrated some
early citizen pushback against the direction of city policy. However, by 1985, police and
protective services expenditures accounted for 62 % of Ferguson’s spending, while
transportation and streets received 15% of city dollars; general government and police
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facility debt services got 12 %; and sanitation, parks and recreation represented 11 % of
city spending.501
Ferguson’s failed municipal court costs increase was not surprising. Ferguson
voters rarely approved any type of tax or fee increase. Consider that by the start of the study
period, it was already estimated that around 700,000 cars were traveling the roads in the
St. Louis area. Ferguson officials agreed with the traffic commission’s recommendation to
construct a bridge near a high traffic area where many school children had to cross and
walk along the shoulders of the road as no sidewalks had been installed. However, voters
defeated the bridge measure along with the alternative proposal to enact sidewalk districts
to fund sidewalk installations.502
Ferguson’s civic engagement was extremely high in the 1970s but by the mid1980s, the political environment in Ferguson had changed dramatically. The 1984 election
saw the mayor and three council members all run unopposed. Ferguson voters’ April 1985
disapproval of a half cent utility tax showed Ferguson voters still opposed raising capital
improvement funds through tax increases. However, the narrow margin of 1,188 in favor
to 1,207 opposed indicated Ferguson’s level of voter turnout and preferences had shifted
substantially.503
Narrow elections were common in other study cities throughout the study period.
As few as a single digit number of votes could determine approval or denial of a measure.
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This was especially true on nonmonetary related ballot initiatives or in low civically
engaged cities like Hazelwood. Hazelwood’s April 1996 half cent sales tax for capital
improvements passed by only nine votes and the vote for amending the number of wards
passed by only 15 votes. Narrow tax elections in Ferguson, however, were unheard of until
the mid-1980s.504
Low voter turnout and narrow elections in Ferguson beginning in the mid-1980s
suggest no clear consensus or mandate from citizens. At this point, the slim majority had
lost a great deal of power as it related to influencing policy through voter preferences. The
only way exclusionists could remain the driving force behind municipal government’s
planning, decision-making, and response to the changing environment would be to gain the
majority on the council.
With a lower voter influence in policy, Ferguson officials were more empowered
to enact corrective, stabilization-oriented policies or they could elect to continue expanding
and reinforcing poor, destabilization-oriented policies of the past. Their choices would
have significant impact on the cities’ direction moving forward.505
To refer to Ferguson’s position in the mid-1980s as a mature inner suburb poised
for a resurgence would be inaccurate. Ferguson had not experienced nearly the level of
structural deterioration and economic decline observed in Jennings, Maplewood, and
University City. Further, Ferguson did not have to adapt to the post-fair housing era
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phenomenon of a major influx of blacks accommodated by a mass exodus of whites. In
fact, the city’s identity preservation strategies were so effective, by the start of the 1980s
even as a north county municipality, Ferguson’s black residents represented only four
percentage points more of total population than black Maplewood citizens’ proportion of
that suburb’s population.506
By the mid-1980s, Ferguson was poised to redefine itself, redirect its policy
patterns, and make history. Ferguson would achieve the latter while becoming known
around the world for refusing to pursue the two formers. Ultimately, the mature inner
suburb would be forced to address the two formers by study’s end. Ferguson’s failure to
capitalize on its opportunities dwarfs Jennings’ downtown central business district blunder.
In 1984, Ferguson was ripe with economic diversity, fiscal solvency, and
professional financial wherewithal. The recession was over, and the economy had
rebounded and entered a period of sustained growth. Ferguson business owners
independently reactivated the Ferguson Downtown Business Association and were hoping
to transform the district into a University City Loop-like area. With the right local
leadership and support, they may have pulled it off. The license office relentlessly attracted
visitors from other cities throughout north county to the westside of Ferguson. The suburb
had a rapidly growing, younger, and untapped black consumer base on its eastside. And
the city had a new young lead administrator with ties to Hazelwood.507
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As fate, or more apropos municipal governance’s role in municipal-level
stabilization would have it, Ferguson not only blew the opportunity, but officials proceeded
to make administrative, policy, and economic development decisions which were direct
contradictions to creating a University City Loop-like business district or a University Citylike anything for that matter.
By 1988, the young city manager was out, a new finance director was in, all requests
and proposals for developing an east-west connecting corridor had been definitively
quashed on arrival, and Ferguson officials were putting the finishing touches on the
delineation of two distinctly different Fergusons. Any attempt to calm the over 200 Third
Ward residents attending the May 3, 1988 special public hearing were largely unsuccessful.
Many residents in and around a subdivision designated for an Emerson Electric buyout
were there to voice opposition to the city’s authorization of the project.508
Residents expressed distrust of Emerson and local government accusing the
manufacturer of being a bad neighbor and officials of deceptive tactics lacking
transparency, communication, and consideration of Third Ward residents. The project
included the city leveraging the eminent domain tool to acquire homes identified in the
plan, providing assistance in finding a new home, and paying moving expenses. Officials
assured remaining residents that their property values would go up as a result of the
project.509
However, the following exchange raises serious doubts to that claim as well as
questions regarding the city’s ultimate goal for the project:
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Ferguson Resident: “What about vacant lots? Will the adjacent owners be required
to purchase them?
Ferguson Official: “No one will be required to purchase a vacant lot. It may just sit
empty.”510
While official plans were not included in the archives, transcripts reveal many
residents expressing concerns. For instance, one resident believed, “Emerson wants the
area rezoned into an industrial park.” Another citizen was convinced, “Emerson just wants
more streets through the subdivision for the employees to get out.”511
Consider the Emerson project and the aforementioned Walmart TIF issue ran
practically concurrently (late 1987-1988). These economic development decisions also
paralleled Ferguson’s early era policies. Ferguson has two main parallel north-south
running streets: New/South Florissant on the westside and West Florissant on the eastside.
New/South Florissant is anchored on the north by January-Wabash Park and on the south
by a S.T.E.A.M. academy high school, a space education and simulation center, and a preK learning center. West Florissant is anchored on the north by a Walmart supercenter and
Emerson anchors the south end.
The Ferguson the world was introduced to in 2014 was fashioned four and a-half
decades prior but was solidified beginning in the mid-1980s. Late 1980s and 1990s
Ferguson officials spoke of improving the eastside neighborhoods through an innovative
funding method. Officials expressed “great concern because the residents [were] not
working together.” The following statements by Ferguson officials offer more insight into
perspectives and relationship dynamics of Ferguson lawmakers and eastside residents:
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“The project offers much more than would otherwise be received.”
“The neighborhood does not have to be forgotten and stay the same, but it will not
improve unless the people pull together.”
“This council has learned a lot while working on this project, and I would like to
find a way to turn around the feeling against the city and convince the residents that
we do want to work with them.”512
As detailed in chapter six, although some forms and tactics changed, Ferguson’s
discriminatory treatment of eastside residents did not begin with the entry of black people.
Before there was the 1990s “wrong side of the tracks” and “ghetto slum” monikers, “the
blue-collar part of town” and “poor white trash” were used as distinguishers. Nineties’
Ferguson officials claimed, “There would be no street improvements if it were not for the
TIF.” However, archives reflect disproportionately low infrastructure investment on the
eastside even in the early period.513
Ferguson officials complained the area’s residents were not civically engaged and
did not work together or with the city. While archives do indicate a significant decline in
overall voter turnout, they also show a significant decline in ballot issues for determining
policies during the same period. Additionally, archives reflect public hearing attendance,
number of citizen comments, and petitions remained relatively stable throughout the study
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period. Furthermore, Ferguson’s post-fair housing era local government was not the best
example of cooperation.
The City of Ferguson upheld its strong opposition against any regional collective
efforts, rejected invitations to joint ventures from adjacent neighbors, and other than the
occasional lending of the city’s dogcatcher’s truck to Kinloch and a Municipal League
membership, participated very little in resource sharing. Ferguson’s issues did not begin
when the mature inner suburb deserted its county sales tax pool comrades, or five years
later when the city was forced to adopt a month to month budget.514
The genesis of Ferguson’s challenges will not be found at a point of deteriorated
housing stock. In fact, pre-WWII houses’ proportion of the suburb’s total housing offerings
increased over two percent between 1990 and 2015. A decline in the city’s tax base will
not satisfy an inquiry regarding the suburb’s transformation from a self-sufficient,
economically diversified juggernaut to a city beholden to commercial retail giants as sale
tax revenue dependency more than doubled to account for 57 % of the suburb’s income by
2005.515
Do not be fooled by the transition, however. Despite Ferguson’s questionable
economic development decisions throughout the first half of the study period, and the fiscal
strain experienced in the 1990s, the municipality was economically strong leading up to
study’s end. The city had 134 employees averaging 43 years of age with 12 years of service
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to city. The city's pension plan was over 100 % funded with 95 former city personnel
receiving pensions.516
The last fourth of the study period saw Ferguson secure an intergovernmental
cooperation and development assistance agreement with NorthPark in 2004; accumulate
an unrestricted funds balance as high as 72 % of general revenue in 2011; increase net
assets nearly two percent from 2012 to 2013; generate a seven percent increase in revenue
through the first quarter of 2013 alone; attract a $19 million, three-building corporate
development due to be completed by the beginning of 2016; and had plans to create 100
new jobs— 80 % of which were to be filled by north St. Louis County residents.517
Ferguson’s contemporary officials (2000-2015) exhibited a notable divergence in
many policy patterns demonstrated by their post-fair housing era predecessors (19701999). This cannot be ignored. Their work resulted in some notable improvements
throughout the mature inner suburb. However, contemporaries upheld the one carryover
from the previous era the city could least afford to keep, and the one which would prove to
be the city’s biggest self-inflicted blow to date.
Recall the seven percent boost in the city’s 2013 first quarter income? Consider that
the increase occurred during a period in which the city’s sales tax receipts were down five
percent. Now, consider that the Ferguson Police Department and municipal court registered
a 13 % increase in fines and forfeitures through the first quarter of 2013.518
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Ferguson’s taxation by citation practices did not begin in 2013. Complaints about
problems on Canfield, discriminate treatment of blacks by the Ferguson police, and
Ferguson’s use of various tactics to quarantine black areas did not begin in 2014. More
notable, they did not even begin with Ferguson’s black residents. Every one of these
elements were present at the start of the study period when Ferguson’s black residents
barely accounted for one percent of the suburb’s population.
During those days, the Canfield complaints ignored by local government came from
whites residing in the area. Residents of the blue-collar side of town served as the Ferguson
isolates of the day, while black residents of Kinloch and later Berkeley served as the target
of the city’s harsher quarantine methods. Interviewee F4 shares:
“Ferguson was a sundown town in those days. You could go over there you know,
for certain stuff like work or whatever, but you better not still be in town once that
sun went down. Not if you were black.”519
Ferguson did not have an economic development problem. Ferguson suffered from
its own refusal to end the racial and social caste system which had guided its policy long
before the advent of fair housing. Ferguson’s isolationism and inequitable treatment of
lower income white areas demonstrated the city’s fundamental economic philosophy.
Insert a change in racial composition, and the city’s overall philosophy is fully revealed.
Ferguson allowed antiquated notions of class and race to guide its economic development
decisions and in doing so, the mature inner suburb committed entirely avoidable errors and
forfeited its advantaged position.
Advancement and retrogression in suburbs’ fiscal health were significantly
impacted by local officials’ economic planning, evaluation, toolbox adjustments, and use

519

Excerpt of quote from Interview F4: 05/07/2019, Black / Male / Ex-Law Enforcement Leader.

288

of tools. Some decisions involved levying, raising, and lowering taxes. Others included
increasing and reducing spending, personnel and services, and use of alternative financing
instruments. Whether a city faced a revenue shortfall and mounting debt or a thriving
economic sector and a growing budget surplus, municipal-level stabilization depended a
great deal on municipal governances’ capacity to protect, increase, and diversify a city’s
sources of revenue through economic decision-making.
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Chapter 8. Conclusions
My examination of five mature inner suburbs in St. Louis County found three
stabilized cases, one transitioning case, and one declined case. Consistent with existing
theories of community stabilization, I found mature inner suburbs could achieve
stabilization and remain stable, and I found various internal and external factors impacted
municipal-level stabilization. I also found several key elements which challenge existing
stabilization theories and expand on existing concepts of neighborhood stabilization. I
conclude, the role of municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization is to enact best
practice policy, practices, and programming.
My conclusions do not argue a direct causal relationship between municipal
decisions and municipalities enjoying stability or suffering decline. I do, however, argue
that municipal governances’ policy decisions significantly impacted cities’ stability. While
many other factors affected cities’ racial composition and economic conditions, stabilizing
inner suburbs required good municipal governance as quality policy decisions were a
prerequisite to stability. Further, I found quality policy decisions required additional
support to be effective stabilization tools while poor policy decisions did not require
additional support to negatively impact cities’ stability.
Stabilization literature outlines human capital in the form of talented, inclusive, and
committed leadership as requirements for stabilization. Stabilized cases like University
City and Hazelwood, and Maplewood beginning in the middle period, enjoyed this
resource in local government. However, Jennings demonstrated that the presence of human
capital absent the presence of professional management renders talent, inclusive policies,
and committed leadership largely inconsequential. Ferguson demonstrated that despite
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human capital, talent, committed leadership, and the presence of professional management,
failure to implement inclusive policies in a timely manner can be just as consequential as
the absence of the aforementioned elements.520
By the mid-1970s, Ferguson’s open housing advocates were still advocating for
adoption of anti-discrimination policies, and Maplewood’s low black in-migration was not
enough to divert citizens’ attention from their mission of purging a corrupt city hall. The
timing of policies was important as policy determined cities’ level of preparedness for
dealing with destabilizing events. Nevertheless, while early antidiscrimination housing
policy was necessary, it was only effective when it interacted with other factors such as
professional management and strong resident programs.
Studies posit regional collaboration and community involvement as prerequisites
to sustained stabilization. However, I found these factors are not always necessary for cities
to realize stabilization or to enjoy sustained periods of stability. I found very little in the
way of regional collaboration in the St. Louis region. In fact, Ferguson’s municipal
governance explicitly opposed the notion of regional cooperation, and there remained
minimal civilian participation in boards and community efforts in Hazelwood throughout
the entire study period.521
Hazelwood and University City present an opportunity to contrast the Jennings case
and better understanding the impact of professional administration on stabilization efforts.
All three cities aimed to combat resegregation by enacting open housing policies early,
leveraging city forces to investigate, report, and pursue legal recourse in discrimination

520

Ahlbrandt & Cunningham 1978; Orfield 1981; Lee 1985; Keating, Pammer and Smith 1988; Saltman 1990;
Nyden, Maly and Lukehart 1997; Ferman, Singleton and DeMarco 1998; Kirwin 1999; and Cashin 2004.
521
Orfield 1981; Saltman 1990; Weiher 1991; Kirwin 1999; Orfield 1997; 2002; Fischer et al. 2004;
Swanstrom and Banks 2009; Hendrick 2011.

291

matters, formed and promoted committee participation, and allocated city resources to
support integration groups. However, University City was the only city to enjoy a robust,
civilian-led integration maintenance program in the University City Residential Services.
University City’s citizen engagement was extremely high and municipal
governance effectively leveraged its active citizenry. Officials funded and supported
citizens’ efforts, solicited citizens’ input, valued civilian commissions and boards, and
encouraged participation in city functions and events. Although for different reasons, both
Jennings and Hazelwood struggled to seat full human rights boards and neither city enjoyed
strong and active residential integration programs.
While Hazelwood did not experience the level of black resident influx seen in
Jennings during the early and middle-era, Hazelwood’s latter-era transition rivaled
Jennings’ highest level of transition as the suburb experienced acute transition in a shorter
period of time. Hazelwood’s professional administration better equipped the suburb to
provide ongoing support and supervision of stabilization efforts during the period of rapid
transition. Despite minimal citizen engagement and support for stabilization programs,
Hazelwood’s professional government helped mitigate destabilizing effects of acute
change in the suburb.
Existing theories require proactive municipal governance action to compliment
citizen stabilization efforts. This understanding fails to account for proactive citizen
coalition building and mobilization which transforms municipal government. Maplewood
contradicts the interventionist approach to stabilization. In the Maplewood case,
government and citizen actions were occurring simultaneously, but efforts were in direct
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conflict. Only after citizens were successful in changing the form and composition of local
government were adequate resources dedicated to stabilization projects.522
Scholars have already established that institutional change is not required to
improve municipal governance’s responsiveness to citizens. However, Maplewood,
Ferguson, and Jennings presented variations in municipal governances’ structure and
responsiveness to voter preferences which are important to expanding the understanding
of the role of local government in stabilization. My examination revealed institutional
change significantly improved Maplewood’s capacity to stabilize, and Jennings’
institutional structure limited its municipal government’s stabilization effectiveness.523
For University City, citizen preferences tended to favor best practice policies such
as open housing, antidiscrimination, and integration maintenance policies and officials
enacted these policies. For Jennings, citizen preferences tended to oppose best practice
policies. Despite Jennings’ nonprofessional governance, officials usually elected best
practice policies anyway.
Ferguson’s slim majority tended to oppose best practice policy in favor of avoiding
integration. Ferguson’s council majority favored best practice policy but repeatedly elected
to vote consistent with the preferences of the slim majority. Despite the council’s expressed
belief that certain policies and failure to enact certain policies were not in the best interest
of the city, Ferguson officials elected to honor the preferences of the slim majority.
Maplewood’s renaissance can be traced as far back as the citizen’s mid-1970s
purging of city hall. Maplewood citizens mobilized and demanded a new form, more
accountable, and responsive government. Citizen leaders collaborated to ensure their local
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institutions remained functional and impactful. While city officials and administrators are
lauded for Maplewood’s resurgence and rightfully so, it was the well-organized efforts of
the suburb’s citizens which thwarted destabilization threats, refashioned Maplewood’s
identity, and set the city on the path to becoming the mature inner suburb we see today.
While Maplewood citizens’ efforts resulted in increased responsiveness to citizens
and improved the quality of the city’s policy decisions, Ferguson’s responsiveness to
citizens negatively impacted its municipal government’s quality of policy decisions.
Jennings’ low responsiveness to citizens’ preferences resulted in best practice policies.
However, Jennings did not possess the capacity needed to ensure actions complemented
policies. Unlike Ferguson, Jennings did not institute policies counter to best practice. Best
practice policy selection did little to affect stabilization, however. Unlike Maplewood,
Jennings did not address the city’s capacity deficit created by its institutional structure.
Research indicates architectural and locational features significantly impact
stabilization. University City benefitted a great deal from its mixed housing stock and its
proximity to the central city and Washington University. Consequentially, the suburb
attracted highly educated, civically engaged, and socially conscious professionals. Citizens
organized groups, participated in various associations and projects, mobilized, and
executed campaigns for a range of issues.524
While University City’s architectural and locational features provided the suburb
advantages, the benefits of these advantages were often offset by costs. For example,
University City’s proximity to St. Louis city and Washington University increased its
attractiveness and resource richness. However, challenges to stabilization were also
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significantly increased as certain areas bordered declined neighborhoods and the
university’s buying of buildings removed properties from the city’s tax rolls and increased
the city’s fiscal strain.
North county suburbs were surrounded by ever-present reminders of the
resegregation and economic decline that can happen in previously burgeoning
municipalities. Early implementation of policies and establishment of programs helped
cities prepare, but stabilization depended on cities’ capacity to effectively mitigate
disparities, deterioration, population decline, fiscal challenges, and polarization. Many
north county suburbs lacked the capacity of a University City to stabilize.
It is also important to note that cities’ location impacted the timing of racial
transition. As a consequence of their locations, University City and Jennings’ experienced
in-migration of blacks before the other study cities, and Maplewood was last to experience
a notable influx of blacks because of that suburb’s location. Further, location affected the
amount of black in-migration into cities. North county suburbs experienced more inmigration of blacks because of their proximity to north St. Louis city. This made Jennings
especially prone to tipping and Maplewood much less prone to tipping.
Timing of transition impacted city’s economic conditions as new black
suburbanites’ socioeconomic strata changed over time. Early period transitions involved
in-migration of middle and upper-class blacks buying homes while middle-era new black
suburbanites tended to be lower-income and subsidized renters. This is best demonstrated
in the cases of Ferguson and Maplewood. Both municipalities experienced low early-era
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transition. These suburbs’ middle-era black population increases exhibited influxes of
more low-income black renters than homeowners.525
Traditional understanding of invasion and succession points to new inhabitants
taking over an area, but Jennings offers an opportunity to expand on the theory of invasion
and succession. As Jennings’ residents aged and cycled out of single-family residences,
local government authorized more apartment developments to accommodate and retain its
senior population and homeownership was often transferred within families. This
discovery helps us better understand Jennings’ municipal government’s role in the
proliferation of rental units and the city’s overall housing stock composition.526
Municipal governance played a significant role in housing stock preservation and
composition but increases in renter occupied dwellings and aged housing stock did not
automatically equate to decline. University City exhibited economic and racial balance
despite proliferations in rentals. Although the city’s mixed housing stock provided the
suburb an advantage, policy decisions still demonstrated intentional efforts to mitigate the
destabilizing effects of concentrating low-income and subsidized rentals.
When dilapidated HUD properties threatened to accelerate blight in University
City, officials leveraged the city’s professional capacity to halt and reverse the trend. After
Jennings’ collegial attempts to collaborate with HUD were largely ignored, city leaders
from both suburbs collaborated to openly promote plans to file suit against the federal
agency. However, when HUD amended its practices, the presence of an LCRA better
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equipped University City to address the problems of derelict HUD properties while
Jennings lacked the tool.
University City was largely successful in staving off neighborhood decline because
the LCRA helped empower the city to better preserve the municipality’s housing stock.
However, University City’s rehabilitating of derelict buildings, new construction, and
redevelopment of blighted areas were only part of the city’s effective housing stock
preservation system. With aggressive enforcement of stringent building codes and
occupancy regulations, innovative strategies such as the home rehabilitation loan, adjacent
lots abatement, and rental housing registration programs, the city effectively fought off
deterioration in its neighborhoods.
University City was not the only study city to leverage these tools. What was unique
about University City’s use of tools, however, was University City explicitly leveraged
tools to encourage affordable housing throughout the city and prevent concentrations of
government-assisted residents. Officials creatively utilized low-income programs like
Section 8 and CDBG funds, advocated for low-income renters, and limited luxury
apartment developments and conversions.
Research has established that housing segregation is not required for cities’ to
experience school segregation as black-white school segregation is often present in
integrated municipalities— particularly at the high school level. Further, studies have
pointed to segregated schools as a precursor to economic decline and assert city-school
collaboration as necessary for the effective promotion of stably integrated locales and
attractive schools. However, contiguous and noncontiguous school district boundary
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differences confound application of these concepts and high-performing segregated
schools and noncollaborative revitalization efforts run counter to these claims.527
University City schools have been mostly segregated since the 1980s, yet the
suburb remains stable and the school district continuously outperforms other districts of
comparable size and racial demographics. While the city has enjoyed periods of high-level
collaboration with the local school district, the city has also experienced sustained periods
of adversarial relations dynamics between city and school district officials. This is also true
in Maplewood. Maplewood’s renaissance involved two separate, noncollaborative efforts
on the part of city and school officials. Although each entity’s work helped the other’s
efforts, collaboration ensued only after both the city and school district had revitalized its
respective institutions.
Through various collaborative efforts with school districts, regional forums,
marketing campaigns, and programs, north county suburbs worked to counter image
defamation, struggling schools, and discriminatory treatment from various agencies and
industries. These factors undoubtedly affected overall conditions as the north county
experience included all the destabilizing elements which made neighborhoods undesirable.
Economic development strategies served as an important determinant in suburbs’
fiscal condition over the study period. Some suburbs concentrated their income
dependence, some creatively achieved an economically diversified mix of revenue streams,
and others wavered between identities. Regardless of position, however, each suburb
navigated multiple threats that impacted their city’s fiscal conditions throughout the study
period. Suburbs’ response to events like fluctuations in the economy, discrepancies in

527

Wilson and Taeuber 1978; Farley 1984; 1987; Massey and Denton 1993; Orfield and Eaton 1996; Orfield
1997; Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 1999; Fischer et al. 2004; Orfield and Lee 2007; and Nelsen 2015.

298

projections versus actuals, flooding, equipment failure, and an uprising highlighted cities’
level of preparedness and economic philosophy.
Through the use of economic tools like TIF, tax abatement, tax credits, low-interest
financing, special business district taxing, neighborhood improvement, and transportation
improvement taxes, municipal government occupied a significant role in shaping the
landscape, function, and feel of inner suburbs. Some of these decisions were advised by inhouse professional CPAs and city finance departments as a continuance of a developed
strategy for maintaining financial solvency. Others lacked in-house financial advisement,
investment strategies, and best practice regulatory conformance.
Financial crises in the study cities caused spending on community enrichment
programs to wane as policymakers and program supporters found it difficult to justify these
types of expenditures regardless of programs’ target populations. Some provisions
considered imperative in strong economic times became expendable when cities
experienced fiscal stress. Consequently, cities struggled to develop effective strategies and
programs that endured. However, professional cities tended to continue providing certain
services despite periods of fiscal strain.
Despite advantages and challenges, Hazelwood and University City’s policies and
spending remained aimed at preventing areas of concentrated poor people. Hazelwood,
Maplewood, and University City invested substantial resources in parks, recreation, public
spaces, cultural attractions, infrastructure improvements, and pedestrian-friendly
enhancements like bike lanes and bus shelters. Jennings made early investments in
communal improvements, but early fiscal stress hampered efforts.
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Ferguson offers the most compelling case in my study of the role of municipal
governance in stabilizing mature inner suburbs. As inevitable changes in racial
demographics were occurring in the 1960s and 1970s, Ferguson possessed the professional
capacity required to prepare for destabilizing effects of transition and to support and
manage integration programs. Nevertheless, officials elected not to proactively enact best
practice policy or support integration programs.
Instead of implementing zoning and land use strategies which dispersed lowincome rentals throughout the municipality, Ferguson’s policies concentrated low income
apartment complexes on the city’s eastside. Investment in neighborhoods and quality of
service delivery favored the city’s wealthier westside at the expense of the city’s eastside
citizens, housing stock, and infrastructure. Ferguson’s policy decisions eliminated and
decreased desirability of certain residential areas by concentrating commercial and
industrial businesses nearby, and the suburb did not start investing significant funds in the
development of mixed-use, walkable environments until the 2000s.
While municipal-level stabilization is fairly easy to observe, the stabilizing process
is an extremely complex phenomenon. Capturing every dynamic involved in the process is
impossible. Nevertheless, examinations have provided a roadmap for better understanding
elements which are essential to stabilization. We know municipal governance occupies a
central role in stabilization. However, even in the best-case scenario, municipal governance
alone cannot achieve stabilization and factors outside municipal governance authority limit
what the body can do in pursuit of stabilization.
Except for early policy intervention, Ferguson possessed all the prerequisites for
stabilization. Jennings possessed early policy intervention but lacked critical prerequisites
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such as professional governance. Hazelwood and University City possessed both
prerequisites, and Maplewood adopted the prerequisite most relevant to its challenges.
While there are many other factors to consider, I submit that these decisions had substantial
impact on the respective positions of the suburbs by the end of the study period.
Despite its fiscal soundness, sustained desirability, and professional leadership,
Ferguson was a transitioning case as early as 2010. Ferguson expands our understanding
of the role of municipal governance in stabilizing mature inner suburbs as it provides an
example of the effectiveness of rejecting best practice policies independent of additional
support. I conclude stabilization in open housing suburbs requires good municipal
governance and outside support, but municipal governance needs no additional support in
compromising municipal-level stabilization through poor policy decisions and
nondecisions.
Recommendations for Future Research
Contextualizing 1960s Population and Crime Surge in Studies of Suburban
Integration
Black suburbanization alone did not induce the palpable fear observed in suburbia
in the 1970s, nor was black suburbanization the principal phenomenon challenging
suburban idealism. The 1960s illuminated cities’ lack of capacity to handle dynamic
societal changes and like metro cities, inner suburbs entered the 1970s with looming
doubts. The country had changed dramatically in one generation since the post-WWII
explosion in suburban incorporations. New Americans were being added to the population
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at rates never before seen in the history of the country and by the late 1960s, the first few
cohorts of baby boomers were 20 somethings with something to say.528
While the exponential increases in population could account for most increases in
measurable categories including crime, by 1960, the rate of increase in violent crimes
began to grow at a disproportionately faster rate than the rate of population growth.
Between 1960 and 1970, violent crime increased by 126 % in the United States, and violent
crimes attributed to the social, political, and cultural revolutions could only explain a small
percentage of the increase.529
The era saw the formation and expansion of countless civic groups working to
change a wide range of conditions, laws, and minds. Efforts resulted in important historical
achievements of which civil rights and fair housing rank among the most notable. Some
groups remained active in the post-civil rights era fighting to realize the terms outlined in
the legal victories of the 1960s. Citizen collectives known as integration maintenance
groups occupied a crucial role in municipal-level stabilization by working to prevent
resegregation in suburbs.
Much has been written about the work of suburban integration and integration
groups. Studies frame successful stabilization in the context of the black suburbanization
period. I posit, to better understand neighborhood and municipal-level stabilization in inner
suburbs, and to better design revitalization programs for destabilized communities require
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See US Census Current Population Reports Population Estimates and Projections: P25-1141; Colby, S. L.,
and J. M. Ortman. (2014). “The Baby Boom Cohort in the United States: 2012 to 2060.” Issued May 2014;
and FBI UCS Annual Crime Reports. Note: The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program is produced from
data received from law enforcement agencies voluntarily participating in the program.
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According to Eisen, L. B. “America's Faulty Perception of Crime Rates: America's crime rates are at their
lowest point in decades. So why do so many Americans think crime is going up?” March 16, 2015.
brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis.
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research which contextualizes post-fair housing era municipal-level stabilization with the
unprecedented pre-fair housing era surge in population and violent crime.
Best Practice vs. Citizen Preference
Conventional wisdom posits cities benefit from having civically engaged citizenry.
Studies indicate citizens play a critical role in determining what is best for the city.
According to some scholarship, cities’ sustainability is connected to local governments’
level of responsiveness to citizens’ preferences and warns local government must “never
forget that you always govern for people.” However, I found, for the sake of exhibiting
local government responsiveness to citizen majorities, local government may elect poor
policy over best practice to the detriment of the city.530
Study cities with highly engaged citizenry were especially prone to citizen
preference-based policymaking. This is traditionally encouraged and can be helpful for
cities’ growth and fiscal health as engaged electorates can provide capacity building
assistance and expertise by way of boards and other civic service activities.
Notwithstanding, politically savvy, well-organized citizen groups may possess preferences
which are contradictory to best practice. When personal perceptions are galvanized into
group efforts, opposition to best practice policy can be effective.
When discontent provokes mobilization, disparagement, and sabotage instead of
problem solving, polarization and gridlock occur. Consequentially, either poor policy
selection or stagnation is the result. I found the relationship between citizen preferences
and municipal governances’ level of responsiveness to citizen preferences significantly
impact the role of municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization. I conclude, in
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See Sanchez-Teba, E. M., and G. J. Bermúdez-González. (2019). “Are Smart-City Projects CitizenCentered?” Department of Economics and Business Administration: University of Malaga.
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cases in which municipal governance elected not to apply best practice stabilization policy,
decisions were a result of dedicated adherence to the preferences of a citizen majority at
the expense of best practice.
University City was not the only inner suburb to anticipate that discriminatory
housing practices like blockbusting, steering, and inequitable lending would accompany
black suburbanization and; the suburb’s path to open housing was not without robust
citizen opposition. However, the city was one the few suburbs to proactively prepare.
Ferguson was also home to a substantial population of civically engaged citizens from
which lawmakers could select for committee assignments, but whose conflicting views
made policy making tantamount to an allegorical civil war over the issue of integration.
By the mid-1980s, University City still enjoyed robust civic engagement while
Ferguson began to experience a significant decline in civic engagement. Although
University City’s citizen engagement had declined, the decline was much less notable than
Ferguson’s. I posit, the significant decline in Ferguson’s civic engagement was due to the
lack of economic mix in black in-migration as poorer black residents were less likely to
vote, run for office, and incorporate politically.
Future research should investigate civic engagement levels of early era, middle era,
and contemporary black suburbanites and compare engagement levels and policy
preferences with municipal governments’ policy choices. One goal of such research would
be to see if eras reflect notable differences and if so, determine if and how these differences
impacted local governments’ policymaking processes, decisions, and use of best practice
policy. I hypothesize, black civic engagement and black voter preferences’ policy impact
decline the later black in-migration begins in a suburb in the early and middle eras.
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Figure 1. Municipalities w/10,000 population 1970-2015.
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Figure 2. Black population shifts - Municipalities w/10,000 population 1970-2015.
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Figure 3. Regional Percent Black Shift Since 1970 / North County Concentration.
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Figure 4. Bellefontaine Neighbors Percent Black Trajectory 1970-2015.

Figure 5. Jennings Percent Black Trajectory 1970-2015.
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Figure 6. Hazelwood Percent Black Trajectory1970-2015.

Figure 7. Florissant Percent Black Trajectory1970-2015.
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Figure 8. Black population shifts 1970-2015.
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Figure 9. Black population shifts 1970-2015.
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Figure 10. Black population shifts

1970-2015

Figure 11. Black population shifts
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Figure 12. University City’s black pop. in 1970 was much higher than other suburbs.
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Figure 13. University City 1970-1980

Figure 14. Jennings 1970-180
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Figure 15. University City’s black population trajectory 1970-1980.

Figure 16. Jennings’ black population trajectory 1970-1980.
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Figure 17. Point at which Jennings and University City black population rate intersect.
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Figure 42.

Hazelwood

Florissant

343

Figure 43.
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Appendix A. Consent Form
Participant Consent: Interview for Research
Dear, Community Stakeholder;
My name is xxxx xxxx. I am a xxx at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. I am conducting
research on the role of municipal governance in achieving and maintaining municipal-level
stabilization in mature inner-ring suburbs. I am writing you to request your participation as
an interviewee in my study. You will remain completely anonymous, but your insight may
prove invaluable to the findings.
This study is of great importance as inner-ring suburban communities are grappling with
challenges historically believed to be reserved for disinvested portions of the inner-city.
Suburban revitalization and stabilization require unique approaches to examining issues,
identifying solutions, and implementing initiatives. Studies show that municipal
governance can impact conditions in municipalities in a variety of ways. My goal is to
better understand the relationship between the dynamic factors that impact municipal
governance and the effects of municipal governance on municipal-level revitalization and
stabilization of older inner-ring suburbs. Moreover, I aim to strengthen community
stakeholder capacity to achieve community stability by contributing information that
expands our knowledge of policy-making effects on suburban transitions.
Participation in this research is free and voluntary. You may withdraw from the interview
at any time or refuse to answer any question. There is no risk of harm to participants. This
study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board protocol number: 1096007-4.
You may request a summary of the findings. You may also request to have any part of your
submission eliminated from the study. All raw data will be destroyed at the end of the
study.
If you consent to participate, I will schedule a confidential interview to be conducted via
the most convenient method for you (e.g. phone, video chat, in-person). With your consent,
the interview may be audio taped. You will be assigned a number to maintain
confidentiality. The information obtained in the interview will be coded for analysis and
will be kept in a secure location. Only I and my faculty supervisor, xxxx xxxx will have
access to the data. Every possible measure will be taken to ensure your anonymity. I invite
you to be as blunt and candid as you wish to be. Your participation is greatly appreciated.
You are contributing to important work.
Sincerely,
xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx
University of Missouri-St. Louis
xxxx@xxxxx.edu
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I _______________________, agree to participate as an interviewee in the research of
municipal governance in mature inner-ring suburbs conducted by xxxx xxxx, xxx at the
University of Missouri-St, Louis. I understand the purpose of the study is to collect and
analyze data related to experiences and conditions in St. Louis County municipalities to be
formulated into policy and community stakeholder recommendations.
I understand my participation is completely voluntary. I may withdraw from the interview
at any time and I may refuse to answer any question without penalty. I understand that the
interview may last one and one-half hour. I understand that the interview will be audio
taped unless I request it not be. I understand that the recorded audio will be transcribed and
stored in a secure location until the completion of the study, at which time the transcription
will be destroyed. I understand that questions and concerns regarding the study are to be
directed to:
xxxx xxxx
xxxx – Political Science
University of Missouri-St. Louis
(xxx) xxx-xxxx
xxxx@xxxxx.edu

I have read the information above. I agree to participate as an interviewee in this research.
Please, place an X in the spaces below that correspond with your preferences.
I consent ____ I do not consent ____ to have my responses recorded to audio.
I consent ____ I do not consent ____ to being quoted in the report.

______________________________
Participant signature

__________________________
Date

*This project has been reviewed and approved for human subjects research by the
University of Missouri-St. Louis Institutional Review Board protocol number: 096007-4
in accordance with the National Research Act (PL 93-348) implemented by Federal
Regulations (45 CFR 46). Should you have any questions concerning your rights as a
participant you can forward them to:
Office of Research Administration
341 Woods Hall
One University Blvd.
St. Louis, MO 63121
(314) 516-5899
Fax: (314) 516-6759
ora@umsl.edu
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Appendix B. Interview Questions
Note: You are not expected to have insight into every topic. Open-ended questions will be
asked based on relevancy and your connection to the municipality (e.g. resident, official,
business owner). Below are some example questions I will utilize to help guide the
interview:

1. Tell me about yourself, your connection to the municipality.

2. What were the municipality’s characteristics when you arrived (e.g. economics, racial,
housing)?

3. What characteristics changed, when did these occur, what do you think caused them,
and how did the community respond?

4. What is your impression of local government and civic engagement?

5. Do you have any suggestions for community improvement?
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Appendix C. Guiding Questions for Data Collection
Role of Municipal Governance in Stabilizing Mature Inner Suburbs:
A Study of Five St. Louis County Municipalities
1970-2015

Stabilization Efforts
Guiding Questions
Municipal Governance
1.) Policy Decisions:
a. Did the municipality employ integration maintenance practices (i.e.
point of sale inspections, forbidding For Sale signs, door-to-door
solicitations, affirmative marketing to whites?
b. Did the municipality pass a fair housing ordinance?
c. Did the municipality rezone land to exclude rental housing?
d. Did the municipality participate in federal affordable housing
programs (i.e. CDBG, Section 8, LIHTC, etc.)?
2.) Policing and Code Enforcement:
a. Did the municipality have its own police department, or did it contract
out?
b. Did the municipality have programs to specifically recruit black police
officers?
c. Did the municipality have any civilian review boards?
d. Did the municipality have separate property maintenance and existing
building codes?
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e. Did the municipality out-source its code enforcement, share officers
with other municipalities, or contract with the county?
3.) Engagement, Support, and Timing:
a.

Did the municipality engage residents, solicit resident input on issues,
and include residents in decisions?

b. Did the municipality appoint and hire black administrators and
employees?
c. Did the municipality establish, support, provide resources, and/or fund
civic associations working to improve race relations?
d. Did the municipality implement municipal-level stabilization strategies
prior to exceeding 20 % black population?
4.) Environmental and Infrastructure Investment:
a. Did the municipality invest significant funds in mixed-use pedestrian
friendly developments (i.e. parks, public spaces, recreation centers)?
b. Did the municipality initiate, support, and/or fund land reutilization,
beautification, and revitalization programs?
5.) Financial Practices:
a.

Did the municipality employ taxation-by-citation practices relying
heavily on traffic fines and court fees to generate revenue?

b. Did the municipality employ a professional CPA or contract with an
accounting firm?
c. Did the municipality participate in the county sales tax pool or did it
elect to be point-of-sale?
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d. Did the municipality apply for and secure grants (for training,
equipment, etc.)?
e. Did the municipality use TIF and/or other tax breaks to attract
businesses?
Community Groups
1.) Did a community-led stabilization effort occur?
2.) When and in what way did stabilization efforts begin?
3.) What groups were involved in the stabilization movement?
a. How was the group formed, structured, staffed, and funded?
b. What was the composition of the group (e.g. race, age, profession,
residency)?
c. What was the group’s goal and what activities did the group engage in?
d. How did the group promote its efforts (e.g. brochure, media,
newsletter)?
d. Did the group form coalitions and if so, with whom?
e. What was the group’s impact on stabilization in the community?
f. Does the group still exist and if not, when and why did it dissolve?

